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Technical Report 74

December 1961

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## A Survey of Problems in the Tactical Training of Armor Units (U) s (U)

by

Robert A. Baker

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**U.S. Army Armor Human Research Unit** **search Unit**  
**Fort Knox, Kentucky**

Under the Technical Supervision of

**The George Washington University**  
**HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH OFFICE**  
operating under contract with  
**THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Office of the Chief of Research and Development  
Army Research Office  
Washington 25, - C.

CRD/J


SUBJECT: A Survey of Problems in the Tactical Training of Armor Units

TO: COMMANDER  
ARMED SERV TECH INF AGENCY  
ARLINGTON HALL STATION  
ARLINGTON 12 VIRGINIA  
ATTN TPCR

1. The attached report is for your information and retention.
2. The report summarizes opinions of personnel assigned to armor units. It points up problems in training and equipment which affect combat effectiveness. Data is a result of questionnaires completed by personnel while on the job.
3. It is to be noted that a great deal of this information was collected during 1958 and 1959. Some statements, therefore, might not wholly apply at the present time due to changes in training methods, equipment and facilities. On the other hand, it is felt that cognizance of the potentiality of problems noted herein will serve as a valuable aid to the commander when assessing the combat readiness of his organization.

FOR THE CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:

1 Incl  
as

  
GEORGE J. BAYERLE, JR.  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Human Factors Research Div

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## A SURVEY OF PROBLEMS IN THE TACTICAL TRAINING OF ARMOR UNITS (U)

by

Robert A. Baker

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Technical Report 74  
December 1961

Task UNIT I

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## COMPOSITION OF THE RESEARCH TEAM

The members of the research team who conducted the research reported here were: Dr. Robert A. Baker, Task Leader, Lt. Col. John G. Cook, USA (Ret), Mr. Eugene G. Roach, Mr. Shepard Schwartz, and Mr. J. Roger Ware.

Dr. Howard H. McFann was Director of Research and Lt. Col. William L. Boylston was Chief at the U.S. Army Armor Human Research Unit during the planning of the research and during the early stages of data collection. They were succeeded by Dr. Norman Willard, Jr. who was Director of Research and Lt. Col. Edwin W. Reynolds who was Chief of the Unit at the time the report of the research was reviewed. Lt. Col. Reynolds has since been succeeded by Lt. Col. G.H. Spires, Jr. as Chief at the Armor Human Research Unit.

"In dire emergency, it is conceivable that a division could be deemed combat-deployable today without having undergone field maneuvers and after completing only 26 weeks of training. But God forbid, for battle records show that the combat effectiveness of such prematurely deployed units is low and the price of their commitment is very high. Because of the gravity of the situation in July 1950, for example, two battalions of the 29th Infantry were committed without having completed the advanced unit and field maneuver phases of their training cycle. Despite the fact that their officers and men were as experienced *individually* as those of other Regular Army units, the two battalions suffered extremely heavy casualties and were undeployable after only three brief engagements with lightly armed but fully trained North Korean units. . . ."

Lead Time For Combat Readiness  
ATTNG-SCH 370.2/34 (31 July 1958)  
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES  
CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND

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## **SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **(U) MILITARY PROBLEM**

The significant role of armor on either the nuclear or the conventional battlefield requires that U.S. Armor units maintain high levels of quality and quantity in tactical training. Yet each Armor commander who is responsible for conducting this training is faced with many difficulties. Some problems are well known, and he encounters them daily; other difficulties not yet generally recognized might become critical in the event of mobilization. Moreover, more effective solutions to present problems and better means of improving tactical training must always be sought.

Aware of the need for more information on these problem areas, United States Continental Army Command (USCONARC) established a research requirement for the evaluation and improvement of armor tactical training. The present study, a survey of military opinion and experience with regard to general and specific aspects of tactical training of armor units, constitutes the first step in the research. Subsequent phases of Task UNIT research are being concentrated on increasing the tactical proficiency of the tank platoon, as the basic fighting group in the Armor combat organization.

### **(U) RESEARCH PROBLEM**

Objectives of this study were to obtain military judgments as to armor tactical training requirements necessary to ensure combat proficiency, and to identify the difficulties that are preventing the attainment of maximum training effectiveness. It was thought that an Army-wide survey of training problems and of the materiel and personnel resources that are available would (1) lead to a more precise definition of the requirements for training the tank platoon, (2) show the steps necessary for improving the quality and increasing the amount of tactical training, and (3) furnish information about tactical training that would be useful in mobilization planning.

### **(U) PROCEDURES**

After a survey of the armor literature, a list of 71 questions was constructed for use in interviewing battalion commanders with armor training responsibilities. The list contained questions on eight general problem areas: armor unit training practices, procedures, and problems; platoon leader training requirements; tank commander training requirements; tank crew training requirements; the training programs for Armor; Army training tests, maneuvers, and tactical exercises; tactical and mobilization training requirements; new equipment, materiel, and tactics.

All tank units organic to armored and infantry divisions, armor groups, and armored cavalry regiments except three battalions in the Pacific Theater, four in the Continental United States (CONUS), and one on duty in Lebanon were included in the survey. Using the list of questions as a basis for the interview discussion, research personnel tape-recorded interviews with 40 battalion commanders (or designated representative) from 38 armor units in Europe and the United States (August 1958 through March 1959). Of the

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## SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Armor units surveyed, 22 were units of the Seventh United States Army in Germany, in combat-ready status, and 16 were CONUS units in various stages of training.

### FINDINGS

Among the facts and opinions disclosed by the survey of military commanders, in each of the eight problem areas, were the following:

- (1) *Armor Unit Training Practices, Procedures, and Problems*
  - (U) (a) In most armor units with an armor training mission, the training mission is often overshadowed by nontraining missions.
  - (U) (b) Inclusion of mandatory noncombat subjects in unit training programs interferes to some extent with completion of tactical training.
  - (U) (c) Priorities are not clearly established by higher headquarters for the duties, assignments, and training activities of the units. The tactical training mission is therefore frequently delayed or interrupted, and combat proficiency is adversely affected.
  - (C) (d) Of the 40 commanders interviewed, 75 per cent said their units were not combat ready. In the 22 units in combat-ready status (Seventh Army), over 60 per cent of the commanders said they were not combat ready. Additional personnel or the availability of assigned personnel, tactical training, and gunnery training were most frequently cited as the elements needed before combat readiness could be achieved.
  - (U) (e) Almost all the Seventh Army units surveyed were short of platoon leaders. High personnel turnover creates additional training hardships.
- (2) *Platoon Leader Training Requirements.* Most of the commanders said that platoon leader replacements have not been adequately trained before joining the units, and stressed the fact that junior officers need more tactical and field experience.
- (3) *Tank Commander Training Requirements.* Although one third of the commanders regarded their tank commanders and platoon sergeants as fully trained and combat ready, two thirds said they had too many inexperienced NCO's, or NCO's transferred from other Army branches without any training in armor.
- (4) *Tank Crew Training Requirements*
  - (U) (a) Eighty-nine per cent of the 40 commanders favored an increase in the amount of formal crew training, and many suggested greater use of tank crew proficiency exercises as the primary training technique.
  - (C) (b) Of the 23 Seventh Army commanders, 65 per cent said their crews were not well trained or combat ready; more than half of the 17 CONUS commanders said the same thing. Moreover, of the 14 commanders who had received crew replacements within the last year, almost 60 per cent said they were not satisfied with the previous training of these men. Unsatisfactory levels of tank knowledge and of gunnery proficiency were the deficiencies most frequently cited.
- (5) *The Training Programs for Armor*
  - (U) (a) One fourth of the commanders expressed dissatisfaction with the training programs and said that major improvements are needed. The recommendations included increasing field training, platoon level exercises, and gunnery training.

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## SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(b) All the commanders interviewed in the five armored cavalry regiments emphasized the need for increasing and formalizing the training of officers and NCO's in reconnaissance operations.

(U) (6) *Army Training Tests, Maneuvers, and Tactical Exercises*

(a) Ninety per cent of the commanders said there are not enough tactical exercises or maneuvers to train personnel adequately.

(c) Many commanders said that present Army training tests are not adequate for their needs, and recommended major revisions—especially with regard to administration, scoring, and evaluation. Most frequently cited were three defects: The tests do not (1) truly evaluate combat-readiness status, (2) truly evaluate the efficiency and proficiency of the commanders, and (3) furnish the information on which specific improvements would have to be based.

(U) (7) *Mobilization Training.* Some commanders expressed concern, in the event of mobilization, about (a) training of armor specialists and maintenance personnel, (b) an adequate supply of trained NCO's and officers, and (c) availability of training areas and gunnery ranges.

(U) (8) *New Equipment, Materiel, and Tactics*

(a) Virtually all the commanders said that technical and mechanical aids on the existing tanks are being overemphasized.

(b) Among tactical weaknesses cited by some commanders were (1) platoon, company, and battalion movements, (2) combat tactics, (3) night operations, and (4) terrain appreciation.

## (U) CONCLUSIONS

Results of the survey indicate a need for increasing the amount of armor tactical training and improving its quality. These results in general confirm the military opinion (which led to this study) that armor tactical training was in need of improvement.

In specific problem areas the survey also confirms, as military training authorities had expected, that armor units find it very difficult to increase and improve tactical training because of shortages of training areas and gunnery ranges, personnel problems, and conflicting missions. Since increase of acreage and personnel and reduction in the number of assigned missions would present complex problems, particular attention needs to be given to the fullest possible development of all other means of achieving tactical proficiency.

From the many suggestions made by various commanders interviewed for improvement of unit training, the following are among those that appear to merit particular consideration by Armor training and/or operational personnel:

(1) *Armor Unit Training Practices, Procedures, and Problems*

(a) Reduce the number of nonessential subjects imposed on the units, and decrease activities not related to combat.

(b) Establish clear and firm priorities for each mission in relation to the other missions assigned to the unit, with the greatest emphasis on those that assist in achieving combat proficiency.

## SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### (2) *Platoon Leader Training Requirements*

(a) Revise the training of platoon leaders to include more field training, both at the Armor School and in the unit; and emphasize specific job knowledge and practical work at the platoon level.

(b) Increase the amount of officer training on the individual tank and in the individual tank crew jobs, both at the Armor School and in the unit. As the platoon leader population consists largely of reserve (rather than career) officers, it is suggested that such a job-oriented approach would not only better equip such officers for present duty with a line unit, but also better prepare them to resume duties in the event of mobilization.

(3) *Tank Commander Training Requirements.* Increase the quantity and improve the quality of Armor NCO training, particularly for tank commanders. NCO's transferred to Armor from other Army branches, in the attempt to solve the present and growing shortage of NCO's in Armor, should not be assigned to armor units before being trained in armor skills.

(4) *Tank Crew Training Requirements.* Increase the amount of formal tank crew training and platoon field-training exercises for crew members. Establish, wherever it is possible, live-fire and dry-fire proficiency courses as an essential means of increasing crew combat skill. While limitations in area prevent construction of live-fire courses at many posts, most posts can support dry-fire courses.

(5) *The Training Programs for Armor.* For service with armor reconnaissance units, increase and formalize the reconnaissance training of both NCO's and platoon leaders. The job requirements for a reconnaissance platoon or company differ markedly from those for the conventional tank platoon or company. Recognition of this fact has resulted in the recent introduction of a basic officers' reconnaissance course at Seventh Army's Combined Arms Training Center. Training Center personnel and reconnaissance officers have also urged that such training be increased at all levels.

### (6) *Army Training Tests, Maneuvers, and Tactical Exercises*

(a) Increase the number of nonfiring tactical exercises for small units. Even though suitable terrain is at a premium, nonfiring exercises could be conducted at most units in CONUS.

(b) Improve training tests for armor and make them more comprehensive and more objective. Especially needed are improvements in the ways the tests are administered, scored, and used by higher headquarters for evaluative purposes.

(c) In tactical training, increase the number of exercises against aggressor forces and superior numbers. In such exercises, increase the number of incidents simulating those likely to occur in combat, including unexpected casualties, surprise attacks, and the use of mines, and of nuclear and biological weapons—techniques which at present are employed only infrequently and without much realism.

(7) *Mobilization Troop Tests.* Provide a means of obtaining more definitive information about the mobilization capabilities of armor units, by carrying out one or more mobilization troop tests with selected armor units. Such tests could be conducted by selecting CONUS battalions with low deployment priorities, bringing these units up to

## SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

full strength, and administering an accelerated mobilization training program to them. At the end of this accelerated training, the combat readiness of these units should be carefully evaluated by giving them comprehensive and objective tests (as indicated in Par. 6b on p. vi).

### *(8) New Equipment, Materiel, and Tactics*

(a) Develop techniques and devices for simulating combat, in giving tactical training and in teaching tactical concepts and principles.<sup>1</sup> Such simulation techniques, it is pointed out, would be particularly useful to reserve-component units, which are especially restricted by limitations of time, terrain, and equipment.

(b) Train armor units to fight more effectively at night, (e.g., increase the amount and improve the types of night tactical training actually performed at the platoon level); determine the capability of armor units to satisfy current and proposed night operations doctrine.

## **(U) RECOMMENDATION**

It is recommended that personnel with responsibility for Armor unit training and operations consider the opinions and suggestions advanced by field commanders in this survey, in exploring avenues for improving the tactical training of Armor units.

<sup>1</sup>Such work has been done at the Armor Human Research Unit, where a battlefield simulator for platoon level operations has been completed and evaluated.

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**DESCRIPTION  
OF THE RESEARCH**

**A SURVEY OF PROBLEMS IN THE  
TACTICAL TRAINING OF ARMOR UNITS (U)**



(U)

## BACKGROUND

Two major objectives embodied in the present military policy of the United States Army are, first, to prevent the outbreak of war, and second, if that fails, to win any war that may occur. Deterrence is, of course, the primary objective, but it can be effective only if the Army's strength is adequate.<sup>1</sup>

Since World War II, the United States has lagged behind the Soviet Union in producing new armor weapons. The T54, a Russian 100-mm medium gun tank with a Diesel propulsion system, has been in production since 1949 and is superior to our M48 medium tank in both armament and range of operations. A new Russian heavy tank superior to the World War II JS3, and a new Russian amphibious tank have also been developed and are now operational. It is probable that, in field operations, Soviet forces would rely heavily on armor (tanks and self-propelled assault guns).<sup>2</sup>

Though war in Western Europe could be either limited or general, conventional or nuclear, the conventional forces of Seventh Army would be called upon to repel any attack. Armor would undoubtedly be used extensively in such an enemy attack. If United States Armor is to defeat any armored attack, it must do one of four things: (1) outnumber the enemy in tanks and tank crews; (2) outshoot them in terms of accuracy, range, and volume of firepower; (3) outmaneuver them in terms of speed, range, and tactical agility; or (4) outfight them by making maximal use of our existing forces. United States Armor is now outnumbered, both in operational tanks and in trained tank crews. The tanks of the potential enemy are equal or superior to our tanks in firepower, range of operations, and maneuverability. Therefore, under existing conditions of preparedness, to defeat the forces of the potential enemy United States Armor would have to outfight them.

To outfight an enemy it is not enough for our armor units to be well trained and combat ready; they must be superior to the enemy in these respects.<sup>3</sup> Thus, both the quality and quantity of tactical training in TOE Armor units, and the degree of their combat readiness, are of utmost importance.

United States Continental Army Command recently estimated that, with experienced cadres and adequate training facilities, training a fully equipped armored division to the level of tactical proficiency

<sup>1</sup>See References 3 and 8 (Chapter 10) for discussion.

<sup>2</sup>Reference 53. Marshall Zukov recently criticized Russian troop leaders for not moving more aggressively and for not showing more initiative, saying that "Russian armor could be on the English Channel in forty-eight hours in case of war." (Reference 3, p. 193.)

<sup>3</sup>Reference 15.

that will justify the risk of deploying it in combat requires a minimum of seven months—if fillers are trained when they join the division. If fillers are not trained, the period will be at least 10 months.<sup>1</sup> These estimates represent only minimums acceptable in emergency, not desirable minimums to be spent in producing a division that is ready for deployment.

In a division that is ready not merely for deployment but for combat as well, every crewman must be fully trained to respond correctly to the many variables of combat; every crew, platoon, company, and battalion must be ready to oppose the team efforts of enemy units to utmost effect. In World War II, Rommel's panzer divisions clearly demonstrated that excellent training and ample materiel, coupled with effective organization and tactical doctrine, are extremely difficult to defeat.<sup>2</sup>

Tactical training requires considerable time if the armor unit is to attain a satisfactory state of combat readiness. Moreover, many factors seriously hamper the effectiveness of tactical training—for example, recurring shortages in personnel and materiel, rapid turnover of men in key MOS's, and such necessary activities as replacement training and rotation to overseas assignments.

One of the greatest obstacles to attaining combat readiness is the fact that only eight military posts in the United States meet the acreage requirements that are felt to be desirable for training an armored division. Only four—Fort Hood, Tex.; Fort Stewart, Fla.; Camp Irwin, Calif.; Fort Knox, Ky.—are suitable for such training.<sup>3</sup> Of these four, only Fort Hood is considered completely satisfactory for training armor units larger than a battalion. The facilities for armor training at Fort Stewart are limited by swamp land, Camp Irwin has facilities for training only in the desert, and the training at Fort Knox is limited by other missions. Yet, as USCONARC has stressed,

At a time when tactical doctrine is undergoing the most radical change in history, it is imperative that our units be given constant practice in trying new tactics and troop-leading procedures to actual terrain under realistic conditions of time and space. . . . Young officers must be provided with practical field experience if they are to develop the self-reliance, decision-making faculty and tactical know-how necessary to cope with their vast increase in command responsibility. They cannot acquire this troop-leading competence in classrooms or on the drill field of small Army posts. They must be given daily opportunities to work realistically with men, weapons and terrain.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>USCONARC. *Lead Time for Combat Readiness* (ATTNG-SCH 370.2/34), HQ USCONARC, Fort Monro, 31 July 1958. Background information, Headquarters, United States Continental Army Command, for Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker.

<sup>2</sup>Reference 9.

<sup>3</sup>USCONARC, *op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*

Recognizing the problems involved in tactical training for armor, and the need for increasing the deployment capability and combat readiness of the units, USCONARC established a research requirement for the evaluation and improvement of armor tactical training and requested that the U.S. Army Armor Human Research Unit conduct the research. The research will be concentrated upon the training of the basic fighting unit of armor—the tank platoon.<sup>1</sup>

(U)

## OBJECTIVE OF THIS STUDY

As a first step toward improvement of training to make the tank platoon more effective in combat, research personnel at the Armor Unit began by trying to determine the requirements for, and the problems of, tactical training for armor.

To obtain information on present and future needs with regard to training for combat, plans were made for a comprehensive, Army-wide survey of (1) materiel and personnel resources that are available to Armor, (2) the training status of all active Armor TOE units, and (3) present and future training problems of these units. The specific objectives of this survey were to (1) determine the problems of armor tactical training, (2) find ways and means to improve the quality and increase the quantity of tactical training, and (3) obtain additional information on tactical proficiency which would be useful in mobilization planning.

## METHOD

(U) General Approach

First, armor training literature was studied to determine what types of questions would be most appropriate for use in the survey. Included were (1) the field manuals and training circulars that deal with tactical training of the tank company and tank platoon; (2) combat literature that recounts experiences of tank company and tank platoon leaders in World War II and Korea; (3) more recent literature about tank platoon tactics on the nuclear battlefield; and (4) lesson plans and training literature that the Armor School uses to instruct platoon and company officers in tactical principles and procedures. A selected bibliography of the armor literature used is included in this report.

Research personnel then constructed a list of 71 questions for use in interviewing battalion commanders concerning armor unit training activities under their supervision. The questions, some general and some specific in nature, covered eight topics: armor unit training practices, procedures, and problems; platoon leader training requirements; tank commander training requirements; tank crew training requirements;

<sup>1</sup>Work Program for Fiscal Year 1959, Human Resources Research Office, Washington, June 1958.

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the training programs for Armor; Army training tests, maneuvers, and tactical exercises; tactical and mobilization training; new equipment, materiel, and tactics.

The interviews were planned to elicit a maximum amount of information about each training practice or problem and to obtain as many new ideas and suggestions for improvement as possible. Most questions that required a simple yes or no answer were supplemented by specific questions in an attempt to obtain the reasons for the commander's opinions. In addition, as the discussions developed during the interviews further questions were asked as needed to clarify and develop the ideas being expressed by the commander.<sup>1</sup>

The research team visited most of the TOE Armor units in Europe and the United States during the period August 1958 through March 1959 to conduct the survey.<sup>2</sup> Each battalion commander, or his representative, was asked to give as complete an answer as possible to each of the 71 questions. Every interview was recorded on tape to increase the accuracy of the report and to facilitate recording the answers. This procedure also saved interview time, preserved informality, and provided a permanent record. To increase both the validity and reliability of the answers obtained, the anonymity of the commander was guaranteed. Each interview took from two and one half to three hours. Before the interview, each commander was asked to complete an information form covering rank, military background, and experience in armor; he was given a copy of the questionnaire, and had at least 24 hours in which to read the questions and think about the answers he would give in the interview. The research staff believes that such procedures not only increased the amount of information obtained, but also heightened its validity.

## Population and Sampling

- (C) All except six of the tank units organic to armored and infantry divisions, armor groups, and armored cavalry regiments were visited for the survey.<sup>3</sup> The total number of units visited was 40; however, because of operational conflicts, data were not gathered at two of these units.<sup>4</sup> Of the 38 armor units represented in the survey, 22 were combat-ready units of the Seventh U.S. Army in Germany and 16 were

<sup>1</sup>The list of questions which served as the basis for the interviews is shown in Appendix A.

<sup>2</sup>Data also were gathered for a supplementary survey on problems and needs in the training of platoon leaders. Results of this survey are reported in HUMRRO Technical Report 69 *The Determination of Combat Job Requirements for Tank Platoon Leader and Tank Platoon Sergeant*, by Eugene G. Roach and Robert A. Baker, March 1961.

<sup>3</sup>The exceptions were: 2d Med Tk Bn and 3d Med Tk Bn, 40th Armor (Korea); 3d Med Tk Bn, 69th Armor (Hawaii); 1st Med Tk Bn, 34th Armor (Fort Lewis); 2d Med Tk Bn, 69th Armor (Fort Benning); 3d Med Tk Bn, 35th Armor (Lebanon).

<sup>4</sup>1st Bn, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Knox; 3d Bn, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Meade.

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TOE CONUS reserve units which had STRAF designations from Class 1 through Class 8. These units were.

Parent Organization and Battalion	Location
1st Armored Division	
1st Med Tk Bn, 1st Cav	Fort Hood
1st Med Tk Bn, 13th Cav	Fort Hood
2d Armored Division	
1st Med Tk Bn, 66th Armor	Fort Hood
1st Med Tk Bn, 67th Armor	Fort Hood
2d Med Tk Bn, 35th Armor	Fort Hood
2d Med Tk Bn, 37th Armor	Fort Hood
3d Armored Division	
1st Med Tk Bn, 32d Armor	Germany
1st Med Tk Bn, 33d Armor	Germany
2d Med Tk Bn, 1st Cav	Germany
2d Med Tk Bn, 13th Cav	Germany
4th Armored Division	
1st Med Tk Bn, 35th Armor	Germany
1st Med Tk Bn, 37th Armor	Germany
2d Med Tk Bn, 66th Armor	Germany
2d Med Tk Bn, 67th Armor	Germany
2d Armored Cavalry Regiment	
1st Bn	Germany
2d Bn	Germany
3d Bn	Germany
3d Armored Cavalry Regiment	
1st Bn	Fort Meade
2d Bn	Fort Meade
6th Armored Cavalry Regiment	
2d Bn	Fort Knox
3d Bn	Fort Knox
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	
1st Bn	Germany
2d Bn	Germany
3d Bn	Germany
14th Armored Cavalry Regiment	
1st Bn	Germany
2d Bn	Germany
3d Bn	Germany
1st Infantry Division	
1st Med Tk Bn, 69th Armor	Fort Riley
2d Infantry Division	
3d Med Tk Bn, 66th Armor	Fort Benning
3d Infantry Division	
1st Med Tk Bn, 68th Armor	Germany
8th Infantry Division	
2d Med Tk Bn, 68th Armor	Germany

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Parent Organization and Battalion	Location
9th Infantry Division 3d Med Tk Bn, 68th Armor	Fort Carson
24th Infantry Division 3d Med Tk Bn, 34th Armor	Germany
4th Armor Group 3d Med Tk Bn, 37th Armor	Germany
2d Hv Tk Bn, 33d Armor	Germany
AAA & Tank Training Center 3d Med Tk Bn, 32d Armor	Fort Stewart
Armored Combat Training Center 5th Med Tk Bn, 40th Armor	Camp Irwin
3d U.S. Army 4th Med Tk Bn, 68th Armor	Fort Bragg

(U) The battalion commander, or his representative, was interviewed at each of these 38 units. In addition, data were gathered from two officers who had just completed battalion commander assignments and who answered the questions in terms of their recent command experience. Data therefore are presented for 40 commanders, 23 from combat-ready units in Seventh Army and 17 from CONUS units.

(U) Of the 40 officers interviewed, 30 were battalion commanders, 3 were battalion executive officers acting as battalion commanders at the time of the interview, and 7 were tank company commanders designated to represent the battalion commander in answering the survey questions. In the five armored cavalry regiments, the battalion commander was interviewed in 7 of the 13 battalions; in the other 6 battalions, the battalion commander was newly assigned and therefore designated the tank company commander to answer the survey because of his greater familiarity with local tactical training requirements and problems for armor. Twenty-four of the officers interviewed were lieutenant colonels, nine were majors, five were captains, and two were first lieutenants.

(U) All the officers interviewed were Armor officers, and all carried an MOS of 1203, tank unit commander. Of these officers, 17 received their commissions in Officer Candidate School (OCS) during World War II, 15 were commissioned in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), 7 were graduates of the United States Military Academy, and 1 received a battlefield commission during World War II. All had attended one or more courses at the Armor School, 28 were graduates of the Command and General Staff College, and 2 were graduates of the Army War College.

(U) Thirty-four (85 per cent) of the 40 officers had command experience during combat in World War II or Korea, or both; 31 had combat experience commanding an armor unit. Thirty-two had 10 or more years' experience in armor, and only two had less than 5 years' armor experience; the average was 13.7 years. The normal tour of duty for a battalion commander is 18 months or less; 16 of the officers had commanded their battalions or companies for less than 12 months at the time of the interview, 15 for at least 12 months, and 9 for 18 months or more.

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(U) Method of Analysis

When the interview program was completed, transcriptions of the commanders' answers were made directly from the recordings. Insofar as possible, replies to each question were then tabulated to show the number and percentage of commanders replying in various ways. All qualifying remarks were reflected in preparing these tabulations.<sup>1</sup>

Portions of replies thought to contain information or suggestions of unusual pertinence or value are reported verbatim in Appendix B. To preserve anonymity in these quoted comments, each commander is identified only by a word of the phonetic alphabet and by theater of operations.

## FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY<sup>2</sup>

### Armor Unit Training Practices, Procedures, and Problems

(U) Training Activities

At the time of the survey, the 38 units in which data were collected were conducting various types of armor training in the cycle and post-cycle phases, and under other missions. More than half of the units (20) were in the post-cycle phase. Five units were undergoing Basic Unit Training and the same number were in Advanced Unit Training; the others were occupied with refresher training or support missions. (See Table 1.)

Table 1 (U)

*What kind of armor training is currently going on in your battalion?*

	Seventh Army (N = 22)	CONUS (N = 16)	Total*	Percentage of All Units
Post-cycle phase	13	7	20	52.6
Refresher training	2	0	2	5.3
Advanced Unit Training	3	2	5	13.1
Basic Unit Training	3	2	5	13.1
Advanced Individual Training	1	1	2	5.3
Support mission	0	4	4	10.6
Total	22	16	38	100.0

\*Data here do not include the two interviewees who had recently completed assignments as battalion commanders but were not so assigned at the time of the survey.

<sup>1</sup>To reflect the full content of the interview discussion, in some of the tables presented in the following section the statement of the question has been amplified over that serving as the starting point in the interview. Some additional tabulations are presented in Appendix C. Appendix A gives the original form of the question and also indicates the location of text or tabular presentation of data for the various items. No specific report is presented for a few items which overlapped answers given elsewhere or which did not yield useful material.

<sup>2</sup>Some of the results summarized here may be documented only by reading the comments in Appendix B.

Only a few commanders, all of them in the United States, said they trained any of their own replacements in either basic or advanced individual training; however, about one third of the Seventh Army commanders and a smaller percentage of the CONUS commanders reported that they gave refresher instruction on Advanced Individual Training. (See Table 2.)

Table 2 (U)

*Do you train any of your own crew replacements through the Basic Combat and Advanced Individual Phases?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
<b>Basic Combat</b>				
Yes	0	5	5	12.5
No	23	12	35	87.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0
<b>Advanced Individual</b>				
Yes	0	3	3	7.5
No	15	10	25	62.5
Refresher	8	4	12	30.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

Most of the Seventh Army commanders estimated that, during the preceding year, their units had spent 50 per cent or more of their time in productive armor training. Among commanders in the United States, however, 10 out of 17 felt that worth-while armor training had occupied 30 per cent or less of the unit time. (See Table 3.) A majority of the commanders felt that they did not have enough time for training.

Table 3 (U)

*During the last year, what percentage of time would you estimate that your unit has spent in productive armor training?*

Percentage	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Over 90	2	0	2	5.0
90 to 70	8	1	9	22.5
70 to 50	9	6	15	37.5
50 to 30	3	0	3	7.5
30 to 10	1	5	6	15.0
Less than 10	0	5	5	12.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0
<i>Do you have enough time for training?</i>				
Yes	1	0	1	2.5
Yes, but time isn't the problem	10	3	13	32.5
No	12	14	26	65.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0



All but two of the Seventh Army units and most of the CONUS units had engaged in Command Post Exercises (CPX's) or maneuvers during the preceding year. Seventh Army commanders were divided as to the value of the exercises to their units, but virtually all of the CONUS commanders regarded this type of training as valuable. (See Table 4.)

Table 4 (U)

*Has your battalion engaged in any CPX's or maneuvers within the last year?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	21	12	33	82.5
No	2	5	7	17.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

*Were the exercises of value to your unit?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	10	12	22	55.0
No	13	1	14	35.0
Not applicable	0	4	4	10.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

(U) Training and Operational Problems

Commanders were asked to specify the problems they found most critical in conducting unit training (Table 5), and also the problems that caused them the greatest operational difficulties (Table 6). More than half the commanders stated that, because of major problems, their units could not complete the Basic Unit Training Phase in the prescribed 10-week period (Table 7).

The answers and comments of the commanders to these general questions and to various specific inquiries are presented in this section under the topics of personnel, missions, training areas, equipment, and details and support.

- (U) Personnel Problems. The personnel problem is severe, judging from the responses to a number of questions. (See Tables 5-9.) Shortage of personnel was cited the greatest number of times as a serious operational difficulty (Table 6) and the second greatest number of times as the most serious training difficulty (Table 5). Many commanders especially emphasized shortages of platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and tank commanders. Many of their men were transfers to Armor from other Army branches, insufficiently trained and experienced in armor to do the jobs to which they were assigned. More than half the units needed replacements. Fourteen units in Seventh Army and 14 in the United States reported a serious shortage of experienced personnel, especially platoon leaders; 14 Seventh Army units needed more tank commanders or said those available were recent transfers from other branches (Table 5).

None of the commanders of the Seventh Army units reported having enough officers (Table 5). One reason was that the position of

Table 5 (U)

*What is the most pressing or critical training problem encountered in the completion of unit training?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of Total
Lack of training area	14	2	16	40.0
Personnel shortage	3	9	12	30.0
Other missions	4	6	10	25.0
Lack of spare parts	1	0	1	2.5
Equipment shortage	1	0	1	2.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

*What other problems are particularly serious?<sup>a</sup>*

Lack of training area	7	4	11
Personnel shortage	4	6	10
Lack of range space	8	1	9
Other missions	3	6	9
Lack of time	4	0	4
Untrained personnel	2	0	2
Equipment shortage	1	0	1
Lack of funds	0	1	1
Total	29	18	47

*Do you have enough:<sup>b</sup>*

Tanks?				
Yes	21	15	36	90.0
No	2	2	4	10.0
Supporting vehicles?				
Yes	14	5	19	47.5
No	9	12	21	52.5
Trained tank crew personnel?				
Yes	10	3	13	32.5
No	13	14	27	67.5
Support personnel?				
Yes	11	2	13	32.5
No	12	15	27	67.5
Officers?				
Yes	0	5	5	12.5
No	23	12	35	87.5
Maintenance facilities?				
Yes	20	14	34	85.0
No	3	3	6	15.0
Range space facilities?				
Yes	0	9	9	22.5
No	23	8	31	77.5
Maneuvering and training space?				
Yes	0	8	8	20.0
No	23	9	32	80.0
Replacements?				
Yes	9	4	13	32.5
Yes, but . . .	4	1	5	12.5
No	10	12	22	55.0

(Continued)

Table 5 (U) (Continued)

**What is the most pressing or critical training problem encountered in the completion of unit training?**

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of Total
<i>Do you have enough:</i> <sup>b</sup> (Continued)				
Experienced personnel?				
Yes	9	3	12	30.0
No	14	14	28	70.0
Platoon leaders?				
Yes	3	8	11	27.5
No	20	9	29	72.5
Tank commanders?				
Yes	9	7	16	40.0
Yes, but untrained in Armor	5	2	7	17.5
No	9	8	17	42.5
Ammunition?				
Yes	22	15	37	92.5
No	1	2	3	7.5
Other supplies?				
Not enough spare parts	8	4	12	30.0
Not enough POL	0	2	2	5.0
An adequate amount	15	11	26	65.0

<sup>a</sup>These items repeat those shown above, but were reported by officers who ranked them as secondary to the most critical problem.

<sup>b</sup>In general, this inquiry was answered in terms of fulfillment of TOE allotments.

Table 6 (U)

**What are the problems that cause you, personally, the most operational difficulties and headaches?**

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total
Personnel shortage	4	11	15
Other missions	6	5	11
Lack of training area	5	2	7
Housekeeping	4	0	4
Untrained men	4	0	4
Lack of support	2	2	4
Personnel turnover	3	0	3
Lack of time	2	0	2
Lack of spare parts	1	1	2
Maintenance	1	1	2
Coordinating companies	1	0	1
Officer and cadre shortage	1	0	1
Excessive paper work	1	0	1
Inappropriate training program	1	0	1
Lack of range space	1	0	1
Lack of funds	0	1	1

Table 7 (U)

*In your unit is the Basic Unit Training Phase normally completed in the 10 weeks prescribed, or does it require a longer period of time?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of Total
Longer	19	6	25	62.5
10 weeks	2	8	10	25.0
Shorter	2	3	5	12.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

*If longer, why?*

Both lack of training area and other missions	9	0	9	36.0
Other missions	4	5	9	36.0
Lack of training area	5	0	5	20.0
Personnel shortage	1	0	1	4.0
Lack of funds	0	1	1	4.0
Total	19	6	25	100.0

Table 8 (U)

*Is your unit now at TOE strength?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	7	2	9	22.5
No, at a percentage strength of				
100-90	11	0	11	27.5
89-80	5	1	6	15.0
79-70	0	4	4	10.0
69-60	0	3	3	7.5
59-50	0	4	4	10.0
49-40	0	1	1	2.5
39-30	0	2	2	5.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

Table 9 (U)

*What was your estimated personnel turnover rate within the last year?*

Percentage	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total
100	1	1	2
90	2	1	3
80	3	3	6
70	2	3	5
60	1	3	4
50	3	2	5
40	1	1	2
30	2	0	2
20	1	1	2

(Continued)

Table 9 (U) (Continued)

**What was your estimated personnel turnover rate within the last year?**

Percentage	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total
10	2	0	2
Less than 10	5	0	5
Don't know	0	2	2
Total	23	17	40

**What was your estimated personnel turnover during the last 6 months?**

100	0	0	0
90	0	0	0
80	1	0	1
70	0	1	1
60	0	3	3
50	2	3	5
40	3	6	9
30	2	1	3
20	2	1	3
10	5	0	5
Less than 10	8	0	8
Don't know	0	2	2
Total	23	17	40

Table 10 (U)

**Are training facilities available for the following activities?**

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total (N = 40)	Percentage of All Units
<b>Classroom instruction?</b>				
Yes	22	14	36	90.0
No	1	3	4	10.0
<b>Driving practice?</b>				
Yes	18	13	31	77.5
No	5	4	9	22.5
<b>Firing of the 90-mm gun?</b>				
Yes	0	8	8	20.0
Yes, but . . .	0	2	2	5.0
No	23	7	30	75.0
<b>Firing of the .30- and .50-cal. machine gun?</b>				
Yes	4	11	15	37.5
.30-cal. only	12	6	18	45.0
No	7	0	7	17.5
<b>Night operations training?</b>				
Yes	1	4	5	12.5
Yes, but . . .	0	4	4	10.0
No	22	9	31	77.5
<b>Tactical exercises?</b>				
Yes	1	7	8	20.0
No	22	10	32	80.0

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Table 11 (C)

*Do you feel that you have enough facilities and support to complete your  
Armor training mission?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	12	3	15	37.5
Yes, but . . .	0	5	5	12.5
No	11	9	20	50.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

*Do you feel you have enough support for a combat-readiness mission?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	4	1	5	12.5
No	19	16	35	87.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

company executive officer had been eliminated from the TOE. To perform the required duties, most units had made the senior platoon leader the company commander's assistant, and one of the senior platoon sergeants an acting platoon leader. Because of this shifting of key personnel, no Seventh Army unit visited had enough officers serving as platoon leaders, and the shortage was acute.

Many commanders also stressed the effect, on both training and operations, of shortages and of inadequate training and experience. For example, 13 commanders who said the time allotted for training is adequate (Table 3) also said cause of the difficulty is not time alone but involves other factors including the personnel problem. Again, more than half the commanders said they did not have enough trained tank crew personnel, or enough support personnel, particularly trained communications specialists and turret and track vehicle mechanics (Table 5).

The personnel problem was emphasized again in relation to turnover and transfers. Turnover is a continuing problem, though rate of turnover is distributed throughout the training year—the majority of the respondents reporting a turnover rate of less than 50 per cent within the preceding six months (Table 9). In a Seventh Army unit at 80 per cent of TOE strength, transfers were still going on; this unit was to be brought up to TOE strength later. All of the Seventh Army units were at 80 per cent of TOE strength or better; most of those in the United States were at less than 80 per cent of TOE strength (Table 8).

(U) Conflicting Missions. Every armor unit surveyed had a particular tactical or support mission of highest priority, yet every unit had one or more additional missions. For example, though the particular mission of a CONUS armor unit may be to supply trained replacements for units overseas, the unit at the same time must support normal post activities and maintain combat skills at unit training levels; special missions may also be assigned as a need arises. As might be expected, serious conflicts often occur, and the training mission receives secondary consideration.

The addition of other missions was cited third as the most serious training difficulty and second as an important operational

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difficulty by commanders (Tables 5, 6). Many battalion commanders are forced to modify their training plans radically because other missions are imposed on the units without warning. Many commanders said the time required to administer Basic Unit Training could be reduced if these conflicts in missions were resolved. Thirteen of the 14 commanders who said enough time was allotted to training (Table 3) also said that the difficulty was caused not by time alone, but by other conditions; these conditions include the fact that other missions interfere with training (Table 7).

- (U) Training Areas and Facilities. Inadequacy of training areas and ranges was mentioned most often as the most serious training difficulty and also emerged as one of the most serious operational difficulties (Tables 5, 6). Inadequate support was mentioned by several commanders as an important operational difficulty. Some who mentioned time as a training problem also said the time allotted would be sufficient if training areas and support were available. Many also said the time required to administer Basic Unit Training could be reduced if adequate facilities and support were available. In no Seventh Army unit were range areas and space for training and maneuvering reported as adequate, and half of the units in the United States reported inadequate range areas (Table 5). Facilities for firing the 90-mm and .50-caliber guns and for conducting tactical exercises and night training were considered seriously inadequate by the majority (Table 10).

Half of the commanders said their facilities and support were not adequate for completing the training mission assigned to their units. All except five said support and facilities were not adequate for completing a combat-readiness mission. (See Table 11.)

- (U) Equipment, Materiel, and Miscellaneous Facilities. As shown in Table 5, 90 per cent of the commanders said they had enough tanks, but more than 50 per cent did not have enough support vehicles, especially recovery vehicles. Maintenance facilities were in general adequate, although some units reported a critical shortage of spare parts. Enough ammunition and supplies were available to most of the units. Facilities for classroom instruction, for practice and training in driving, and for .30-caliber machine gun practice and firing were in general reported as adequate (Table 10).

- (U) Details and Support Requirements. Several commanders mentioned excessive housekeeping duties as a serious operational difficulty (Table 6). One of the chief complaints of the commanders was that numerous duties and responsibilities unrelated to combat interfered with the training of their inexperienced officers for combat. Commanders who said they had enough platoon leaders and NCO's emphasized that details and support requirements kept these personnel from spending enough time with their men on the job.

## Training Status and Programs

- (C) Combat Readiness. Seventy-five per cent of the commanders said their units were not combat ready. For the units in the United States that are not STRIKE units, the situation is not surprising, since

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combat readiness is not yet expected at their training stage. But more than 60 per cent of the Seventh Army commanders said their units were not combat ready and that they needed more training (and in two instances, more personnel) to reach combat readiness. (See Table 12.)

Table 12 (C)

*Do you honestly feel that your unit is combat ready right now?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of Total
Yes	6	1	7	17.5
Yes, but need additional training	3	0	3	7.5
No	14	16	30	75.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

*What do you need to become combat ready?*

More personnel	0	1	1
Additional training	15	4	19
Both additional training and more personnel	2	12	14
Total	17	17	34

About half the commanders said most of their officers were well trained, but a majority (particularly in CONUS) felt that more training was needed to make the officers really combat ready (Table 13). About half of them considered their NCO's combat ready (Table 14), especially the older, experienced men. They did not consider the newer NCO's combat ready, especially those transferred from other branches without training in Armor.

Table 13 (C)

*What is the training status of the officers in your unit? Do you feel they are combat ready?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
<i>Have they completed formal training?</i>				
Yes	4	4	8	20.0
Most of them	8	13	21	52.5
Some of them	6	0	6	15.0
No	5	0	5	12.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0
<i>Are they combat ready?</i>				
Yes	3	1	4	10.0
Most of them	8	0	8	20.0
Some of them	7	0	7	17.5
No	5	16	21	52.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0



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Table 14 (C)

**What is the training status of the NCU's in your unit? Do you feel they are combat ready?**

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
<b>Have they completed formal training?</b>				
Yes	1	6	7	17.5
Most of them	12	0	12	30.0
Some of them	10	8	18	45.0
No	0	3	3	7.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0
<b>Are they combat ready?</b>				
Yes	1	5	6	15.0
Most of them	12	0	12	30.0
Some of them	10	1	11	27.5
No	0	11	11	27.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

Table 15 (U)

**In conducting tank platoon training in the Basic Unit Phase, do you follow the training formally prescribed in ATP 17-201, Tank Company or ATP 17-202, Armored Cavalry Regiment?**

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	1	7	8	20.0
Yes, but locally modified	8	4	12	30.0
No, but used as a guide	7	0	7	17.5
No, isn't used	7	6	13	32.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0
<b>How is training given?</b>				
Company	6	15	21	52.5
Platoon	4	1	5	12.5
Platoon and company	12	1	13	32.5
Not applicable	1	0	1	2.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

Table 16 (U)

**In your unit's Basic Unit Training Phase, are any modifications made by Theater, Army, Corps, Division, Regiment?**

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	12	10	22	55.0
No	11	7	18	45.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

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Table 17 (U)

*Present plans call for a 35-week training program from the activation of an armored division to its combat commitment. Do you feel this time is sufficient?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	22	14	36	90.0
No	1	2	3	7.5
Don't know	0	1	1	2.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

- (U) Training Programs. In conducting Basic Unit Training for the tank platoon, the majority of the commanders used ATP 17-291, Tank Company or ATP 17-305, Armored Cavalry Regiment, either following the ATP fairly closely or using it as a guide. (See Table 15.)

As shown in Table 16, more than half the commanders said their training program was modified by higher headquarters. For most battalions organic to armored divisions, the division specified certain training requirements and goals. For the battalions of the armored cavalry regiments, general training goals and quarterly training objectives were laid down by the regiment. For tank battalions organic to infantry divisions, general training goals, again, were set by the division. In the actual conduct of armor training the battalion commanders are given a free hand. However, on many mandatory subjects which all unit commanders are required to administer periodically, Seventh Army specified material in considerable detail.

- (U) Requirements for an Ideal Training Program. In discussing their opinions about an ideal unit training program, most of the commanders emphasized the following points:

- (1) Training should be combat oriented.
- (2) It should be as realistic as possible.
- (3) It should consist primarily of practical work and field exercises with the tank.
- (4) It should take place away from permanent post facilities where nontraining activities may interfere with continuous training.
- (5) It should not be hampered by incidental or unimportant activities.
- (6) It should be conducted with all assigned personnel on hand.
- (7) It should be conducted by a cadre of the most experienced, well-trained officers and noncommissioned officers.
- (8) Support facilities—including ammunition, vehicular maintenance, trained mechanics, and POL—must be available.

The chief requirement specified by the commanders for an ideal training environment for an armor unit is a large training and maneuver area that is easily accessible and that includes gunnery

ranges for both the 90-mm gun and the .30- and .50-caliber machine guns. Considerable emphasis was also placed on the need for crew training and for platoon tactical exercises to ensure that team movements for coordination and control are developed to a high level of skill.

As shown in Table 17, 90 percent of the commanders said 35 weeks of training, from the time of activation, would be sufficient to prepare an armored division for a combat role. In fact, the majority said a division could be adequately trained in considerably less time if maximum facilities and support were made available to the commander and his staff, and if the personnel and trained cadre were on hand throughout the training period.

In assessing the training usefulness of CPX's and maneuvers (Table 4), the majority of the CONUS commanders said CPX's were of considerable value, but a majority of the Seventh Army commanders considered the exercises of little value. The chief comment was that only the commanders and staff-level personnel profit from large-scale maneuvers and CPX's. Commanders regarded field training exercises at a smaller unit level as being necessary, and felt such exercises should be specifically designed to train, and to test the job knowledge and performance of the tank crew and the tank platoon skills.

#### (U) Platoon Leader Training Requirements

The majority of the commanders said platoon leaders were not adequately trained before their assignment to the unit. (See Table 18.) The deficiencies in their training cited most frequently were lack of basic knowledge of the tank itself, lack of ability to conduct normal field operations, lack of practical armor knowledge, and inability to command and control a tank platoon.

The general opinion was that training could best be improved by giving potential platoon leaders more field work and by placing a primary emphasis on knowing and understanding the functioning and operation of the tank itself. Several commanders also said that instructing the potential platoon leader in company and battalion level operations was overemphasized and that platoon level operations were being slighted. Several commanders said courses of instruction are too theoretical for the basic Armor officer.

The majority of the commanders said that, to provide on-the-job training, the young inexperienced officer was given a platoon and was helped first by both company commander and platoon sergeant. A senior experienced platoon sergeant was usually made responsible for working closely with the junior officer and for helping him learn how to command the platoon. Most commanders said that, whenever it was possible, the platoon leader was given a chance to work with his platoon in the field. Also, most battalion commanders regularly hold officers' conferences during which the commander and other senior officers instruct junior officers on how to meet the requirements of the unit's mission. Very little formal instruction is presented, most of the training being informal, acquisition-through-experience in type. Sometimes

the battalion commander requires junior officers to take formal or specialized courses at Seventh Army's Tank Training Center or at the Armor School, or to take Armor School courses by extension.

Table 18 (U)

*Do you feel the platoon leader replacements you have received over the past few years were adequately trained before they joined your unit?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of Total
Yes	6	6	12	30.0
No	17	11	28	70.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

*What were their chief deficiencies?*

Basic knowledge of tank	7	5	12	
Conducting field operations	6	1	7	
Practical armor knowledge	1	6	7	
Command and control of platoon	1	5	6	
Maintenance	4	1	5	
Terrain evaluation	2	1	3	
Communications	2	0	2	
Reconnaissance	2	0	2	
Troop leading	2	0	2	
Job duty knowledge	1	0	1	
Leadership	1	0	1	

*How can training be improved?*

Give more field work	9	9	18	45.0
Teach basic tank knowledge	7	2	9	22.5
Teach platoon only	4	1	5	12.5
Give more practice, less theory	0	4	4	10.0
Teach crew duties	2	1	3	7.5
Have platoon sergeant train replacements	1	0	1	2.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

Table 19 (U)

*It has been proposed that platoon leaders be trained on the job with a minimum amount of formal schooling. For example, an officer apprentice could be assigned as an assistant to an experienced platoon leader and would later be given his own platoon after he had learned his job. What is your opinion of this proposal?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
In favor of it	11	6	17	42.5
Not in favor of it	12	11	23	57.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

The majority of the commanders also said that no existing substitute for field experience is adequate—that tactical rules and principles can be taught in the classrooms, but that no proficiency can be gained without considerable practical work in conducting tactical exercises at the platoon level.

Slightly more than half of the commanders felt that on-the-job training with a minimum amount of formal schooling would not be a satisfactory way of training junior officers. (See Table 19.) Some said the young platoon leader is now serving an apprenticeship and the senior platoon sergeant and the company commander are teaching him his job. Others said the present amount of formal schooling is necessary before the officer is assigned to a unit. However, every commander emphasized that more practical training in the field is desirable for the inexperienced platoon leader.

As shown in Table 20, 75 per cent of the commanders agreed that many young platoon leaders do not know the specific duties or the requirements of their job assignments. Several commanders, however, said it was more a matter of not knowing how to go about doing the job than not knowing what the job required.

Virtually all the commanders said that, except for administrative and control functions, training requirements for platoon sergeants and platoon leaders are identical. (See Table 21.) They pointed out that the platoon leader's replacement in combat is the platoon sergeant, and that the platoon sergeant must assume command and control of the platoon when the leader is absent.

In discussing several questions which dealt with career development patterns, more than half the commanders expressed the opinion that their own training in service schools had fitted them adequately for their various assignments. Some commanders felt, however, that "more practical work" or more and earlier field work would have improved their training. (See Table 22.)

Half the commanders said the educational and training system should prepare officers for many jobs rather than for specialist jobs. (See Table 23.) Of the 11 officers who said training should be specialized, the majority felt that such training should prepare young Armor officers to be platoon leaders, and that such officers could learn how to take over other specialized duties, or go back to the Armor School for more specialized instruction. Almost all the commanders maintained that a line officer should have branch service after being commissioned before being permitted to enter a specialized field; almost half said he should complete three years or more of branch service before specializing. (See Table 24.)

With regard to the concepts underlying the Basic and Advanced Courses at the Armor School, 29 commanders said present School concepts should be retained. (See Table 25.) Most of those who said present concepts should be modified also said that young officers should be trained specifically to assume the platoon leaders' duties and that courses of instruction for the Advanced Class should be oriented specifically for staff jobs at a battalion level.

Table 20 (U)

**Many junior officers fail to do what is needed and required. It has been suggested that one of the chief reasons is that they do not know what their duties are nor what is expected of them. Do you feel this is true?**

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	16	14	30	75.0
No	7	3	10	25.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

Table 21 (U)

**Except for more emphasis on administrative and control functions in training platoon leaders, do you feel the training requirements for the platoon sergeant should be identical with those of the platoon leader?**

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	23	15	38	95.0
Not exactly	0	2	2	5.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

Table 22 (U)

**Do you consider your own attendance and training in the various service schools to have been satisfactory for the various duties to which you have been assigned?**

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of Total
Yes	12	13	25	62.5
No	10	4	14	35.0
Not applicable	1	0	1	2.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

**How could it have been improved?**

More practical work	5	5	10
Field duty first	4	2	6
More field work	4	2	6
More specific to job	3	0	3
More on reconnaissance	2	1	3
Longer course	2	0	2
More frequent refresher	1	1	2
Instruction at lower level	1	0	1

Table 23 (U)

***Do you think the armor educational and training system should be designed to prepare officers to specialize in a particular job or prepare them broadly for many jobs? Do you think it is possible to do both?***

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Specialized training	7	4	11	27.5
Broad training	10	10	20	50.0
Both	5	3	8	20.0
No opinion	1	0	1	2.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

Table 24 (U)

***Should a line officer be permitted to enter a special field upon being commissioned?***

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	2	0	2	5.0
No	20	17	37	92.5
No opinion	1	0	1	2.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

***How much branch service should be complete before specialization?***

Five years	4	0	4	10.0
Four years	1	2	3	7.5
Three years	7	4	11	27.5
Two years	8	9	17	42.5
One year	1	2	3	7.5
Not applicable	2	0	2	5.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

Table 25 (U)

***In the Armor Basic and Advanced Courses at the Armor School, the present emphasis is on developing a broad knowledge of the basic branch and on the acquisition of knowledge and skills necessary for specific command and staff positions. Do you think this concept should be retained?***

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	15	14	29	72.5
No	7	3	10	25.0
No opinion	1	0	1	2.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

A suggestion that Armor officers attend an intermediate course between their Basic and Advanced Courses was looked upon unfavorably by 65 per cent of the commanders. (See Table 26.)

Table 26 (U)

*At present, Armor officers attend a Basic Course immediately upon being commissioned, and then after several years return for the Advanced Course. Do you think some provision should be made for officers to attend an intermediate course between the Basic and Advanced Courses?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	4	2	6	15.0
No	13	13	26	65.0
Refresher needed	5	2	7	17.5
No opinion	1	0	1	2.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

#### (U) Tank Commander Training Requirements

About a third of the commanders said their tank commanders and platoon sergeants were fully trained and combat ready (Table 27). Another third said that their senior and experienced NCO's were fully trained and combat ready, but that many NCO's were transferred to them from other branches and that many of these transfers had little or no combat or field experience. The rest of the commanders said their NCO's were not adequately trained, and most said extensive field work or gunnery training is needed to bring these NCO's to a satisfactory level of proficiency. The need for more training in combat tactics and maintenance was also mentioned.

The commonest deficiencies of the tank commanders were said to be lack of tactical know-how and inadequate maintenance of their tanks. (See Table 28.) Other deficiencies mentioned by several commanders were failure to follow up commands given by the NCO to his crew members, general lack of initiative, and lack of ability to control the crew members in performing their duties and carrying out their responsibilities.

Of the 40 commanders, 26 said they were not in favor of a separate and formal training program for tank commanders to be administered by the unit. (See Table 29.) The general opinion was that adding a tank commander training mission to the primary and secondary mission of the units would create very difficult problems and would be likely to produce a tank commander inferior in quality. These commanders considered the senior NCO courses, like those given at Fort Knox and Vilseck (see Table 30), a better solution to the problem of tank commander training. But many commanders recognized the difficulty of getting NCO's to the service schools and have taken steps to train their NCO's on the job.



**CONFIDENTIAL****Modified Handling Authorized****Table 27 (C)**

***Do you feel that the tank commanders and the platoon sergeants you now have are fully trained and combat ready?***

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of Total
Yes	11	3	14	35.0
Old ones, yes	7	7	14	35.0
No	5	7	12	30.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

***What kinds of training do they need?***

Gunnery	15	5	20
Field work	12	8	20
Combat tactics	1	8	9
Maintenance	2	2	4
Reconnaissance	1	1	2
Night operations	0	2	2
Communications	1	0	1

**Table 28 (U)**

***What is the biggest deficiency of the average tank commander in your unit?***

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Tactical know-how	6	2	8	20.0
Maintenance	4	3	7	17.5
Command follow-up	3	2	5	12.5
Crew control	3	1	4	10.0
Initiative	2	2	4	10.0
Resolution to face up to decisions	2	1	3	7.5
Terrain navigation	2	1	3	7.5
Sense of responsibility	0	2	2	5.0
Career motivation	1	0	1	2.5
Basic soldier skills	0	1	1	2.5
Combat gunnery	0	1	1	2.5
Communications	0	1	1	2.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

**Table 29 (U)**

***Would you favor a separate and formal training program for tank commanders to be administered by the battalion?***

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	7	7	14	35.0
No	16	10	26	65.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

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Table 30 (U)

**How many of your present platoon sergeants and tank commanders are school trained, either at Fort Knox or Vilseck?**

Percentage	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total
90 or more	15	3	18
75 to 90	3	3	6
50 to 75	3	4	7
25 to 50	1	3	4
10 to 25	1	3	4
None	0	1	1

### Tank Crew Training Requirements

- (U) Thirty-four commanders favored increasing the amount of crew training in the Basic Unit phase and said a formal enunciation of this training would be desirable. (See Table 31.)

Table 31 (U)

**It has been proposed that crew training in the Basic Unit Phase be increased and formally "spelled out." What do you think of this proposal?**

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
In favor of it	21	13	34	85.0
Not in favor of it	0	3	3	7.5
No opinion	2	1	3	7.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

- (U) Almost every commander said no formal tests for determining crew proficiency were used except the gunner's preliminary examination and the formal platoon, company, and battalion Army training tests. In general, the commanders said, informal observation by officers and cadre constituted the basis for all evaluation. In Seventh Army units, most tank crews are required to fire the Tank Crew Proficiency Course at least once a year. The nature of this course is such that individual measures of combat proficiency can be obtained. The course is usually fired when the unit visits the Vilseck area to complete the battalion test. During the post-cycle training period, after the battalion test is completed, most commanders schedule specific instruction to correct deficiencies noted during the firing of the proficiency course.
- (U) Thirty-nine commanders said they had no formal facilities or techniques for measuring the progress of replacements. Most of them felt that such tests or techniques would be of value.
- (U) None of the commanders said their crews were broken up and reshuffled—unless there were personnel shortages. All of them said

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that crew integrity is highly desirable, and that shuffling of crews has a bad effect not only on proficiency but also on morale.

- (U) For peacetime and mobilization training of tank crewmen, about three fourths of the commanders favored unit training only, rather than the replacement training center system. However, for wartime training, almost half the commanders favored a combination of unit and RTC training. (See Table 32.)

Table 32 (U)

*The question of "unit" vs. "replacement center" training is a familiar one. What type (or types) of training do you favor in peacetime, during mobilization, and during war?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
<b>Peacetime</b>				
Unit only	19	11	30	75.0
Present RTC system	3	3	6	15.0
Some combination	1	3	4	10.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0
<b>Mobilization</b>				
Unit only	15	13	28	70.0
Present RTC system	4	1	5	12.5
Some combination	4	3	7	17.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0
<b>Wartime</b>				
Unit only	6	5	11	27.5
Present RTC system	9	2	11	27.5
Some combination	8	10	18	45.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

- (C) Fifteen Seventh Army commanders said their tank crews were not fully trained and combat ready. Nine commanders in the United States made the same evaluation. (See Table 33.) The need for additional combat field training exercises was mentioned by 12 Seventh Army and two CONUS commanders, and the need for additional field work and gunnery training was also frequently cited. Seven commanders in the United States said their crew members needed training in everything before being considered fully trained and combat ready.
- (U) Fourteen out of 24 commanders answering the question said they were not satisfied with the previous training of their replacements. (See Table 34.) Many commanders complained that replacements had not been trained at all in armor, but were transferred from other Army branches to the using unit as Armor replacements. In general, the deficiencies most frequently cited were lack of basic knowledge of the tank and lack of tank gunnery proficiency.
- (U) Over 80 per cent of the commanders said they wanted tank crew replacements to be fully trained before they arrived at the armor unit for duty. (See Table 35.) They pointed out that unless the receiving

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Table 33 (C)

*Do you feel that the tank crew members in your unit are fully trained and combat ready?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of Total
Yes	8	2	10	25.0
Old ones, yes	0	6	6	15.0
No	15	9	24	60.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

*What additional training is needed?*

Combat field training exercises	12	2	14
Field work	3	6	9
Everything	0	7	7
Gunnery	4	2	6
Crew training	3	2	5
Maintenance	2	1	3
Tactics	2	0	2
CBR	1	0	1
Refresher	1	0	1
Night operations	0	1	1

Table 34 (U)

*Have you been satisfied with the prior training of the replacements you have been receiving?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of Total
Yes	7	3	10	25.0
No	9	5	14	35.0
Not applicable	7	9	16	40.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

*What are the biggest deficiencies of crew replacements?*

Untrained in armor	7	6	13
Basic tank knowledge	3	7	10
Tank gunnery	6	0	6
Combat procedures	3	0	3
Maintenance	2	0	2
Crew duties	1	1	2
Driving	1	0	1

Table 35 (U)

*Do you feel that the tank crew replacements should be fully trained before they are sent to you, or do you feel the unit should complete this job?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Unit
Should be fully trained before reporting to unit	20	13	33	82.5
Unit should complete training	3	4	7	17.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

unit has facilities to train an unskilled replacement, his assignment is actually a handicap to the unit. Not only must the unit train the man before he is able to perform his job effectively, but the job remains undone or inefficiently done while he is being trained, and time is lost by the personnel who must supervise or give on-the-job instruction.

(U) The Training Programs for Armor

Twenty-three commanders expressed satisfaction with the present unit training program; 10 said improvement was needed. (See Table 36.)

Table 36 (U)

*Are you satisfied with your ATP, as formally stated or locally modified?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	10	13	23	57.5
No	8	2	10	25.0
Not applicable	5	2	7	17.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

*How can your present training program be improved?*

More field work	10	0	10	25.0
More platoon tactics	2	2	4	10.0
More gunnery training	3	0	3	7.5
More crew training	1	1	2	5.0
More support	0	2	2	5.0
Developing doctrine for heavy tank	1	0	1	2.5
More communications training	1	0	1	2.5
More maintenance training	1	0	1	2.5
More reconnaissance training	1	0	1	2.5
More time	1	0	1	2.5
More CBR	0	1	1	2.5
No opinion	2	11	13	32.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

An increased emphasis on field work was suggested by 10 Seventh Army commanders. Several commanders suggested increases in platoon tactical training and in gunnery training. Many who were satisfied with the present program said the content of the program itself was not as important as the way in which it was carried out.

Twenty-six commanders said they had the freedom needed to administer the Basic Unit Training program. (See Table 37.) However, many said they felt very strongly that they needed a freer hand if platoon and company training were ever to become maximally effective.

Ninety per cent of the commanders said they gave their junior commanders a free hand in carrying out their assigned missions and training responsibilities. Most of them expressed the idea by saying, "I usually tell them what to do, but never tell them how to do it. This is their responsibility."

Table 37 (U)

*Do you feel that you, as a unit commander, should be given more freedom in the administration of Basic Unit Training?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	9	5	14	35.0
No	14	12	26	65.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

Most of the commanders mentioned at least one subject in the formal training program which, in their opinion, was being slighted, but 32 said none of the subjects in the formal ATP were being overemphasized. Of the subjects they said were being slighted, field training exercises were mentioned by 14, and tank gunnery by 11. (See Table 38.)

Table 38 (U)

*Are there any particular subjects or skills in your present program that you personally feel are being slighted or overemphasized?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total
<b>Slighted</b>			
Field training exercises	11	3	14
Gunnery	11	0	11
Nuclear tactics	1	3	4
Maintenance	1	3	4
CBR	1	1	2
Map reading	1	1	2
Combined arms	1	0	1
General subjects	1	0	1
Mine warfare	1	0	1
Range finder	1	0	1
Reconnaissance operations	1	0	1
Night operations	0	1	1
Survival training	0	1	1
Total	11	13	44
<b>Overemphasized</b>			
None	20	12	32
Mandatory subjects	1	1	2
General subjects	1	0	1
Infantry subjects	1	0	1
Defensive tactics	0	1	1
Intelligence subjects	0	1	1
Range finder	0	1	1
Don't know	0	1	1
Total	23	17	40

All the commanders providing data for the battalions in the armored cavalry regiments also said training in all aspects of reconnaissance operations at the platoon and company levels should be improved. The commanders stressed the fact that officers and NCO's received as replacements required an extensive amount of unit training to become proficient in this type of activity. They also stressed that reconnaissance operations differ significantly from operations in the standard tank company: Not only do equipment and materiel differ, but tactical employment also varies widely. As Table 36 shows, one commander recommended that reconnaissance training be added to the present tank company training program (ATP 17-201).

(U) Army Training Tests, Maneuvers, and Tactical Exercises

Twenty-three commanders did not feel that the Army Training Tests (ATT's) now being given are adequate. (See Table 39.) Seven considered them adequate but suggested improvements. One of the practices most frequently criticized was the use of ATT's by headquarters personnel in evaluating the battalion commander. Most Seventh Army commanders said the present tests—as administered, scored, and employed—leave much to be desired in terms of truly evaluating the battalion's combat-ready status and the battalion commander's efficiency, and furnishing the kind of information really needed for implementing concrete and specific improvements. There were strong protests against the way in which the tests are usually administered. The commanders also recommended improvements in constructing the ATT's, and in the procedures used for evaluating the test results.

Twenty-two commanders said the Army Training Tests should both train and evaluate. Fourteen said that training should occur before the test is taken, and that the test should provide only an evaluation of the training given. (See Table 39.) Because of the inadequacy of training

Table 39 (U)

*Do you consider the present Army Training Tests for armor (e.g., ATT 17-1 and 17-2) adequate to meet your needs?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	5	2	7	17.5
Yes, but could be improved	0	7	7	17.5
No	17	6	23	57.5
Not applicable	1	2	3	7.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

*Do you think that the present ATT's should merely train, should merely evaluate, or both?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Train	2	2	4	10.0
Evaluate	10	4	14	35.0
Both	11	11	22	55.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

areas, and for other reasons, the ATT's serve chiefly as the only way of giving tactical field training, particularly in Seventh Army units.

Ninety per cent of the commanders said more tactical exercises are needed. None of them said there are too many. (See Table 40.) Several Seventh Army commanders said that although more tactical exercises are needed, holding a large number has a bad effect upon morale; if soldiers remain in the field for weeks, away from wives and families, both husbands and wives bitterly resent the separation, especially since it is government policy to send wives and children overseas to keep families intact. Nevertheless, the majority of the commanders felt that, despite subtle effects on morale more tactical exercises are needed to attain true combat efficiency.

Table 40 (U)

*Do you feel there are too many or not enough tactical exercises and maneuvers to prepare your unit adequately for future combat?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Too many	0	0	0	0
Enough	3	1	4	10.0
Not enough	20	16	36	90.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

#### (U) Tactical and Mobilization Training Requirements

Thirty-one commanders said training for combat duties should have precedence; nine said personnel should be trained for both combat and noncombat duties. (See Table 41.) But most of them said the number of mandatory noncombat subjects—that is, subjects not directly related to the soldier's proficiency in combat—is excessive. In particular, there was a strong opinion that nonessential subjects seriously interfere with the completion of combat training requirements. These commanders said that, while the time devoted to each noncombat subject is small, the large number of such requirements (imposed by Department of the Army, by Headquarters USCONARC, by Headquarters USAREUR,

Table 41 (U)

*At present, many units must train their personnel for noncombat as well as combat duties. Do you favor this procedure? If not, which do you think should receive precedence?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Combat training should have precedence	16	15	31	77.5
Both types of training are needed	7	2	9	22.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0



and by Army, division, and regiment) produces an excessive load of training not essential for combat. When mandatory requirements from higher headquarters are added to requirements imposed by local command headquarters, and to numerous activities related to personnel and morale, little time and few personnel are left for the completion of combat training requirements.

Twenty-nine commanders were of the opinion that noncombat subjects should be postponed, and taught at a later date. (See Table 42.) On the other hand, 10 said that to do so would not be a good practice, on the grounds that, if postponed, the noncombat subjects probably would not be taught at all. The majority, however, said that such subjects as character guidance and TIE should not be required by a higher command, and that the question of administering them at any particular period should be left to the judgment of the commander. Since the unit commander is responsible for the training proficiency of his command, they felt, he should also be given the responsibility of determining when and how to present instruction, and trusted to exercise good judgment in administering noncombat subjects.

Table 42 (U)

*It has been suggested that the unit commander should train on the essentials, postponing training on all noncombat subjects and skills to a later date. Do you agree with this proposal?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	17	12	29	72.5
Yes, but wouldn't teach at a later date	1	0	1	2.5
No	5	5	10	25.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

The potential mobilization problems most frequently mentioned were training enough armor specialists and maintenance personnel, training enough cadremen, and obtaining adequate training areas and tank gunnery ranges. Procuring better equipment with which to fight also was mentioned by several commanders. (See Table 43.)

Some commanders suggested that, in order to obtain definitive information about the tactical training and the mobilization capabilities of armor units, a mobilization troop test (or tests) should be carried out. According to this suggestion, CONUS battalions with low deployment priorities would be brought up to full strength and administered a mobilization training program; at the end of this accelerated training, they would be evaluated for combat readiness.

#### (U) New Equipment, Materiel, and Tactics

Thirty commanders said they were not satisfied with the present family of tanks. Many improvements were recommended. The need

Table 43 (U)

*What do you think would be Armor's biggest training problems if all-out mobilization were declared tomorrow?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total
Training specialists and maintenance personnel	6	5	11
Obtaining training areas and ranges	5	5	10
Training cadre and leaders	8	2	10
Procuring better equipment	2	3	5
Placing personnel properly	2	1	3
Training individual crewmen	1	2	3
Procuring more tanks	1	0	1
Training gunners	1	0	1
Training reconnaissance personnel	1	0	1
Reducing training time	3	1	4
Training for nuclear operations	0	1	1
Don't know	1	0	1

for simplification was specified by 27 commanders; omission of the range finder by 16; development of a lighter tank by 15; increased range of operations by 9; and a better tank gun by 8. (See Table . .)

(U) All but two commanders said there was an overemphasis on technical and mechanical aids in the present tanks. None felt that these aids were underemphasized.

(U) Twenty-seven commanders said our present tactical concepts are adequate, but four of them specified that additional practice in learning how to use these concepts is needed. (See Table 45.) Several commanders suggested the development of war games and combat simulators for tactical training.

Table 44 (U)

*Are you entirely satisfied with the family of tanks we now have?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of Total
Yes	8	2	10	25.0
No	15	15	30	75.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

*How should the present tank be improved?*

Simplification of tank	13	14	27
Omission of range finder	6	10	16
Lighter tank	10	5	15
Greater range	6	3	9
Better gun	5	3	8
Less fuel requirement	3	3	6
More human engineering	2	2	4
Everything	2	0	2
Greater speed	1	0	1
Only one universal tank	0	1	1

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Table 45 (C)

*Do you feel that our present armor tactical concepts are adequate to meet the present strength of possible enemy forces?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	15	8	23	57.5
Yes, but more practice in carrying them out is needed	0	4	4	10.0
No	8	5	13	32.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

*Are you giving, or have you given, specific field training on how to meet and cope with a possible attack?*

Yes	10	3	13	32.5
No	13	14	27	67.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

*Do you feel your intelligence information is sufficient to meet your needs?*

Yes	17	14	31	77.5
No	6	3	9	22.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

Table 46 (U)

*What do you feel are your unit's primary weaknesses in the area of tactics?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total
Platoon, company, battalion movements	12	0	12
Everything	0	8	8
Combat tactics	1	5	6
Terrain appreciation	4	0	4
Night operations	2	2	4
CBR	2	1	3
Combat gunnery	1	0	1
Combat reconnaissance	1	0	1
Conduct of attack	1	0	1
Fire coordination	1	0	1
Individual tank tactics	1	0	1
Combined arms	0	1	1
Mobile defense	0	1	1

- (C) Thirteen commanders in Seventh Army said no specific field training on meeting an attack was being given or had been given in their units. In general, most of the preparations against possible enemy attack are in the form of periodic alerts and organizational large-scale maneuvers.
- (U) With regard to tactical weaknesses, 12 commanders cited a need for improvement in platoon, company, and battalion movements, 6 mentioned weaknesses in combat tactics. Four cited inability to conduct night operations, and four cited weakness in terrain appreciation. Eight commanders in the United States said their units were weak in everything related to combat tactics. (See Table 46.)

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Table 47 (U)

*Are there any particular or peculiar problems relating to communications or command and control which you feel call for command action or research, or both?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total
Greater range radio	6	3	9
Better, simpler radio	6	2	8
More communications nets	4	2	6
Reconnaissance control net	5	0	5
Anti-jamming device	2	3	5
More channels	1	3	4
Tankers' helmets	2	0	2
Alternate communications means	1	1	2
Command post vehicle	0	2	2
Better maps	0	1	1

Table 48 (U)

*Are there any other practical armor field problems you can think of which you feel should be researched?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total
Fuel resupply	4		4
Simpler equipment	3		3
Night training	2		2
CBR operational doctrine	1	1	2
Adequate tanker uniform and helmet		2	2
Better tanks		2	2
Greater mobility		2	2
Better telescopes	1		1
Development of unit tests for reconnaissance	1		1
Employment of heavy tank	1		1
Feeding troops in field	1		1
Mine warfare	1		1
More support vehicles	1		1
Procurement of more training areas	1		1
Reconnaissance operations	1		1
Reduction of equipment	1		1
Substitution of .50-cal machine gun for present .30-cal.	1		1
Training reconnaissance officers	1		1
Universal battalion	1		1
Better fire control system		1	1
Common battalion TOE		1	1
Development of device for digging a hole to provide nuclear protection		1	1
Doctrine for mass attack		1	1
Improved Armor TOE		1	1
Improved trafficability		1	1

- (U) In speaking of problems of command communication and/or control, nine commanders said they needed a tank radio with a greater range, and eight said they needed a better radio that was simpler to operate. Six said more armor communications nets were urgently needed, and five stressed the need for a control net for reconnaissance units. The need for an anti-jamming device was mentioned by five commanders. (See Table 47.)
- (U) The commanders mentioned a large number of practical field problems which they felt might benefit from research. (See Table 48.) Several pointed out the need for a more efficient fuel resupply system for combat vehicles, and for simpler equipment—easier to operate and to use in training. Problems mentioned by more than one officer included the need for operational doctrine for CBR warfare, research in night training, better tanks, ways to increase mobility, and adequate tankers' uniforms and helmets.

Table 49 (U)

*Is there anything in the way of training literature, training aids, or devices, which you feel is greatly needed by the field units?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total
None	9	9	18
Up-to-date technical and field manuals	4	0	4
Tank commander's manual	2	1	3
Night operations literature	1	2	3
Crew duty manuals	2	0	2
Tank substitute	1	1	2
Better, more entertaining aids	0	2	2
Platoon leader trainer	0	2	2
Adjustment-of-fire trainer	1	0	1
Conduct-of-fire trainer	1	0	1
Heavy tank training literature	1	0	1
Tactical game	0	1	1

- (U) Eighteen commanders said training literature and training aids were sufficient at field units. (See Table 49.) Of those who suggested improvements, four cited the need for up-to-date technical and field manuals; many commanders said that equipment is on hand for a year or so before the relevant training literature is published. Three commanders requested a manual written specifically for tank commanders, platoon sergeants, and platoon leaders, to set forth the essential job duty information.<sup>1</sup> Three other commanders recommended more and better literature on night operations.

<sup>1</sup>Such a volume, *The Tank Commander's Guide*, second edition January 1960, is already available from the Stackpole Company (formerly Military Service Publishing Company), Harrisburg, Pa. None of the commanders interviewed knew of the existence of this volume.

As their biggest obstacle to completing tactical training, more than half the commanders again mentioned lack of adequate training areas. (See Table 50.) This need is especially acute in the Seventh Army area. Personnel shortages and the interference of other missions were mentioned by several commanders in commenting on difficulties involved in conducting tactical exercises.

Table 50 (U).

*What is your biggest operational difficulty in successfully completing a tactical exercise or any type of tactical training?*

	Seventh Army (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Inadequate training area	18	4	22	55.0
Personnel shortage	1	3	4	10.0
Other missions	0	4	4	10.0
Shortage of ranges	1	2	3	7.5
Untrained personnel	2	0	2	5.0
Shortage of tank recovery vehicles	0	2	2	5.0
Lack of support	1	0	1	2.5
Poor maintenance facilities	0	1	1	2.5
None	0	1	1	2.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

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AND  
APPENDICES**

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## Appendix A (U)

### LIST OF QUESTIONS ON WHICH THE INTERVIEWS WERE BASED

#### 1 Armor Unit Training Practices, Procedures, and Problems

- a. What is the general mission (or missions) of your unit? What is the particular mission (or missions) of your unit? (p. 16)
- b. What kind of training is currently going on in your unit? (Table 1)
- c. In conducting tank platoon training in the Basic Unit Phase, do you follow the training formally prescribed in ATP 17-201, Tank Company (or the ATP appropriate to armored cavalry regiments, armor groups, or tank companies of infantry regiments)? (Table 15)
  - (1) How is the training given?
  - (2) What problems or difficulties normally occur?
- d. Are any modifications made by Theater, Army, Corps, Division, Regiment, or by anyone other than yourself? (Table 16)
- e. In your unit is the Basic Unit Phase normally completed in the 10 weeks prescribed, or does it require a longer period of time? If longer, why did it take longer? (Table 7)
- f. Do you feel you have enough time actually allotted for training? Do you feel you have enough time actually allotted for the Basic Unit Phase?
- g. What is the most pressing or critical training problem encountered in the completion of unit training? Any other problems? (Table 5)
- h. What kind of training facilities are available for classroom instruction, driving practice and training, firing the 90-mm gun, firing the .30- and .50-caliber machine guns, conducting tactical exercises and tactical training, and conducting night operations training? (Table 10)
- i. Do you feel that you have enough facilities and support to complete your armor training mission? Your combat-readiness mission? (Table 11)
- j. What causes you, personally, the most operational difficulties and headaches? (Table 6)
- k. Do you honestly feel that your battalion (or company) is combat ready right now? If not, what do you need to become combat ready? (Table 12)
- l. Could you estimate your personnel turnover rate within the last year? The last six months? (Table 9)
- m. Do you train any of your own crew replacements through the Basic Combat and Advanced Individual Phases? (Table 2)

n. What is the training status of the officers in your unit? Do you feel they are all fully and well trained? Do you feel they are combat ready? (Table 13)

o. What is the training status of the NCO's in your unit? Are they fully and well trained? Are they combat ready? (Table 14)

p. Do you feel you have a sufficient number of competent officers and NCO's?

q. Is your unit now at TOE strength? (Table 15)

r. What per cent of time in the last year would you estimate that your unit has spent in productive armor training? Do you feel that you have enough time actually allotted for training? (Table 3)

s. If you had a completely free hand and could establish your own "ideal" Armor Unit Training Program, what would you do? Please elaborate on how you would go about giving this training. (p. 20)

t. Present plans call for a 35-week training program from the activation of an armored division to its combat commitment. Do you feel this time is sufficient? (Table 17)

u. Has your unit engaged in any CPX's or maneuvers within the last year? Were the exercises of value to your unit? (Table 4)

## **2. Tank Platoon Leader Training Requirements**

a. Do you feel the platoon leader replacements you received over the past few years were adequately trained before they joined your unit? (Table 18)

(1) What do you consider the chief deficiency or weakness in the training they received?

(2) Do you have any suggestions for improving the training they currently receive?

b. What steps have you taken to provide on-the-job or additional training for the junior officers? (p. 21)

c. What kind of field training do you think would be most effective for teaching command, control, and tactical principles to new platoon leaders fresh out of school? (p. 21)

d. It has been proposed that platoon leaders be trained on the job with a minimum amount of formal schooling. For example, an officer apprentice could be assigned as an assistant to an experienced platoon leader and would later be given his own platoon after he had learned his job. What is your opinion of this proposal? (Table 19)

e. It has been suggested that one of the chief reasons many junior officers fail to do what is needed and required is that they do not know what their duties are nor what is expected of them. Do you feel this is true? What distinguishes a competent platoon leader from a poor one? (Table 20)

f. Do you consider your own attendance and training in the various service schools to have been satisfactory for the various duties to which you have been assigned? What revisions can you suggest which you think would better meet your needs? (Table 22)

g. Do you think the armor educational and training system should prepare officers to specialize in a particular job or should it be designed to prepare them broadly for many jobs? Do you think it is possible to do both? (Table 23)

h. Should a line officer be permitted to enter a special field upon being commissioned? If no, how much branch service should he complete before specialization? (Table 24)

i. In the Armor School, the present emphasis is on developing a broad knowledge of the basic branch and on the acquisition of knowledge and skills necessary for specific combat and staff positions. Do you think this concept should be retained in the Armor Basic and Advanced Courses? (Table 25)

j. At the present time, Armor officers attend a Basic Course immediately upon being commissioned, and then after several years return for the Advanced Course. Do you think some provision should be made for officers to attend an intermediate course between the Basic and Advanced Courses? (Table 26)

### **3. Tank Commander Training Requirements**

a. Do you feel that the tank commanders and the platoon sergeants you now have are fully trained and combat ready? What additional kind or type of training do they need? (Table 27)

b. Do you ever give the tank commander a chance to act as platoon sergeant or the platoon sergeant as platoon leader for purposes of training? Do you think this is a good training idea? (Table C-1)

c. What is the biggest deficiency of the average tank commander in your unit? (Table 28)

d. How many of your present platoon sergeants and tank commanders are school trained, either at Fort Knox or Villetta? (Table 30)

e. Would you favor a separate and formal training program for tank commanders to be administered by the unit? (Table 29)

### **4. Tank Crew Training Requirements**

a. It has recently been proposed to increase the amount of crew training in the Basic Unit Phase, and to formally spell out this training. What do you think of this proposal? (Table 31)

b. How do you go about assigning new tank crew replacements to duty?

(1) Are you completely satisfied with this procedure?

(2) What do you think is needed?

c. What kinds of tests, critiques, or evaluation devices do you have for checking on the proficiency of the individual tank crewman? (p. 28)

d. Do you have any formal facilities or techniques for measuring the progress of a new replacement following his assignment to your unit? (Table C-2)

e. How frequently do you break up crews and reshuffle them, other than when it is absolutely necessary due to personnel shortages? (p. 23)

f. The issue of "unit" versus "replacement center" training is an old, recurrent one. How do you stand on this issue during peacetime, during mobilization, and during war? (Table 32)

g. Do you feel that the tank crew members in your unit are fully trained and combat ready? What kind of additional training do they need? (Table 33)

h. Have you been satisfied with the prior training of the replacements you have been receiving? If not, what is their biggest deficiency? (Table 34)

i. Do you feel that the average crewman in your unit can take over other crewmen's jobs and perform satisfactorily—i.e., are they interchangeable? (Table C-3)

j. Do you feel that the tank crew replacements should be fully trained before they are sent to you, or do you feel the unit should complete this job? (Table 35)

k. It has frequently been suggested that all tank crewmen should be trained as specialists at one crew position, and only familiarized with other crew jobs. What is your opinion of this? (Table C-3)

l. With the exception of more emphasis on administrative and control functions, do you feel the training requirements for the platoon sergeant should be identical with those of the platoon leader? (Table 21)

#### **5. The Training Programs for Armor**

a. Do you follow ATP 17-201 Tank Company Program for the Basic Unit Training Phase?

b. Are you entirely satisfied with the present ATP 17-201 as formally stated or locally modified? Can you think of any way or ways in which this program can be improved? (Table 36)

c. Do you feel that you, as a unit commander, should be given more freedom in the administration of Basic Unit Training? (Table 37)

d. Do you give your junior commanders a fairly free hand in the conduct of their missions and their training? (Table C-4)

e. Are there any particular subjects or skills in your present program that you personally feel are being slighted or overemphasized? (Table 38)

#### **6. Army Training Tests, Maneuvers, and Tactical Exercises**

a. What is your frank opinion of the present Army Training Tests for armor—e.g., ATT 17-1 and ATT 17-2? Do you consider them adequate to meet your needs? (Table 39)

b. Do you feel there are too many or not enough tactical exercises and maneuvers to adequately prepare your unit for future combat? (Table 40)

c. Do you have any techniques for quality-controlling the training proficiency of personnel in your unit?

d. Do you think that the present ATT's should merely train, should merely evaluate, or both? (Table 39)

#### **7. Mobilization Training**

a. At the present time, many units are forced to train their personnel both for noncombat as well as combat duties. Do you feel this is wise? If not, which do you think should receive precedence? (Table 41)

b. It has been suggested that the unit commander should weed out all noncombat subjects and skills and train on the essentials. Then, at a later date, train on the less essential subjects. What do you think of this proposal? (Table 42)

c. What do you think would be Armor's biggest training problems if all-out mobilization were declared tomorrow? (Table 43)

#### **8. New Equipment, Materiel, and Tactics**

a. Are you entirely satisfied with the present family of tanks we now have? If not, in what ways do you think they should be modified or improved? (Table 44)

b. Do you think the present tanks are over- or underemphasizing the various technical and mechanical aids? (Table C-5)

c. Do you feel that our present armor tactical concepts are adequate to meet the present strength of the aggressor? (Table 45)

d. Are you giving, or have you given, any specific field training on how to meet and cope with a possible aggressor attack? Do you feel your intelligence information about the aggressor is sufficient to meet your needs? (Table 46)

e. What do you feel is your unit's primary weakness in the area of tactics? (Table 46)

f. Have you received any special instructions and have you developed any procedures for integrating new and special weapons into your organization? (Table C-6)

g. Are there any particular or peculiar problems relating to communications or command and control which you feel call for command action or research, or both? (Table 47)

h. Are there any other practical armor field problems you can think of which you feel should be researched? (Table 48)

i. Is there anything in the way of training literature, training aids, or devices, which you feel is greatly needed by the field units? (Table 49)

j. What is your biggest operational difficulty in successfully completing a tactical exercise or any type of tactical training? (Table 50)

k. With regard to either training or actual field operations, do you have any difficulties or problems in any area not previously mentioned?

## Appendix B

### SELECTED COMMENTS BY COMMANDERS INTERVIEWED

#### 1. Armor Unit Training Practices, Procedures, and Problems

- (U) What is the general mission (or missions) of your unit? What is the particular mission (or missions) of your unit?

Commander ALFA (United States):

The general mission given this unit is to train and prepare for the normal type armored cavalry mission, that is, security, armor combat, and possibly reconnaissance. The particular mission . . . is more difficult, in that we are split between two different missions that take us in two different directions. On the one hand, I still have the basic responsibility for the training for combat in a cycle which will begin next month; on the other hand, the day-to-day responsibility for the support of Reserve training throughout this area results in a very adverse impact on the training that I am able to give my unit.

- (U) In conducting tank platoon training in the Basic Unit Phase, do you follow the training formally prescribed in ATP 17-201, Tank Company (or the ATP appropriate to armored cavalry regiments, armor groups, or tank companies of infantry regiments)? How is the training given? What problems or difficulties normally occur?

Commander BRAVO (Germany):

. . . The training given is in those areas in which the troops are somewhat deficient at this time, and require constant and repeated training—the areas of maintenance, communications, map reading, mine navigation, the use of compasses, terrain appreciation, tactical problems or range work . . . shoulder-to-shoulder marches, and those items that are essential for an effective combat team. This training, incidentally, is given as a rule by the platoon leaders. They are the teachers. Quite frequently the company commanders give the more advanced or over-all scope . . . and the training is conducted along these lines.

The problems and difficulties . . . are the changes in the programs that usually occur: the requirement to exert additional training at times, such as in-the-theater driving practices. Such things take a considerable amount of time and they do, of course, detract from the normal training. In addition, we are currently faced with the battalion tests . . . levies are placed on the battalion to furnish officers to test other armored battalions in the theater, and this, of course, completely wipes out the formal training program for lack of instructors.

Commander CHARLIE (Germany):

The group of men presently with this battalion were received as recruits. . . . They were taken through the Individual Training, Advanced Individual Training, and the Unit Training Phases . . . right in this battalion. We followed the usual Replacement Training Center procedures in each one of these phases, as outlined in the appropriate ATP's . . . given as both classroom formal type, and as practical work. . . . We did think that we would be able to give organized training on a committee system. But . . . we had full TOE equipment—to include each and every vehicle, with the problem of maintaining them—we could not pull people into . . . committees for the purpose of giving that training. Consequently, the training was given by the individuals. It was given by the platoon sergeants, the platoon leaders, and any other specialists who may have been around.



What problems and difficulties normally occur? Lack of time and too heavy a training schedule. . . . It was nothing unusual to work 17 or 18 hours a day, and our people were pretty well worn out before it was all over. This pressure lasted, easily, from July until November. . . . The extracurricular activities were many and varied . . . such items as parades, ceremonies, formal inspections conducted by higher headquarters. There was no time in the training schedule for such activities as these. . . . Any training that we missed we were required to go back and give, so if a man found himself two paces to the rear and he didn't pick it up in a hurry, the first thing he knew, he was floundering. . . . I do not feel that these extracurricular activities were always necessary.

- (U) Are any modifications made by Theater, Army, Corps, Division, or Regiment, or by anyone other than yourself?

Commander FOXTROT (Germany):

. . . We made some modifications due to the time shortage. Although there were no modifications made by higher command, there was—and in my experience, there always is—a recurring emphasis placed on certain subjects.

Commander GOLF (Germany):

There have been no modifications . . . in this organization in that particular phase itself. However, when this unit was initially trained, our training time was cut by two weeks and we took it out of the Advanced Individual Training Phase . . . which is a very critical phase, [and] left the unit not properly trained up to that point. Consequently, it made our training in the BUT Phase a little more difficult.

Commander ALFA (United States):

Yes, we have made modifications ourselves as approved by the regiment to which we belong. . . . A reduction of four hours from the commander's time, an addition of two hours each on the platform as security guard, the platoon as advance guard, the platoon as rear or flank guard, and night attack; and on the firing exercises—the firing of Tables I through IV, whereas the ATP calls for Tables V through VIII. We do not have the range facilities. In approximately half a year we hope that our tank crews will fire at another post where these facilities are available.

Commander DELTA (United States):

Was the BUT Phase of the ATP modified? Most definitely yes—simply because we have not had the time, the training opportunities, to execute it as it stands.

- (U) In your unit is the Basic Unit Training Phase normally completed in the 10 weeks prescribed, or does it require a longer period of time?

Commander ALFA (United States):

The Basic Unit Phase is planned to be completed in 10 weeks, plus 12 hours in the 11th physical week . . . as a substitution [for] 12 hours which will be lost on a move to . . . another station for the final period of our training time. [Also] the local post intends a Command Maintenance Inspection for the middle of our training period. This will knock at least one week out of our 10 weeks' training . . . because—besides the preparations for the CMI—there is also the rescheduling of training . . . to avoid sending vehicles out into the mud for tactical training just before they are to be inspected by the post CMI team. . . .

Commander HOTEL (Germany):

. . . In the States, we did complete the Basic Unit Phase in the 10 weeks prescribed. Personally, I do not think it takes longer. I think the period

could be reduced if you had ample training facilities. . . If you don't have the facilities, if you're short of personnel, if you have many inspections . . . these things all subtract from the efficiency with which you can train a unit and lengthen the time it will take you to train it.

- (U) Do you feel you have enough time actually allotted for training? Do you feel you have enough time actually allotted for the Basic Unit Training Phase?

Commander FOXTROT (Germany):

I feel that the time allotted for training is sufficient if properly utilized, which is an ideal I have never seen accomplished continuously. A day, a particular class period, even a block of two or three days may be well utilized, but in general there is a waste of time—not of the instructor's time, but of the person being instructed.

Commander INDIA (Germany):

It isn't really a question of time. I presented my training when the battalion was . . . way down to under 400 men. Giving me time on a training schedule didn't mean a thing if I could only turn out 30 men per company to pull maintenance on 17 tanks per company. My problem at that time was people, and I just didn't have the people.

Commander DELTA (United States):

Yes, I feel that we have enough time actually allotted to the Basic Unit Training Phase as the ATP's now stand, but this is an entirely misleading situation unless you . . . possibly do such a thing as maintain a time card on each and every soldier in the command. My battalion is following a 44-hour training week. The only deviation from this is that I—once again because of shortages of personnel—keep my headquarters company entirely on an on-job training type schedule.

. . . If we kept track of the actual activities of a given individual within that company, because of the frequency with which he pulls KP, goes on guard, performs details or supports our local post in one way or another . . . almost ad infinitum, you'd find that probably the average soldier in the command is following a training program that . . . I doubt very seriously would run more than 10 or 12 hours per week.

- (U) What is the most pressing or critical training problem encountered in the completion of unit training? Any other problems?

Commander HOTEL (Germany):

. . . The situation here in Germany is peculiar. It didn't exist at any of my three assignments in the States—or even in Korea, for that matter. The most critical problems here are three, and the first is that you don't have the areas to train the tanks, except in a major training area. You visit that major training area two or three times a year as a tank company in a reconnaissance battalion, and this is the only time your company is operational; this is the only time you get an opportunity to train.

. . . Personnel is our second problem. . . . Circumstances regarding personnel are very pressing—two- and three-man tank crews, sometimes one man present. There are a lot of people assigned to the tanks, but these people are [doing other jobs] education center clerks, unit police—things of that kind. Added to your other personnel problems such as reenlistment leave in the United States for 90 days, schools—all this just doesn't put the people on the tanks to do the job, even though they are assigned on the morning report.

Time is the [third] critical factor. . . . If you have too few people, then you automatically have a time problem. . . . If we had all of our people and had the area to use them, we'd have no time factor. Ample time is provided

for all of our activities, but as soon as you get one man short on a tank crew, then ample time is not provided.) The ATP is at fault here; [it assumes] full crews and habitual employment of crews together, etc., and often we find this is not the case in practice.

Commander FOXTROT (Germany):

In the maintenance field, we always run into with a particular thing . . . that's just not available in the theater. Officers . . . often get quite disgusted with the fact that something that they feel somebody should certainly have provided for has not been provided for. A typical example in our unit is . . . sprockets. Everyone knows the life of a sprocket; everyone knows—at least from reports I have submitted, and even if they don't they could estimate—the amount of wear, the number of miles we would put on the vehicles. Yet, when it came time to get new sprockets, there were none in the theater. There still are none. . . .

. . . We have two small training areas here, one of them extremely small. I'd say we cannot do much better than platoon problems in that area. Company size problems are out of the question. . . . You hardly move a quarter of a mile before you are out of [one] area—you're better off just using it for driver training. Oh, of course, with some imagination we find that we are able to get some tactical training across. . . . I feel that no matter where we move the vehicles, we can certainly inject a great deal of training. As we move out, we tactically march from the area; we tactically march to the area; we play dangerous directions with our vehicles; we are constantly communicating; we even find that we have been able to run small, limited objective night attacks in some of these areas, which is purely nothing more than imagination. . . . When you look at the area, you throw your hands up in horror and say, "This thing is too small, this thing is impossible." Well, it's not quite that bad. You've got to make the best of what you have.

. . . One of the biggest problems, of course, in the replacement and rebuilding and keeping them moving, if you will, is that problem of ensuring continuity in the operation. If there is no old [hand] there to show the new man what to do and how to do it, then we have to stop—everybody does—and show him how to do it. . . .

. . . We are beginning to receive replacement NCO's now. They appear to be MOS qualified. Now, we will have to learn in time just how much experience they have had. You know a Form 20 is sometimes deceiving. . . . A number of the people . . . here have been retreaded, so to speak, before they come in. . . . A man may have experience as a cook, and he may also have an old MOS as a cook. [We] say "It shows here that you are a tanker," and he says, "Sir, that's a new one they just hung on me. . . . I feel that I am best qualified to be a cook. I've been a cook for over ten years." In a case like that, we . . . try to put a man in a job that he feels that he can do, and experience shows that he could probably do it better than his retread one. This may, in time, cause us to do some reshuffling. . . .

. . . Our platoon leaders vary in experience. . . . Some seem to be better adapted for tank operations. . . . We find that a platoon leader who is aggressive, and gets with it, is the man we want. We find that we may have a very intelligent platoon leader; perhaps he might even be the smartest young officer in the division for all we know, but if he lacks command presence, and is not aggressive, he has difficulty in getting his authority across.

Commander GOLF (Germany):

Some of the problems that are frequently encountered in the completion of Basic Unit Training are lack of officers and lack of noncommissioned officers. . . . Over here we have numerous commitments for officers and non-commissioned officers for special duty, temporary duty—there is a constant drain on the line unit. . . . One example, of course is maneuver requirements (umpires, maneuver damage requirements, officer requirements to repair maneuver damage caused after exercises) which are lengthy work projects. . . .

... My company's strength at the present time is 55; my authorized strength here is 105. . . . It works a constant hardship on us in trying to maintain our equipment and keep it in a state of combat readiness with the personnel commitments we have and no replacements forthcoming.

Commander BRAVO (Germany):

I think one . . . critical training problem is the movement to training areas. While we do have a few close-in training areas, they are not very adequate for tank battalion training as a unit. This necessitates at the present time approximately a 70-mile road march and that tremendously increases our maintenance problems.

... There is, I feel, a very definite lack in not being able to take the battalion out on a training exercise without having to fit it into a schedule of a training area—which at the present time may be two or three times a year, depending on the way the schedules are set up at the major training areas in Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels.

Commander DELTA (United States):

The primary problem that we have in training—and there's no reason to restrict it to Basic Unit Training . . . is simply that of personnel. . . . My companies have an average strength of about 60 or 65—in one case about 70—personnel. . . . I will run anywhere from 10 to 20 . . . personnel on temporary duty or special duty, that are not available for training. My personnel are allowed one month of leave per year, which means that 8 to 10 per cent of the command must be absent at all times if this one month of leave per year is to be granted to everyone. . . . I have people in the hospital—not great numbers, but one or two in each company; I have people on pass. Local policy is to push hard in the matter of voluntary contributions to funds—we've had three such campaigns in the last three or four months. . . . We push hard the contribution of blood to the Red Cross [but this does mean lost time]. To make a long story short when I turn a company out for training—unless it is a very, very important type of training where I would literally close the company down and move out the first sergeant and everyone else with the exception of the CQ—unless I do that, I am usually able to muster only 10, 12, 15 men per company for training; these are seldom the same men two days in a row or in any given day. . . . That is the main training problem, and as a result of it we are actually accomplishing very, very little. . . . I don't know how many years the senior noncommissioned officers of an organization can live in this environment, [and] never really be part of a full TOE company that goes out and really trains and really accomplishes something, without themselves going to rack and ruin. In the back of my mind I hold the ideal that we would have more combat effectiveness, we would have an army that is more capable of expanding in mobilizing situations, if we would . . . organize and man that number of units that can be manned within present manpower levels. I daresay that in higher headquarters this situation does not look so bad because we are required to report on a monthly operational readiness report as though all of our [Replacement Stream Input] trainees were permanent parties. This actually gives my battalion a slight overstrength, but it's a complete farce because these people will be with us only eight weeks and then they will leave and go elsewhere.

... With the exception of recovery vehicles of which I have none, nor are there any in the regiment . . . I have all the hardware—the vehicular equipment—that I am authorized by TOE. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage. . . . I have about twice as many vehicles as I have personnel to maintain them. They have to be maintained, nonetheless, this being another drain on what would appear on the surface to be training time.

... There's an unfortunate lack of stability among officer personnel in my battalion in this regiment, and I daresay Army wide. I personally suspect that this instability need not exist with better personnel management. . . . I

took command of my battalion on the 28th of July, it's now the 5th of March, and I have had eight battalion operations officers during this time. I would say that this is, in fact, something of a training handicap.

. . . This particular post has very, very fine ranges and a great many of them. The facilities of all types, generally speaking, are of very fine quality. It also has a reasonable amount of maneuver space. But you'd think, when you request one of these facilities, that we had an American soldier occupying about every square yard of the Reservation. . . . So, very often there is a squabble over what facility you can have and when you can have it. Training schedules [must be] prepared in my headquarters 19 days before the first day of execution. We don't find out what ranges or training areas we will be authorized, however, until two weeks before training commences and there are frequent changes announced after that date. This means a terrific addition to the work load of my Operations Section. [Space is very hard to get] but I can get in my jeep right now and drive all over the Reservation, and it's difficult to find soldiers in the field training. I don't know what the answer to this problem is, but I feel there is a great waste of training space and range facilities because, somehow, they do not end up being used as scheduled.

. . . A great many enlisted personnel, including an alarming number of senior noncommissioned officers . . . are totally inadequate to be more than about corporal in rank. . . . This doesn't stem from any indifference on their part; most of them are very sincere, dedicated, and conscientious personnel. What it stems from is just a fundamental lack of brains.

. . . A hardship . . . is worked on organizations permanently stationed here in that we [do most] of our field training during the winter when the Reserve and National Guard . . . are not here because we know that in the summertime when they are here the training areas will be even more difficult to get. We spend a lot of time, as a result, wallowing around in the mud and the snow and the cold. Although this may be considered a hardship on the personnel, it actually is probably a blessing in disguise and serves to teach us better how to operate under those conditions.

Ammunition is generally available to us in adequate quantities. There is a needless administrative flap and difficulty involved in its procurement, however, that might well be cleared up Army wide. Regulations require that qualifications firing be accomplished on a fiscal year basis; ammunition, for some queer reason, is made available on a calendar year basis. It is difficult, as a result, to do any coherent planning and to be able to know for sure that you will be able to get the required ammunition without some kind of a fight somewhere along the way.

We have not been handicapped as to gasoline, although it is constantly talked of that a shortage is right around the corner. I think that perhaps if we were really operating as we should be—full-scale type operation—instead of sitting around with a handful of men and trying to train them—the gasoline shortage might become more severe. . . .

Commander ALFA (United States):

My . . . problem is the continued and long-term absence of anywhere up to 50 per cent of the personnel of my command on temporary duty and special duty administrative and logistical support of the Reserve summer training. . . . The requirements are, if anything, increasing. Thus, the first and most critical problem is the fact that the personnel who should be training in combat duty are not made available to me for the period when my unit is to train. At the moment, approximately one third of my command will be absent for the first half of the Basic Unit Training. It is doubtful whether many of them will come back for the second half of BUT. [Furthermore] every officer who is a platoon leader is to be taken away for one half of BUT and will not be physically present with the unit. A large number of these officers will be away for the other half of BUT. Thus, the platoon leaders who need the tactical

training and experience and who have never had it since commissioned over a year ago, will now be denied the opportunity of training with their platoon until they take the platoon into a platoon test. This problem could be solved by treating this unit in accordance with its tactical mission as one of the strategic forces in the United States and permitting me to have my soldiers and officers back for the period I am to undergo BUT. I believe that it is a fallacy to state that I shall have completed the training at the time I return from the camp in another state, because in fact large numbers of my personnel will never have been through the training at all.

... The maintenance facilities are present; however, because of a shortage of funds at Post level ... Ordnance [is not permitted] to stock their parts. This means that as soon as the training starts, and the vehicles begin to break down (as they will, for they have not been out in the field in some cases for two or three years), there will be approximately 45 days' loss per vehicle on deadline because the part—no matter how small—will not be requisitioned until the vehicle actually goes on deadline. ... The dollars saved in not permitting the unit a stockpile are [inconsequential] compared with the millions of dollars lost in equipment days spent idle in deadline and the invaluable training time lost because the vehicles are not available for the training of the personnel to whom they are assigned.

Commander KILO (United States):

... On training with an infantry division in a tank battalion, I am of the opinion that if you could isolate the battalion in an adequate armor training area, [you could] train the battalion even if you were short of personnel ... and have the unit join the division for various maneuvers [and] field exercises. ... It would probably help to give tankers real good tank training in terrain that is ideally suited for learning basic principles of armor, and then have them join their parent unit in the division.

... The battalion has assigned a TOE strength of 89 tanks; at present, 30 are operational, and 59 are in the Central Storage Pool. We actually have more than we can utilize.

... We are definitely under strength in trained crewmen. On our TD there is a reduction down to about 50 men per tank company, and out of those comes the support personnel; we can man approximately one platoon per company, so it gives us a maximum capability in the battalion at the present time of five tank platoons as opposed to an authorized TOE strength of five tank companies of 17 tanks each. ... There is a shortage of officers. ...

... The biggest problem we have in maintenance facilities is the area of our motor pool. The shop space itself is entirely adequate, but the outside area is composed of silt—a clay material that develops holes up to 8 or 10 feet deep during the spring thaws. ... Our range space is also inadequate. ... The replacements we receive at the present time, since our primary mission is one of training armor basic trainees—well, they might be QM, or they might be engineers, and occasionally we pick up armor type replacements. ...

... A sufficient number of experienced personnel? Experienced personnel to meet our mission—yes. For cadre—A cadre, especially—we have very experienced NCO's. Our B cadre is not as good, of course. It is reasonably good. We have some awfully high caliber NCO's for that type organization, but speaking as related to the full TOE strength—we do not have adequate personnel to put the tank battalion in the field with all of its equipment.

... Concerning platoon leaders, we are short of junior officers. Many of the officers we do have are from other branches and are on their two-year Regular Army commitments. ... They have the potential and capabilities, but no armor training except at Camp Irwin where platoon leaders were rotated to give them as much training as possible. ... Most of them know the tank, but they have had no training and experience in its control. ...

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- (U) What kind of training facilities are available for classroom instruction, driving practice and training, firing the 90-mm gun, firing the .30- and .50-caliber machine guns, conducting tactical exercises and tactical training, and conducting night operations training?

Commander DELTA (United States):

. . . We've had no problem getting places to fire the 90-mm gun—range space—except the question of scheduling. The ranges are there . . . but there's usually a hassle on the particular date that you'll be allowed to use them. The same thing can be said of .30- and .50-caliber machine guns. . . . We haven't done a great deal of night operations training . . . [it] has been restricted primarily to movement, the seizure of an objective before darkness falls, its organization for defense, its outpostting, and so forth, and the defense of it without movement during the night. We have attempted some night firing with the artillery battery—trying to work out some techniques for the use of searchlights that were available here. However, once again one of these range flaps came up into this, so that after . . . it had been assigned to us and we were on the range for firing . . . we received word that we had to cease, assist, come home—some other type activity that would use part of the impact area making our operation impossible. We have not really done any night tactical training in the sense of making night attacks with armored vehicles, and so on. . . . I think that it could be done at this post with the training areas that are now available which, generally speaking, are but little used at night.

Commander BRAVO (Germany):

Regarding tactical exercises and training . . . there is a lack of continuity, as I see it, in this battalion testing business. I think it is most effective if you can have a space of time to conduct platoon tests, then immediately . . . go on to the company test phase while the people still retain a bit of their knowledge of the platoon tests, and then from there—after a short period of training toward the battalion tests—complete the battalion tests. . . . I feel this could be done well within a six-weeks' period. . . . Our platoon tests were held early in May . . . our company tests were conducted in July and August; we have had a battalion pretest problem conducted at Grafenwoehr for 10 days, during which time we conducted a three-day exercise in September. . . . We will not take our battalion test until early December, and this is too wide a space of time, I feel, to get a true picture of the battalion's ability to go into combat now. I think moving this space of training together . . . would give a better picture of the effectiveness of a battalion based on the tests of the platoon, company, and battalion.

**Do you feel that you have enough facilities and support to complete your armor training mission? Your combat-readiness mission?**

- (U) Commander JULIETT (Germany):

Yes, I feel that we have enough. . . . I feel that the greatest value—the most important training facility—is a major training area. . . . We cannot train people in garrison. . . . A garrison is a deteriorating thing. We have got to get the people in the field. . . . We can say they can do so much on paper, which is fine, but when they get in . . . those major training areas, then we can see what we really have. But we don't know until we get there.

- (C) Commander HOTEL (Germany):

If we had the people . . . on the job, consequently being trained—we could say that we are adequately supported with facilities, etc., for our combat-readiness mission. Personally, I am of the opinion that we are incapable of our combat-readiness mission. . . . Probably the main [reason] is that tank guns have got to put holes in other tanks, and I'm not convinced that we can do it; we haven't done it in the range.

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- (C) Commander ALFA (United States):  
... There are not enough facilities and support to complete our training mission. . . . If we cannot complete our training cycle adequately, we certainly shall not be combat ready. We are not combat ready at the moment in any sense of the word.
- (U) Commander LIMA (United States):  
I think we certainly have enough facilities and we have enough support within the unit. . . . However, I will point out . . . that we are still saddled with this support mission here on the post for Reserve Component and National Guard and Regular Army units coming in and it is that element of the support that I would like to get away from completely.
- (U) What cause you, personally, the most operational difficulties and headaches?

Commander HOTEL (Germany):

Again, three problems: facilities, personnel, and time. . . . Somebody, somewhere, has to say this is important, or this is important. I find right now that I'm charged with athletics being a Number One priority thing. I find that educating my below-normal NCO's . . . is a Number One priority. I personally feel that learning how to fire the guns properly is a Number One priority, and somebody else says that the combat mission is the Number One priority. So I think it is a matter of sitting down and saying, "Stop! This is the thing that is important. . . . These others, devote as much of your efforts from the primary priority as you can safely devote." Actually, I suppose combat readiness should be our biggest thing here, and this—we'll, sometimes you get the impression this is the least important of everything.

Commander JULIETT (Germany):

I would say that . . . [it is] trying to fit all the various things we have to do in the time we have to do them, and then come out with something constructive that makes us feel, anyway, that we have done the job. I'm sure that we must keep ourselves oriented upon definite objectives. I think that if we don't have the objectives before us we will wander about blindly. . . .

. . . I think it's a case of "What do you want to do well?" Now, we believe that—training-wise—our ability to shoot, move, and communicate are the things we are looking for. All right. If we have a number of things to do, let's ask . . . "What is the end product here?" We must be able to shoot; we must be able to communicate; let's keep our maintenance up[and] train our drivers so that they can move. Now, those are four objectives; let's keep ourselves from getting fouled up, so that we can meet those objectives.

Commander MIKE (Germany):

. . . We get most of our headaches administratively. It has reached the point where it appears that an officer must personally investigate, prepare, and sign almost any type of administrative operation or requirement. We have such normal items as reports of surveys, personnel actions, investigation of each and every type of accident or injury regardless of whether it is sustained in the motor park or . . . on the softball diamond. . . . We receive pretty copulent correspondence from up the line on almost each and every delinquency report. . . . These, in turn, have to be processed through this headquarters, and they of course have a suspense date on them. . . . Even though an investigation has been conducted, especially in the case of a traffic accident, we are placed in the unenviable position of having to call in the individual and conduct practically an investigation of our own, particularly when the accident involves German nationals. . . .

. . . The biggest operational difficulty we have over here is sufficient space to get out and conduct the operational training of company- or larger-size units—preferably battalion—which we are not able to do. That, and maneuver damage. Maneuver damage is a never ending source of concern.



Commander NOVEMBER (Germany):

I believe our greatest headache is . . . getting properly qualified personnel in the jobs where they belong. . . . We had a tremendous turnover of personnel [in Korea] due to the limited amount of time that a man was required to remain in that combat area. I see no difference between the turnover of personnel in Korea and what we are having here in Germany today. . . . Getting qualified tank commanders, platoon leaders, and platoon sergeants is one of my most pressing problems. I do not think that it is a matter of the training they have received; it is a matter of personnel procedure. We get people from the theater who have spent six, seven, or eight years with the MP's in a grade of SFC, and we are told to retrain them as tankers. We get men from the States who have tankers' MOS's, and upon investigation we find that they have been janitors in classrooms at Fort Knox. In one instance, the individual could not be retrained as a tanker due to his age, so I have had him transferred to a transportation battalion. . . .

. . . I have given this a considerable amount of thought. I feel that the Armor Center should be made responsible for the unit in the field [that is,] to provide the people. I would like to be able to requisition directly upon Fort Knox for the men that I need. When they came to me I would know what type of training they had. Along with that would come a personnel evaluation from their supervisor there, and I could easily fit the men into my organization. As it is now, we get people from almost anyplace in the Army. As a result, it keeps the commander of an armor unit constantly retraining people and looking for better personnel to replace the people he has that don't fit into his organization. . . .

Commander ALFA (United States):

Personally, [I find] the most operational difficulties . . . in the area of personnel. . . . I have just been informed that approximately 150 profile cases from the other battalions in the regiment are to be lumped together within my battalion for the start of my Basic Unit Training, and that people with profiles that make them available for combat will be taken from me to replace these that are to be added. Thus, I will have a great number of soldiers training with me who I already know are not able to go into combat and who have not a satisfactory physical profile, in many cases, for training.

. . . [Something like] five per cent of my command [is on special assignment not connected with armor duties]. I was informed on their being assigned that I would never see them. The only time we see them is when we send an officer out to pay them. . . . Were I to go into combat, this means that five per cent of my command would be immediately vacant and these posts would have to be filled by someone. Most of these men have ratings; therefore, they keep men who are doing their jobs in the unit from holding these ratings. . . .

. . . Most . . . young officers, since their commissioning, have been waiting impatiently for just one thing—the day they can take a platoon that they can call their own into the field and work with it. . . . Those officers who are present for the first 50 per cent of BUT will have units that are empty of men in most key jobs. Additionally, they will not have the equipment to train the platoons. During the second half of BUT, when the men may possibly return, the officers are being removed on logistical support jobs. Thus, the first time the platoon leader will see his entire assembled platoon is the day that he embarks on the platoon tasks. This, I feel, is very unfortunate. We [may lose these young men] because they never have an opportunity to train in the job for which they entered the service. It also, of course, has an impact not only on my training ability but also on the combat readiness of my battalion at the completion of the training cycle.

. . . [Other difficulties are the] . . . shortage of funds at this particular post [and] the ambivalence of the headquarters above us toward their responsibilities—Reserve training vs. preparation for combat of the active unit. At the moment, the Reserve training has been given the priority. . . .

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I do not question the decision; I merely state it as a fact. This is the importance given the missions here, and therefore--with combat readiness being given a secondary mission--I am afraid we are going to obtain secondary results.

- (C) Do you honestly feel that your battalion (or company) is combat ready right now? If not, what do you need to become combat ready?

Commander OSCAR (Germany):

I do not consider the battalion to be combat ready. Six months from now we might be a damn good battalion. Right now we need training in just about everything at the platoon and company levels. I figure it would take us about nine months to get ready, and of course we would never be ready until we had had a chance to fire the main gun.

Commander NOVEMBER (Germany):

No, we are not combat ready. We are not up to strength, and we have too many people that have to be trained. Only 52 of my 72 tanks could roll if we had to. We need a considerable amount of field training.

Commander QUEBEC (Germany):

No, not really. I would like to take them through intensive live-fire training. . . . Before we could really be combat ready, we need better materiel, a gun that will kill the enemy tanks, an adequate and workable resupply system, and a hell of a lot of realistic combat training.

Commander DELTA (United States):

I do not feel that my battalion is combat ready right now. First of all, it's not a battalion. It's got about two companies-worth of people in it. It has been years since [it] participated in full-fledged battalion field training as a battalion. What is needed to make this organization combat ready is . . . personnel [and] materiel.

. . . To get my battalion combat ready, if I assume the immediate availability of M48A2's and M84's, would require by present plans that the replacement fillers--approximately 500 in number--come in; that they receive BCT, AIT, BUT, AUT. . . . As the plan now stands, there will not be an adequate opportunity to accomplish AUT or any type of field training exercise. This is almost criminal negligence--to send an American combat regiment to Europe and to give it a real operational role and to have denied it the opportunity to ever operate as a battalion and as a regiment. I would say . . . that it would take approximately eight months from the time we got started until we could be . . . really combat ready.

- (C) What is the training status of the officers in your unit? Do you feel they are all fully and well trained? Do you feel they are combat ready?

Commander DELTA (United States):

My officers are not fully and well trained for the particular type organization that we have. At the present time--this being a happy situation that did not exist earlier--I'm a fraction overstrength in officer personnel. Of these, however, I have one major . . . only, on the entire battalion staff, who will gyroscope with the battalion. In my companies, I have three company commanders who will gyroscope with the battalion . . . [but two of them] are lieutenants who will probably be replaced by captains prior to gyroscoping. . . .

. . . I have . . . perhaps seven technical service officers who are detailed to Armor for two years; at the time of their joining some have attended one or another of the Armor School officer classes . . . but they simply don't have the background in armor that permits them to go immediately to work and accomplish very much. . . . During the last six months I have had a great

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many RFA officers; such training experience as we do get into has helped their individual training, no doubt. But . . . you no sooner start to teach these people something than away they go again and the unit finds itself flat on its back with no one that knows how to do the job once again.

- (C) What is the training status of the NCO's in your unit? Are they fully and well trained? Are they combat ready?

Commander GOLF (Germany):

The training status of the noncommissioned officers in my unit, I feel, is very good, with one exception . . . the need, of course, for qualified tank commanders is paramount if we want to stay combat ready, and we have in this unit taken a very deep and serious interest in the reenlistment program. . . . I will perhaps be able to retrain enough . . . AUS personnel to man most of my tanks, or all of them, with tank commanders. . . . If I am faced with the problem of training tank commanders out of new replacements, I will—if I am allowed—set up a short period of training specifically designed for tank commanders only. It is very important that the tank commander become effective very, very quickly. If he is effective, then his tank crew will be effective.

Commander DELTA (United States):

NCO's in my unit are in very much the same boat that the officers are in. We are not ready to field a combat-ready battalion. I have, I would estimate, among my senior NCO's, approximately 50 per cent who are school trained one way or another—and not all of them are still doing the type job [they trained for]. . . .

. . . The Armored Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion for all practical purposes has no capability today. . . . We have larger tanks, heavier tanks, bigger guns; we have a new series of trucks; we have a new series of radios, a different SF artillery piece. But if you come right down to the bedrock of the matter, [we still have] a Recon Battalion that has almost the identical capability that the Recon Battalion of World War II had. All these wonderful new things have not yet reached us. . . . Most of our personnel are reasonably knowledgeable in conventional combat . . . but we are by no means ready for operations on the nuclear battlefield. We just don't yet know what it means. The post runs a CBR school, and I push as many of my people through it as I possibly can, both officer and enlisted. . . . But even what is taught is theory, theory. . . . It doesn't get people to the point where they have ability as opposed to knowledge, and I think we need more of that among either officers or enlisted men. . . .

- (U) What per cent of time in the last year would you estimate that your unit has spent in productive armor training?

Commander DELTA (United States):

I can't talk too fully about everything that's happened in the last year because I wasn't here for all of it. . . . [It] can perhaps be divided up into four blocks, each of three months. During the first of these three-month blocks, the battalion—on behalf of the regiment—organized and presented most of the Basic Combat Training and some of the Advanced Individual Training that was given to gyro packets that were destined for a sister regiment overseas; during the second three-month period in that year, the battalion . . . personnel were pulled out . . . [to manage] several hundred buildings on this post . . . and supply activities during the summer when Reserve and National Guard units were here, so that during that period one might say that virtually no training was accomplished. [The next] three-month period was devoted, by and large, to a modified Basic Unit Training in my battalion getting ready for [a] platoon test. . . . The last three-month period—we actually are still in it—is modified AIT, the primary purpose of which is actually to get us ready

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to be able to train our own permanent replacements. . . . During this time I'd say that virtually every hour of every day was covered by a training schedule for every organization in this battalion. Authority was given, for example, during the three-month period when we supplied so much support for Reserve and National Guard, to cancel any scheduled class for which 10 or fewer personnel could be mustered in attendance. . . . Most classes were so scheduled; this left a few personnel . . . not gainfully employed. So training was consolidated at the battalion level. . . . If we could actually add up the number of hours of training that individuals received during this year . . . I think that probably you'd find it to be 10 or 12 hours of training per week. I'd be very surprised if we hit it that high.

- (U) If you had a completely free hand and could establish your own "ideal" Armor Unit Training Program, what would you do? Please elaborate on how you would go about giving this training.

Commander FOXTROT (Germany):

For the Basic Combat Phase, I would see to it that each man became proficient in small arms. . . . In the Advanced Individual Phase, the most important thing, I feel, is tank gunnery. This is our weapon. Our whole unit is organized to support the main armament of the tank, namely the gun. . . . Tank driving [also] is Advanced Individual, but the gunnery is the most important. The Crew Training Phase overlaps with the Advanced Individual Phase. The loader learns how to load swiftly, without error; the gunner learns to gun; the driver learns to maneuver his tank; the commander learns to control all three. Crew training . . . is finalized in the Crew Training Phase by formal drills which would be discarded in time of war, but the basic idea of crew drill would always mingle in the actions of these four men who form a crew. Cadre training—I think it would consist only of a "quickie" refresher on methods of instruction. Cadre should not have to be trained; a unit should not be given cadre who do not have the knowledge. . . .

. . . The Platoon Phase: One of the most important things is that . . . there [be] no manpower drains on the platoon; that a man is not the loader one day, the gunner the next, and some time later is called upon to drive the tank. Given a platoon, then all the kinds of training scheduled—tactical driving, discussions on the formations possible for a platoon to use—should be stressed first, and learned. The road march is important . . . and then, of course, the combat formations . . . should be drilled into the crews. Then, and not in a disassociated manner—it should have been included all along—gunnery should be inculcated into the training. The movement of the platoon, the movement to the area, the securing of the area, should all be tied in on the most important equipment we have—the tank gun.

. . . The training of the company would involve going out to the field—suitable terrain, and enough of it—and . . . going through the sequence that is normal for any [tactical] operation . . . as often as time and terrain permit. It's the old theory that practice makes perfect . . . [but] the training is not available except in major training areas, and the major training is available to the unit only on a rotating basis, with many other units in the theater.

Commander GOLF (Germany):

If I had a free hand . . . I would make a few changes. . . . Delete 16 hours or more (you could actually delete 24 hours) from the Basic Combat Training Phase and add it to the Basic Unit Training Phase to give the crew more proficiency as a crew. Further, in the Advanced Individual Training Phase, I believe that I would either split my tank crews down to teams of two-and-two or three-and-one. I lean very strongly toward three-and-one. As you know, under the present program everyone . . . does the complete program as a unit. To expedite this—and I feel it would make stronger tank crews—I would have my drivers that I have picked out to be drivers go through a driver training program, and concurrently with that, the loader, gunner, and tank

commander go through a gunnery training program. I believe it would allow us more time in the BUT Phase for these various subjects and we would have better trained personnel. [Also] add time to the Tank Crew Proficiency Course. . . . To become an ideal tank crew, you must run and rerun the Tank Crew Proficiency Course, which is the only training course that we have set up that will train the crew to work together.

Commander JULIETT (Germany):

. . . In the Combat Phase, I think [the soldier] needs a great deal in the way of . . . being able to put his driving and shooting and any tactical tricks we may give him into tactical exercises and small unit problems. He should be kept almost entirely in the field for, I would say, the first eight weeks—he should not see the inside of a building.

. . . Now, where do we start this training? . . . An armor soldier . . . will require some [infantry-type training]. . . . But what we need to make a tank crew is to put him in the tank and train him right in the tank; and I think the cadre should be with him at all times. . . . I think the cadreman is going to find his job just about twice as hard, not only during the time he is training—but during the time that he is not with the man, he is going to have to be undergoing a certain amount of training and indoctrination himself. . . .

. . . I think that if [armor trainees] get the basic things in the Platoon Phase, with a good deal of emphasis on terrain appreciation, then they come up with a certain amount of combat sense. . . . Once the platoons are well trained, the Company Phase is relatively simple. A battalion is as good as its companies, and the company is as good as its platoon; and if the platoons are properly trained, you'll have a good battalion.

Commander KILO (United States):

. . . If I could train armor trainees in the Basic Combat Phase, it would be radically different from what we are doing now. I would train armor soldiers, and now we train infantry and branch-immaterial soldiers. There is a lot of information in current Basic Unit Training programs that is pertinent only to continuing into Advanced Individual Training for light weapons infantrymen or to heavy weapons infantrymen, and it has no application at all for armor soldiers. I would definitely have men assigned into tank crews. I would give them many of the academic subjects which would make them militarily proficient. I would give them Code of Conduct training, intelligence training—all those things that go to make up a basic soldier. . . . There are a lot of subjects I would do away with and substitute others, but I could not say just what they would be without a detailed analysis of the [program].

. . . Now, about the Advanced Individual Phase: Well, my ideal would be to know in advance that you were going to keep people all the way through the Company Phase. In the AIT Phase, you repeat things from the BCT Phase . . . so there are certain points where you could reduce that. . . . The ideal solution would be to keep . . . the same individuals in the same crews in the same platoons, just going farther along with their armor work as they became more technically qualified in the things they were already familiar with. They'd . . . qualify in as many positions as they could until they got to where they could fill in for each other or could assume more advanced duties. In the Crew Training Phase . . . [you would have more] opportunity for the crews to train together. . . . Then I'd give a tech spec test . . . and make sure that my people knew what an armor crewman, then an armor crew, then an armor unit, should know in a given amount of time at the end of these periods. I would try to use spec courses, and training tests, as training vehicles, then at the end of the course I would give them a test that they knew they were going to have to take. . . . As you went along and you found that you had weak points or weak people, you could emphasize their training. And you might find people that were capable in everything except one position—say, as the loader. This would be of primary importance during mobilization, because then you have to use maximum people. Some of them simply are not capable of performing

all of the crew duties, and . . . they ought to be isolated and recognized as secondary soldiers. . . .

. . . Now, the Platoon Training Phase—I think it should be done, initially, by making sure that all our people understand certain basic [principles]. . . . For instance, I would train them to . . . combat formations without the radios, and I would get them used to doing it by arm and hand signals. . . . All this would be designed to go from one step to another. I'd want them to know just exactly how a unit looks by having sufficiently demonstrated it. . . . I'd want them to go through it until they became very proficient in selection of location, selection of positions—all of those things should be just routine, practically—and I would also keep on giving the tech spec tests to see how they were progressing.

. . . Part of [the platoon leaders' training] would be done in the field and part of it would have to be classroom work. You'd have to find the best conditions to teach the people the basic principles of tank platoon movements and . . . I would insist that [the platoon leader] had . . . each part of troop leading procedure so well learned that he could take something from his brain and put it in there in practical application. The Company Phase should be mostly field work. Maybe all of it should be field work. . . . I would be sure to use the Proficiency Test or similar tests as training vehicles; this is the only way . . . you can determine where you need additional academic instruction. . . .

. . . [Why can't we] carry out the plan? . . . Basic trainees are being put through the armor training on a production basis and are being used to support other units. Our primary mission is to take care of them. Our other mission is to prepare them for combat. We have got a very definite maintenance mission . . . and this takes a very large part of our effort. We have a . . . Well, we don't have a tank battalion that is prepared to fight in combat. We don't have the people to train them and prepare them to fight in combat at this time.

Commander DELTA (United States):

What would I do if I had a completely free hand? . . . First of all I would gather unto me a qualified cadre. I would try to have no fewer than three officers per company. I would have a full battalion staff, and . . . no fewer than 25 enlisted men per company. I'd like to have 60 days to train this cadre and to lay out plans.

Then I would like to move the cadre to an adequate field training area. I would get outside of buildings and I would stay completely out. . . . We would do this, actually, pretty much as training was done during World War II. . . . I would have most of them taught by the individual companies, and with a certain amount of consolidation at the battalion level. I would start off . . . after the individual had received his minimum issue of uniforms and equipment, by running a continuous driver-training, driver-maintenance program. . . . I don't believe that an organization such as mine should go overseas in a combat role unless every man in every company is fully qualified to drive and perform driver-maintenance on every vehicle in that company.

This requires, incidentally, quite a change in our outlook on what officers should know. . . . We're busy at the present time telling our junior officers that the modern army has become so complicated that no individual in it—no individual within a small organization, if you will—can know and actually do all the jobs within that organization. At the platoon level, this certainly is wrong. At the company level there is certain merit for this viewpoint, but we're overdoing it. As a result, I've got certain officers and noncommissioned officers [who think] their function is to hold a swagger stick in their left hand, stand by wherever activity is going on, and supervise. They're ineffective supervisors, and the reason they're ineffective supervisors is that they don't know how. You can't teach a parrot to talk, for instance, unless you know how to talk yourself.

I would have the officers that would be running this training program that I envisage very well trained themselves. . . . We have got to develop these basic shoot, move, communicate skills in officer personnel. They must also be developed in the cadre that I would have to train this organization of mine with. I would get them out and completely away from an established garrison, because that's the only way I know that you can escape these various and sundry details that are thrust upon you. We build our elaborate military establishments and . . . then we saddle [ourselves] with the necessity for their maintenance.

Once I lead my organization into the area of which I speak, I would operate it much as a marine tank battalion that I [visited] during World War II operated. After a reasonable length of time in the training of their personnel, they combat-loaded all vehicles. . . . Training took place in three-week blocks. The personnel, every last one of them, were available . . . 24 hours a day during that period. They lived in the field, they slept in the field, they trained by day, they trained a reasonable amount of time by night. The particular training period lasted for about two and one-half weeks. The vehicles then were brought in for maintenance; the weapons were properly maintained during a three- or four-day period. At the end of that time, all of these vehicles were run back out to their dispersed formation on the area. The vehicles were locked up, left there, and the entire organization departed that training site for one week.

. . . During that one week and two week ends all the personnel of that organization simply went away and spent that time with their families and had no military functions whatsoever. At the end of that ten-day period, they came back and they started another vigorous training program.

In other words, we have here a block of four weeks. Of those four weeks, two and a half were spent on very vigorous training and four days in maintenance—one week off for every month. . . . You'll find that there is no more off time—nonduty time—involved in a system of that type than there is at the present time. You can't train a team if a significant number of the team members are absent constantly, and if the members who are absent on Monday are not the ones who are absent on Tuesday, and so on, and that's exactly what we find ourselves doing—Army-wide. We need a very bold step forward in the management of our training time in some system such as the one I have just advocated.

Commander ALFA (United States):

. . . Ideally, a unit going through the unit phases of this type of training program should be put off by itself under tactical conditions where it is able to [go through the training] with a minimum amount of interference. As long as a unit, particularly an armored unit, is present on a post where there are . . . higher headquarters, there is going to be this continual dichotomy as to whether we are going to have green golf courses [and] service activities or whether we are going to have a trained unit. If the money for both is not available, we are only kidding ourselves if we think we can do both at the same time. . . . It is probably the training that is going to suffer the most. . . . A post which is in a state of deterioration is readily visible to anyone who may pass, whereas a cancer within the training of a combat organization is usually not as visible, particularly if there is high esprit and morale among the non-commissioned officers within the unit and among the officers. . . . The unit will look sharp . . . but at the same time not be in an adequate state of training. It is not that the ATP is improper—as a matter of fact, you could probably make minor changes within the ATP in all sorts of things and still come out with a well-trained unit if the unit were left alone during its training and were permitted to train without the artificial interferences. . . .

- (U) Present plans call for a 35-week training program from the activation of an armored division to its combat commitment. Do you feel this time is sufficient?

Commander ALFA (United States):

It is difficult for me to answer this question because I am not in a division but in a separate organization. It is my thought that the 35-week training period is sufficient. There will, however, be variations because the state of training of the division at the end of the 35 weeks will depend to a much larger extent than is usually recognized upon the personality of the commander—his force, his vigor, and specifically his interest in the tactical training of the unit.

Now, as to ways and means by which the time could be reduced and preserve the necessary proficiency level, I believe a division is probably not as susceptible to the type of distractions that interfere with the training schedules in this particular smaller unit. A major general is normally capable of resisting pressures of this sort better than the lower ranking individual who may command a battalion which is separate or a regiment which is separate. However, again—my general thought is that with any unit, no matter what the type of unit, if it is . . . put out in the field where with a minimum of interference it can do its training—then I think the division will . . . be much better trained.

Of course, obviously again, it depends on availability of personnel; the type of support that's given, particularly in an armored unit; the status of Ordnance supply so that the vehicles will actually be available for the men to train and spend a minimum amount of time in deadline; and lastly, of course, the necessary ranges, and particularly training areas, so that realistic training may be set up for the unit.

- (U) Has your unit engaged in any CPX's or maneuvers within the last year? Were the exercises of value to your unit?

Commander HOTEL (Germany):

I've said this before, but I reiterate it: The exercise value of present field training exercises in Europe to tank units—except for four officers in that unit—is zero. The tankers get nothing out of it except the indirect advantage they get from the officers' training.

Commander GOLF (Germany):

This organization has conducted a number of command post exercises. I think they have been very effective. I had the privilege of serving on one at the corps level and it was very beneficial to me. . . . I don't believe that the combat command, division, and battalion type field training exercises are of any relevant benefit to the individual tank crewman. We must make the tank crew proficient at platoon and company level training. . . .

Commander ALFA (United States):

. . . The experience of this battalion for the previous year is divided into two separate and distinct parts. In the first half of the year, before the battalion returned to the United States, they had all sorts of CPX's, maneuvers, field exercises, reconnaissance operations, firing, and everything else, which were of extreme value to the unit. . . . Since the return to the United States and the creation of this new unit, we have had no CPX's [etc.] of any sort. . . . The value to the unit of [these] exercises in Germany is self-evident. It was not only valuable training tactically; the unit received a great morale boost from the awards which it won. . . .

Commander DELTA (United States):

My battalion has engaged in very few CPX's, maneuvers, field exercises, recon operations, and the like during the last year. During the spring, a little less than a year ago, the battalion did conduct reconnaissance platoon tests. Nothing further of this nature then happened until the month of October



or November, when we began going out for periods of training in preparation for the platoon tests that were held in December. In December the battalion was turned out on a CPX which was run by the regiment. This CPX gave a workout to the battalion headquarters and to the company commanders, executive officers, and a mere handful of personnel in the company. The CPX was very short. It lasted 24 hours, and it was very poorly umpired and got all fouled up, and there were many miscommunications. Confusion reigned supreme. This was caused by a lack of training experience of the battalion headquarters, and a lot of paper directives that were put out caused it to come to pass.

## 2. Tank Platoon Leader Training Requirements

Do you feel the platoon leader replacements you received over the past few years were adequately trained before they joined your unit? What do you consider the chief deficiency or weakness in the training they received? Do you have any suggestions for improving the training they currently receive?

Commander NOVEMBER (Germany):

. . . I have received two platoon leaders who had had no prior armor experience. However, in Korea I received platoon leaders who had been through the basic course, and I felt that they did not have enough practical experience at platoon level. . . . I had a feeling that they could sit down and talk about how a company should operate, and how a battalion should operate, but when it got down to actually taking care of the details and techniques of running a platoon, they didn't have it.

Commander KILO (United States):

No, I do not feel the platoon leader replacements we have received were adequately trained . . . to go into a unit that was already trained. We run into the problem of having to train our lieutenants. . . . They are well grounded academically in tactics up to the battalion level, and it's well for them to have this information. The primary deficiency is individual proficiency equipment-wise. They've not had any experience in the techniques of movement and control. . . . They have had it all explained to them academically, but to take these men and put them into combat as they are currently trained in our schools—well, I don't think this is the proper procedure.

Commander LIMA (United States):

No, definitely. They were not adequately trained before they joined the unit. . . . I think that they have a knowledge—a working knowledge—of theoretical techniques. I say working in that they've never practiced it, but at least they think about these things, and they know why certain things should be done. But the difference between having this knowledge and applying it in a field situation is tremendous.

. . . If I had my way, for instance, from the moment a student arrives at Fort Knox for the Basic Course, he would never see the main post of Fort Knox until at least 8 to 10 weeks later. He would go out in the field, and he would be in the field seven days a week for the majority of his training period there, and he would be eating, living, breathing, and using tanks—period. . . .

Interviewer: Would you be in favor of 90 per cent classroom work at Fort Knox, and 10 per cent field training for the AOB classes?

Commander LIMA: The only difficulty is this. . . . Somebody is going to say, "Fine. We'll give them half this work—the platform work at Knox. Then we'll send them out to the tank battalion for the practical work." And all of a sudden, here at the tank battalion come all of these eager, bright-eyed future tankers . . . and while they're here, my [regular] training program just goes by the board completely and I have the mission of training these people. . . . You've got to set up specific units that have nothing but a primary mission of training these young lieutenants, and not bother [units] already established. . . . In other words, if we're going to have a unit which has the designation of the tank battalion, all right—let's make it a tank battalion. Let's not make it a group of labor personnel or a group of instructor personnel. . . . At Knox and at the School . . . set up specific instructor planning and working groups that take these people out in the field . . . [a battalion or two] of tanks, with the primary mission of training young lieutenants. . . . If they've got the leadership potential, they'll learn it in eight weeks or they'll never get it.

Commander ALFA (United States):

The platoon leader replacements which I have received since I have been with this unit have, in general, been reasonably well trained as far as school training goes before arriving here. This is their first assignment upon leaving the Armor School. . . . Unfortunately, they have arrived in an artificial

situation perhaps, but one that is going to confront them for 90 percent of their time in the United States. . . . Perhaps one of the first deficiencies in the training these young men received before they came here . . . [is that it] was aimed at the tactical training and commanding of the platoon [but since] arrival here—they have now been in this unit for over a year—they have been unable to tactically train or command a platoon at practically any time. I think that we must, in the training before the young platoon leader comes for duty, precondition him to what we call the facts of life within a unit within the ZI. . . . And they must know before arriving that they are going to be bound up in all sorts of paper work, and courts, and boards, and . . . miscellaneous temporary duty. . . . If they don't expect this, then I'm afraid we automatically set them up to leave the service at the end of two years.

. . . I think the chief deficiency or weakness—and it probably is not in the training that these young men receive—perhaps in their personalities—is the general lack of initiative on the part of these young officers. . . . They wait to be told what to do before they move.

. . . They do not have adequate hardware knowledge when they come in. There is no substitute for the young officer at the platoon level knowing his equipment well. . . . I think we must be sure that these young officers do not worry about dirtying their fingers when getting down into the nuts and bolts of operating their platoons. They must know more than just the theory; at that level they must also be able to actually work with the vehicle and know what makes it . . . run, and exactly the same thing for weapons. Furthermore, in combat [they will have to do] a great deal of the training of the replacements. . . . So my suggestion . . . would be to cut out some of the nice-to-know things that they may need in 5 to 10 years . . . and juice up a little bit some of the things they must know as platoon leaders, with particular emphasis on the hardware.

. . . It's hard for them to really be motivated toward learning the things they need to know unless they have actually confronted the normal situation they will hit within the platoon. If there were some way in which these young men could be confronted with a platoon on arrival, and have the chance to work with it for a day or two . . . then perhaps they might learn more in the School. This again would seem to favor a return to the system whereby a man went to a unit for a short time before going to school, so that he knew what he did not know prior to going to the School.

#### What steps have you taken to provide on-the-job or additional training for the junior officers?

Commander JULIETT (Germany):

The value of a platoon lies in training the platoon leader as a platoon leader. . . . I would like to have this young officer know how to take care of the equipment . . . and know that his men can be trained by him, if necessary, in knowing how to do the job. . . . I feel that the company commander has a very definite stake in training his platoon leaders.

. . . The company commander must be out there, or a senior officer, to go through these things with the platoon leaders, and . . . the older officer must realize that these people are really not trained. They must realize that initially in a tank—a tank to many people is a confusing thing—noise, vibration, a radio screaming signals in your ear—it's all somewhat nerve-racking. And trying to control five tanks, and your own tank, and so forth, is a . . . m bigger job than most people realize. And when you say that a basic officer should be trained just at platoon level—that is, primarily at platoon level—believe me, that's enough.

Commander NOVEMBER (Germany):

I have encouraged the officers within the battalion—not only the junior officers—to take extension courses from the various service schools. It's rather a pet peeve of mine that the pressure is put on these officers to take [university extension] courses because they want to remain in the Army.

They take such subjects as American History, or German I and German II. To me, that does not increase their professional knowledge one bit. I feel that they need extension courses that will help them in their daily duties rather than something that is remote and will never be of any value to them.

Commander DELTA (United States):

I have managed to provide very many on-the-job training opportunities to my junior officers. I have all of my company maintenance officers at the present time in the Armor School for one week for a "quickie" maintenance course. I try to take full advantage of school opportunities . . . things that develop the real how-do-you-do-it skills. I have one officer at the present time in the Communications Course; I have just received an officer back from the Tank Maintenance Course; and I have another officer lined up who will start the next Communications Course. Of course, these particular schools are out of the regiment.

Within the regiment, I give individual officers missions to prepare certain things . . . beyond the normal type activity. I'll bring junior officers in and require that they write a particular portion of a CPX. I have established a battalion drivers' school which sees to it that every junior officer—or every officer, for that matter—becomes driver qualified, and this course includes the preventive maintenance services.

I am setting up . . . a one-day training opportunity in what I personally call terrain visualization, where we are going to teach the officers [and the senior noncommissioned officers] how to look at a two-dimensional map and have it stand out as if it were a three-dimensional map. I find that our map-reading training is very, very poor. . . . In the hopes of training these people so that they can go back and train others, they will construct terrain on a sand table from a map; they will make a map from another sand table already constructed; they will learn how to make color-layer overlays that indicate elevations on topographic maps [and] how to make terrain profile diagrams; they will learn how to do ridge lining [and] stream lining.

I have also a battalion officers' school in operation two hours each week. The subjects . . . so far include ammunition, communications, civil disturbances, riot control, use of the Federal troops in support of civil government. We are currently engaged in training on air transport operations, and we have many, many more subjects scheduled for the future.

I also am emphasizing the use in each company of what we call a training officer, and [they] . . . have the responsibility for schedule preparation and inspection of training . . . even though there is not very much training going on at present. They meet daily with my Battalion S3 and each day they receive a little training on instructional techniques. . . . We have a program afoot for endeavoring to improve the ability of our junior officers to speak, to present training. We plan there to record classes for each man on a tape recorder so that the man can then sit down with a qualified, more senior officer . . . play back the tape and pause at the points where corrective advice is indicated . . . and have him take notes on this interview in the hope that we will not find the same mistakes being repeated.

We also have a program which is definitely in the "nice-to-know" . . . category. Once a month, for one hour, one of our officers will present a book review to all of the other assembled officers in the battalion from the Army's selected reading list. We have done this because I feel that we are so busy that the average one of us does not have time any more to do the amount of reading of that type that he should. . . .

**What kind of field training do you think would be most effective for teaching command, control, and tactical principles to new platoon leaders fresh out of school?**

Commander NOVEMBER (Germany):

. . . One of the greatest fallacies in our school system [is that] we spend a year going to school, and then we are given an assignment that has no

relation to what the individual has been schooled in. Probably four or five years later he might get an assignment related to what he has been schooled in; this doesn't generally apply to platoon leaders, but to the more senior officers. The best way [to train the new graduate] is to give him a platoon and put him under the supervision of an experienced company commander, and give him plenty of field duty. . . .

Commander GOLF (Germany):

. . . Too many platoon leaders are allowed to go out and run a problem on their own, with nobody really observing them very closely. . . . It is very important that initially, when [the platoon leader] gets out of school, gets his first command, it is made absolutely certain that his troop-leading procedures [and] command principles are correct. If they are verified and corrected at that time, I don't believe you'll have any future problems with them.

Commander BRAVO (Germany):

. . . We need . . . mobility in a place where, after giving the usual explanation and demonstration, we can put them on the ground and let them command their platoons. Let them get the feel of moving a platoon, not necessarily just in a tactical exercise--but something to stimulate their training by having an opposing-forces concept, a platoon against another. . . .

Commander LIMA (United States):

. . . The small [platoon] type of tactical exercise is good, and the more of these small tactical exercises we run, the better we will be able to handle these troops . . . there's no substitute for training in the field. [The platoon leader has] got to do his maintenance in the field, not in the maintenance shop or in the maintenance yard. . . .

. . . The more realistic you can make these problems, the better off you are. They do some things here that are extremely worth while. They do some live firing, and they use tank vs. tank. . . .

**It has been proposed that platoon leaders be trained on the job with a minimum amount of formal schooling. For example, an officer apprentice could be assigned as an assistant to an experienced platoon leader and would later be given his own platoon after he had learned his job. What is your opinion of this proposal?**

Commander GOLF (Germany):

I don't feel that platoon leaders could be better trained on the job with less formal military education. I think the present setup is fine. I have had the experience of having a young platoon leader with a senior platoon leader in a parachute troop. We were authorized two officers per platoon, a platoon leader and an assistant platoon leader; and in every case the platoon leader was an experienced individual--normally, a first lieutenant--and the assistant platoon leader was inexperienced. And it was habitual that the assistant platoon leader received very little training and guidance from the senior platoon leader, and his on-the-job training was of little value. I am definitely opposed to that.

Interviewer: Is it your feeling that this assistant platoon leader could have acquired more knowledge had he been given a platoon and been merely guided by his commander rather than following in the shadow of his senior platoon leader?

Commander GOLF: I certainly do. I think it's a waste of talent and valuable training time to place a young officer . . . under a platoon leader for on-the-job training. One, he is very susceptible to picking up bad habits unless you have got a first-class platoon leader leading him--and every platoon in the Army does not have a first-class platoon leader. Two, he picks up a lot of bad teaching points--training points--and also, he can get into bad habits in troop-leading procedures and command problems. . . . [He] should be

directly under the command of the company commander or be responsible for his platoon—make his mistakes and let his commander help him over his hurdles and correct him.

It has been suggested that one of the chief reasons many junior officers fail to do what is needed and required is the fact that they do not know what their duties are and what is expected of them. Do you feel this is true? What distinguishes a competent platoon leader from a poor one?

Commander DELTA (United States):

Certainly there are cases where [junior officers] don't have a clear understanding of what is expected of them, but the usual case is, I believe, that they simply don't know how. As a result . . . sometimes the individual is a little bit reluctant to get in and take the control that must be exercised over any successful venture. I find this—I've personally a bug on the subject of maintenance—I find this to be very, very true in my motor pool. The platoon leader—and the same comment might be made of the company commander as well—finds it an embarrassing experience to go to his motor pool during the conduct of stables, for example, to have some corporal bring up an odd-shaped metal part and say, "Sir, what should I do with this? It looks bent." The first question that the leader asks him is, "Son, did it come off a jet, or a truck or a cannon?" When a man knows so little about a particular subject, it's hard to jump in and get wet the very first time. . . .

Commander HOTEL (Germany):

A good platoon leader is a good tanker. He is the best gunner in his platoon. He knows the maintenance on his tank. He . . . can do the job of every man in the crew. If he can do this on his own tank, he can dare to do everything else that a platoon leader has to do. He gets involved in tactics, and all these things, but if you don't know the jobs on the tank, you probably won't live long enough to apply the tactics to begin with. . . .

Commander BRAVO (Germany):

I think what distinguishes a competent platoon leader from a poor one is the ability to apply the knowledge he has gained and to supervise the men in his platoon in the course of their training, as against the poor one, who has perhaps a greater amount of book knowledge but simply cannot apply it in the way of supervision. . . . They cannot, with a few exceptions, get down there and tell a man. . . .

Commander ALFA (United States):

In general, I think initiative is perhaps one of the key words here. The poor platoon leader is generally the one who sits and waits, and who makes excuses. The good platoon leader is one who has initiative, who does something. He may start off wrong, but he gets something done. He gets a job and analyzes the mission ahead of time, and when he is given an order, if he is good he is actually already working on that very thing and moving forward. He must be a man who is not afraid to know his men, and know their problems and their difficulties, and actually lead the men personally.

. . . Too many of these young men are wrapped up in the prerogatives of their rank, and too little wrapped up in the responsibilities of their rank. And, once again, they find the 8-to 5 schedule more to their liking than the 24-hours-a-day demands of leadership of troops. This is perhaps the greatest area of difference between the really competent platoon leader and the poor one. . . .

Commander DELTA (United States):

The differences . . . are certainly great. What I ask for in my platoon leaders is that they be physically energetic. I want them to have the fire in them when I receive them. I find it's much easier to calm them down and guide their energies in the right direction than it is to inspire them in the first place. . . .

**Do you consider your own attendance and training in the various service schools to have been satisfactory for the various duties to which you have been assigned? What revisions can you suggest which you think would better meet your needs?**

Commander JULIETT (Germany):

The Armor School, I feel, did a great deal to prepare me for my job, specifically along the S3 line. I find that what I went through the School, much that was given to me in the way of operations orders, estimates, basic exercises, and so on, has stood me in good stead. . . . Concerning revisions, the only thing I can say is that I thought that perhaps the Advanced Course could be shortened. I feel that there is a good deal of fat on the program, or there has been in the past, I know, and perhaps the fundamentals or meat of the matter—the requirements that a young staff officer needs to prepare him to command in the field—could be cut down to specifics and approached in a more realistic manner.

. . . I think the CPA is a good idea. . . . The handling of personnel situations, no matter what level they are on—the handling of officers, the handling of men—is to me really the whole thing. I feel that this is a problem that is with us all the time, and a man that can take more along personnel lines, not only placing the right man in the right spot, but—How do you minister to his needs? How do you reward him? How do you discipline him? What are your objectives? What are your ideas? . . .

Commander ALFA (United States):

My own attendance and training in the various service schools has been most satisfactory. . . . In many cases I would prefer to have a man who had never been to the Advanced Course, let's say, but who is a hot-shot fine officer, to a man who had been to the Advanced Course but was not very competent. In almost any school system—and this is a problem of any bureaucracy—a good steady mediocrity can get someone through. And therefore an attempt to treat graduates of a school as all being equal just because they graduated from the school (I think) assigns undue importance to the school and to what the school can do, given the quality of students that are exposed to the training.

**Do you think the armor educational and training system should prepare officers to specialize in a particular job or should it be designed to prepare them broadly for many jobs? Do you think it is possible to do both?**

Commander JULIETT (Germany):

. . . [With the platoon leader] you're starting out with an individual who basically knows nothing. I don't think it is good to hold him in a classroom too long. He should get out and get with it. I think he should be thoroughly grounded in the equipment whenever he gets to his unit. We can train him here. But the basic course should be shortened.

. . . I feel that perhaps we would do much better if (after we have given [officers] the quick basic indoctrination) we took them out to the field—and then, about five years later, we brought them back for the Company Officers' Course—and then, maybe eight or nine years later, for the Advanced Course, and then we wouldn't have people who are basically platoon leaders trying to think in terms of combat commands. I feel that our school system is not perhaps geared to what we actually have on our hands. We have a young officer who is an inexperienced officer, and I feel that he should get his job done with the troops before he comes back to get his education broadened.

Commander ALFA (United States):

. . . Something must be done to make the young officer more willing to acquire at least one specialty within his branch. . . . Only in this manner will we produce sufficient officers that actual rotation of these special jobs can be

possible, and also by this we prepare better platoon leaders and better company commanders because they have some knowledge. But without command emphasis from the highest levels being given to this program . . . (and as long as the prize appears to go to the man who does not become a specialist) we are going to continue to have a deficiency of specialty. In my opinion, the Army is facing a critical period . . . when the Reserve officers with 20 years of service depart.

. . . Perhaps even a compulsory attendance at one specialized course during the first five years of his commissioned service would do much to lift this bugaboo. But this is an area of difficulty. We must train [enough] specialized men on materiel . . . so that there is not later a stigma or a penalty imposed upon the officer who did take the specialized course.

Commander GOLF (Germany):

The Army educational and training system should, I feel, prepare an officer for a particular job, rather than broadly for many jobs. I don't think that it is possible to effectively do both. As an example, I had a first lieutenant in my company as a platoon leader. All of a sudden one morning, he's Battalion S2. He is not effective on the job. It takes a very long time before he is effective, because Intelligence work is a very vital function of a battalion operation, especially when in combat. So I believe that an individual for an S2 type job should receive specialist training in that job and remain in that particular field. . . .

Commander DELTA (United States):

I think we can draw a graphical illustration of my viewpoint on this subject. . . . Along the abscissa I would lay off the [individual's] scope of knowledge . . . of pertinence to the military profession, and along the ordinate, I would register the depth of understanding that an individual has in this particular item, under the scope that we are considering. Then you can block out certain areas which would have scope vs. depth of understanding as their measurements. I feel that—among the personnel with whom I am associated—too much emphasis is currently being placed upon broad scope at the expense of depth of understanding. This makes for a very fine conversationalist—someone who knows a little bit about everything—but I do sincerely feel that we have gotten such tools of the trade now that a greater depth of understanding is needed in many things that we are doing. . . .

. . . I think that the more intelligent man will develop a greater area of knowledge . . . and I therefore think that those of lesser mentality should be the ones who should be kept narrow in scope . . . and if in a sufficiently narrow scope they cannot get a sufficiently deep understanding, then we should eliminate them. And I think we should train the people of higher intelligence, so that we can give them a broad scope to a reasonably deep . . . understanding.

. . . So far as armor leaders are concerned, three things that I feel our junior armor leaders need [to learn] are—move, communicate, shoot. . . . In the field of move, which not only involves driver skills but also involves the maintenance of a piece of equipment in such condition that it can move, I would say that it would require training opportunity—school opportunity—probably approaching 100 days. . . . In the field of communicate we can get by with about a one-month school . . . since most of our communications maintenance is done by higher echelons. I feel that in the field of shoot every junior armor officer needs a course of probably not less than six weeks.

. . . Now this parallels my own experience a little bit, and that probably modulates my attitude. . . . At the beginning of World War II, when [the School] first came into existence, the courses they gave were very similar to the Associate Courses, and AOB—such courses as we are now giving. I think you will find that this very soon proved to be unsatisfactory to the field. . . . [The Armor School then] established four courses for officers—one in maintenance, one in gunnery, one in communications, and one in tactics. This was done in answer to the pleas from the commander in the field to give him people that really could do, instead of just talk about doing, these particular jobs.



**Should a line officer be permitted to enter a special field upon being commissioned? If no, how much branch service should he complete before specialization?**

Commander GOLF (Germany):

. . . I feel that all officers should initially start their careers from a line-type organization. And I feel that they should remain in a line-type organization until they have had command level at a company for a minimum of three years. . . . It is impossible for them to visualize the requirements and problems of a line company in combat unless they have served themselves in a line-type unit. . . . We have too many requirements—this is from my combat experience—placed on line units by personnel that have had very little line duty, or no line duty at all. They send a combat requirement down that is completely ridiculous . . . because they don't understand, and it creates hardships both ways before the matter is straightened out.

Commander HOTEL (Germany):

Every officer should be like the Marines: every man is a fighter, and then something else. Every officer in an armored unit should be a tanker. He should go right there until he has got the experience in it, and then he should be permitted to get off on these subsidiary things. The reason for this is that every armored officer wears the branch insignia and carries an armored MOS. And a young officer who comes into a unit, say a 1203, and moves into an assistant adjutant's or some such job, and gets out of the Army in 21 months, and then gets recalled in four years to fight a war—it's presumed . . . that he's a tanker. And to find out that he's not, in case of war, is a costly way to find out. People are going to get killed finding out. I think they should be qualified as tank leaders, and then moved to the other things

**In the Armor School, the present emphasis is on developing a broad knowledge of the basic branch and on the acquisition of knowledge and skills necessary for specific command and staff position. Do you think this concept should be retained in the Armor Basic and Advanced Courses?**

Commander NOVEMBER (Germany):

I feel that there should be a line between the Basic Course and the Advanced Officers' Course, and that the Basic Course should prepare—or train—the officer to be a platoon leader and nothing else. Of course he can't run a platoon unless he has some understanding of what the company is doing, and also the battalion should be touched upon, but that should be just the framework upon which his main interest, which is the platoon, is hung. He should stay with what the platoon is doing.

Commander BRAVO (Germany):

As for the present emphasis on developing a broad knowledge of a basic branch, I feel that this concept should perhaps be retained, but modified to some degree in that I feel that there are too many [courses]—if I can think in terms of my own course—that give too broad a scope . . . for command, and especially for higher command. . . . Basically being geared to battalion level at the Armor School, the training conducted there would prepare, in my mind, a man for any command.

**At the present time, armor officers attend a Basic Course immediately upon being commissioned, and then after several years return for the Advanced Course. Do you think some provision should be made for officers to attend an intermediate course between the Basic and Advanced Courses?**

Commander BRAVO (Germany):

I feel that the 16-week Basic Course immediately upon being commissioned is essential. It gets the man in the proper spirit for knowing what he must do when he gets down to that command. When he gets down to that platoon, he

has a working knowledge of what a platoon leader must do. But the five-year period before we return him to the Advanced Course—without any intervening courses—I think is a drawback to the individual. . . .

Interviewer: You definitely advocate an intermediate school between AOB Course and the Advanced Course?

Commander BRAVO: Yes, I would. I do. . . . It may be a specialized course in communications, or maintenance, or whatever other courses are essential. But I do think there is a gap there. There's a period in those formative years of an officer when he should become very familiar with these things, rather than waiting and then trying (as in many cases) to drive into him, as a captain or a major or even as a lieutenant colonel, the importance of maintenance, for instance. It just doesn't work in most cases. They've lost their interest in it—their desire to learn it.

. . . I strongly feel that there should be an intermediate course somewhere between the Basic Course and the Advanced Course. Perhaps this is the place to get some of this specialization in for some of these people who are interested in other phases, but it is essential for a commander to have a thorough and fundamental knowledge.

Commander GOLF (Germany):

Under the present program, where an officer normally attends a basic 16-week course immediately upon being commissioned, and then normally returns after five years to the Advanced Course—I feel that this is too long a period without formal military education. If no other type of course can be devised, I feel that somewhere during the intermediate period he should be sent back to the Armor School for a very thorough refresher course which would cover all the latest types of equipment, the latest tactical doctrine, and the Army thinking—and given some information on future developments. This adds a little to the enthusiasm that the officer has for the service, and he would feel that he really has something to look forward to in the way of equipment, new training doctrine. It will cause him to (shall I say) scramble his brains a little more and think ahead, and perhaps come up with some new ideas himself that he can present to the Army if he knows the line of thought of the Armor branch. What are we working on? What do we want? Many good ideas can be brought up from the field if this enthusiasm is created down at the lower levels.

Commander NOVEMBER (Germany):

I do not think that an intermediate course is required. As I mentioned before, I think that an officer should get some troop duty before he goes to the Basic Course. . . . They [the courses] have, say, nine months for . . . everything that is essential, and they have two months' time left over so they start padding the thing. Rather than padding it, it would be desirable if . . . troops were available so the men could get out in the field with the troops and practice there in the School what they have learned in the classroom.

Interviewer: . . . At what level of command do you feel that the curricula are being padded?

Commander NOVEMBER: It's been my experience that it was padded at the Advanced Course at Knox. I also think the Command and General Staff tour was padded considerably. I don't know whether that has been changed recently or not.

Commander FOXTROT (Germany):

I do feel that a gap of five years away from school is an unnecessarily long time, and I advocate shorter and more frequent courses. It has been my experience in the two service schools that I have attended that the length of the course detracts from the actual enjoyment of the course and the amount learned. . . . I would advocate a shortening of courses, with possibly a week or even two weeks at the end of the course for the officer to review the

instruction he has received . . . at his own pace, and guided by his own conception of what he needs and will require in his future assignment. . . . Granted that in the next assignment instructional material [is] gone over, but this is not the same as a review at the officer's leisure, on time provided by the Army, and motivated by the initiative of the individual.

Commander ALFA (United States):

. . . I am a strong believer in the motivational aspects of the short period of troop duty prior to attending any school. Now it may be argued that the second lieutenant goes out inadequately prepared then, and makes perhaps a fool of himself in the faces of the men he is to command; but I have a little more faith in the general preconditioning training of these people--plus the fact that nobody really demands an awful lot of the young second lieutenant the moment he is graduated--and I think the Basic Course is perhaps a little bit better a little bit later on after the man has learned what he doesn't know in the unit.

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### 3. Tank Commander Training Requirements

Do you ever give the tank commander a chance to act as platoon sergeant or the platoon sergeant as platoon leader for purposes of training? Do you think this is a good training idea?

Commander ALFA (United States):

The platoon sergeants in this organization generally act as platoon leaders a good portion of the time because the officers are not present. . . . I think that it is an excellent training idea for the noncommissioned officer to serve one grade up every now and then. It has been traditional in my battalion. The success of this sort of training was shown about a half year ago in Europe when all the officers were away umpiring, and then suddenly the battalion was called upon to go into the field and represent an aggressor mechanized regiment. Under the sole control of the noncommissioned officers . . . the performance of the battalion was outstandingly superior.

. . . I think that in too many units they are inclined to treat the noncom as a noncom, no matter what, and I think very strongly that we miss a very great training opportunity by not permitting [the noncom] to fully take over as platoon leader or as officer. . . .

What is the biggest deficiency of the average tank commander in your unit?

Commander BRAVO (Germany):

I think there's a greater deficiency [than map reading, etc.] . . . and that is the question of CBR and reaction to atomics. With this new era of special weapons, I feel that a great deal of emphasis will have to be placed on not only reaction to atomics, but all the means available to an individual to protect himself. . . .

. . . The men that I have observed—when the atomic simulator went off, they were more awed and wanting to view it as they would a fireworks display. They did not and could not realize, I feel, that if that were the real thing they . . . should be taking cover whether it was a preplanned, friendly shot or whether it was an enemy shot. In the natural, necessary preparations in the case of a friendly shot they were weak, and they certainly did not react fast enough for a known enemy shot. Similarly, the question that ties in with this is dispersion. They have not geared themselves to the vehicles remaining in close proximity, etc. The normal dispersal under conventional means is good, but when it comes to reaction to atomics they are very slow. I think that is very probably—right now, in this battalion—what I would consider my major deficiency.

Commander DELTA (United States):

The average tank commander in my unit [has] a twofold deficiency. . . . The first "fold," which is his fault, is his lack of fair and adequate sense of responsibility for the equipment assigned to his platoon. The second deficiency is simply that he is not adequately conversant right to the ends of his fingertips with all the skills that he must exhibit to become that effective, and of course that's our fault somewhere along the line for not having made the training opportunities available to him. I'd like to cite the technique used in the Russian Army for developing this sense of pride and ownership of the vehicle. . . . It is my understanding that a tank crew is assigned to a tank at the time that the serial number for that particular tank is decided upon and it starts its manufacture. The tank crew . . . follows this tank down the production line. . . . They accompany this tank virtually for the rest of the time, until they are no longer available for this purpose. If this tank is transferred from Troop A to Troop B, the sergeant and his crew go with the tank. That is their tank, and they'd better see to it that nothing ill happens to it.

Would you favor a separate and formal training program for tank commanders to be administered by the unit?

Commander JULIETT (Germany):

I think it would be a pinch at this level to conduct a school such as you have outlined. It would probably work out for the first two or three weeks without strain, and then you'd find that the commitments and the requirements placed upon us for the officers, various noncoms, etc. . . . would finally come to a place where we would have to drive the thing continually. I don't think it is within our capabilities here to do a really adequate job.

. . . We find that the standardization of these instructions is one of the big things, too. We know that if they go away to school and if they train at a good school, they become highly qualified instructors.

. . . We fully realize that it takes a good deal of courage to go ahead and tell a man that we are going to send him away for a month or six weeks or two months. However, I think in the long run that we should look upon it as an investment. . . .

Commander NOVEMBER (Germany):

I do not favor a tank commander training program administered by the unit. I feel that is the responsibility of the supporting school, namely the Armor School. I have said that Vilseck is an activity created to fill a deficiency in our personnel procedures. I see no reason for Vilseck. . . . I think my belief that I should requisition directly from Fort Knox would improve our present position a hundred per cent. I think the trouble isn't with the training. The trouble is in being able to get people that have been trained—properly trained—to us rather than having them lost along the way. I know this situation existed in Korea. We had to establish a tank mechanics' course in Seoul to meet the requirements of the tank units in the Eighth Army. The Armor School maintained that they were training a sufficient number of mechanics and sending them to us. They never reached us. . . .

Commander BRAVO (Germany):

. . . While the facilities here are more than adequate for the training that we do, I would prefer to have a man come in from a school formally trained as a tank platoon leader, rather than to try to train him myself here, because the training here would be contingent upon the availability of time—the problem of interference breaking the training cycle [alerts, VIP's, formations]—all of which would have a tendency to break the continuity of training. . . .

Commander KILO (United States):

I think that each tank commander should be evaluated . . . at least by his company commander, and I think it would be better if all evaluations were done by two levels above. Tank platoon tests would be given at battalion level, and company level tests would be given by combat command. . . . A company commander should really realize what his tank commanders are capable of, not just what his platoon is capable of, and this could be determined by giving special emphasis to such things as firing, or estimation of terrain . . . [etc.] and this proficiency testing would . . . put the company commander in a position to evaluate his whole group. A lot of times you get too close a relationship in the platoon for the lieutenant to really tell if they are all proficient. I think they should handle this at company level.

. . . I would say that a tank commander should be well grounded in his knowledge and ability to go through any mechanical phases of the tank. He should be able to put the tank into power operation better than the other people in his tank. He should be able to operate the radio . . . replace tubes . . . [and] make a meter check. . . . He should be tested on his knowledge of the lubrication points on the tank. . . . [You may see a tank commander] stand out there and watch the driver go around the tank and lubricate it, and if the driver misses half a dozen lubrication points, the tank commander doesn't even know it. The same thing applies to all the parts on a tank.

Such basic things as the general tank crewman would need to know, the tank commander should be able to answer, and he should be even more proficient in them. . . . He should be evaluated on all aspects of the tank, and also on his ability to handle people. That's one of the biggest problems we have. . . . I think he should be tested on his capability to step up in his tank position—as section leader, or as platoon leader, for instance. He ought to know how to handle the tank. He should not only know the position of his tank in the line, he should know the platoon's position in the line formation. All of this is given to the armor crewman, but the tank commander needs to have a more thorough knowledge of it than some of the other people, and his test should be a little bit more a special type of test . . . because if he doesn't know it, then the other members of the crew are going to suffer. . . .

#### 4. Tank Crew Training Requirements

It has recently been proposed to increase the amount of crew training in the Basic Unit Phase, and to formally spell out this training. What do you think of this proposal?

Commander INDIA (Germany):

I would be in favor of this proposal. The kind of training, again, is the practical kind. I think it should be about 15 percent classroom and 85 percent practical. . . . It should be given out in the field, just as we have been doing it here . . . for example, maintenance instruction. We got all of the training aids together that we could. We got a lot of speaker systems and put all of the tanks around in a semicircle and the battalion motor officer, who was the instructor, went through, step by step, weekly servicing, for example, on a tank with the crew. We're supposed to be tactical every time we are out in the field, but we just line these tank crews up in a semicircle for control and efficiency in getting the instruction across. . . . We could do this in the motor pool, but we get a better sense of realism out in the field when we tell these people, 'You have to take this tank and prepare it to go on a five-mile road march.'

Commander ROMEO (United States):

This crew training would be all right provided you could get all four people at the same time and train those people to stay together. . . . If we could, for instance, take a trained crew out to a desert training area or combat training area such as Camp Irwin, and go through the Crew Proficiency Course . . . learning each other's jobs in this crew training phase, then you would have the ideal situation. But with the changes and the moves and the continual breaking up of crews. . . .

. . . The ideal crew training would be such as they have in SAC in the Air Force, where when a crew is grounded for lack of a man, that crew goes into a complete new phase and is retrained until the new man is brought up to the degree of proficiency of the rest of the crew.

Commander ALFA (United States):

. . . I think that this would be a very fine thing. . . . [It should be] primarily training that would result in the crew's training together and working together within the vehicle. . . . Within this unit, at the present time, the nonavailability of the personnel for training with the unit completely lacks the entity of any training at the crew, squad, section, or platoon level. We do not have the same people present day after day. Therefore, putting crew training in my present Basic Unit Training plan would merely be eyewash because I do not have that much steady, consistent availability in the crews to make it worth while. . . .

Commander KILO (United States):

I think that's a very fine proposal. . . . In effect, you have got concurrent training of the crews going on all the time in the Basic Unit Phase. . . . The training should be . . . a proficiency test type of thing. There are two or three different ways to do this. One way is to have a formal test, which is a headache. To organize it, and run it—well, it becomes so clumsy that pretty soon you find yourself spending all your effort running the test instead of teaching your people. But with the platoon in unit training, you could have just one station set up, and a key test—for example putting the turret into operation . . . and take the names of the ones that couldn't do it . . . and then give them a class in that. . . .

How do you go about assigning new tank crew replacements to duty? Are you completely satisfied with this procedure? What do you think is needed?

Commander FOXTROT (Germany):

In previous assignments, I have been in several units where the packet platoon—20 men arriving in a lump—was provided for the unit. I have never yet seen those 20 men stay together. The packet platoon or platoons never start arriving until the unit is so riddled by departures that to use them as a packet is not the best way to accomplish the mission of the unit. Further, in every packet there are persons with skills needed in other sections of the battalion which have also been riddled by departures, and to keep up the [unit's] efficiency . . . it is necessary to pluck those individuals with skills obtained in civilian life—typing, clerical-type work. If some arrangement could be made that packets start arriving in units a period of time earlier than has been the case in the past so that they could be utilized as a packet, I feel that the system—the idea behind it—is good. It just does not work out in the field when you don't start getting packets until you are at about 60 per cent strength.

Commander KILO (United States):

When we get tank crew replacements—well, . . . the last ones we got, we immediately assigned to the company, then we put them back into the battalion training program. But we didn't have too many of them, so we could do this. . . . Of course, if we get just one man, he just goes on down to the company; but a lot of times it pays to pull a man out of the company and be sure he has the general knowledge that he needs on basic combat training. . . .

Interviewer: Are you satisfied with this procedure?

Commander KILO: . . . It weakens on a crash basis. I think somebody should research it and establish criteria on what a man should know and then design tests . . . meant primarily to be used as a training vehicle.

. . . How people would do, eventually, would be tested, of course. Once you establish your requirements, and establish the test and procedure for testing the people, you would be a long way along toward proficient training. The problem always is limited experience, including my own, and the fact that you have not got the time to sit down and detailedly analyze and figure out, "What does this man need to know? What does Armor say he needs to know?" Then you'd have the cumulative thinking of our Armor people. . . .

What kinds of tests, critiques, or evaluation devices do you have for checking on the proficiency of the individual tank crewman?

Commander FOXTROT (Germany):

One of the best tests . . . is the Tank Crew Proficiency Course. [These] Courses at various . . . training areas vary in how good they are, and the one at Grafenwoehr is one of the best. [The] Proficiency Course is in itself about as good training as can be given a tank crew any time during its entire existence, whether it is a newly formed crew or a crew which has been operating together for some time. In addition to tank crew proficiency, a test or a problem in taking up firing positions, selecting the position with good field for firing and so on, making range cards, posting local security, etc., is added to the actual running of the Tank Crew Proficiency Course, which is geared [to] a combat situation—I am speaking of actual combat rather than preparation for combat. The things outlined [above] . . . just about embrace all the training that a tank crew needs to be combat ready.

Commander GOLF (Germany):

. . . We have a Tank Crew Proficiency Course at Grafenwoehr which is a very good course. . . . I don't think there's a better course anywhere for checking the effectiveness of a tank crew. Further we utilize platoon and company tests for each individual check down to the last requirement—for example, the requirements for a loader in the assembly area, in attack,



defense, or whatever the situation might be, and so forth for the rest of the crew members. They are constantly checked for proficiency.

Commander CHARLIE (Germany):

We have the regular gunner program that we go through, where we fire the various types of tests, we have the regular maintenance, and we have the platoon tests. We have many ways of evaluating the proficiency of the individual tank crewman. . . . The tank commander and the platoon sergeant . . . especially in a unit such as this that has been together for some time . . . can pretty well tell you about the individuals.

Interviewer: Do you feel that a standardized type of proficiency observation check list would be of value for determining the true proficiency of these individuals?

Commander CHARLIE: Yes, I definitely do. [The Courses at Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr] are very fine courses. My personal criticism, however, is that they put too much emphasis on . . . coming up with a score rather than letting the individuals get the maximum training benefit out of it. . . . I've seen many of them go hit that course for the first time—and I know that they're good people—but they blow up because they know the consequences and they know the pressure that is on the company commander and on the battalion commander. They try to come through, and it's pretty doggone difficult for them. . . . But I do think the course itself is a very fine thing. We are getting ready now to construct a dry-run TCPC here in our own training area, where the terrain of course doesn't approximate that of the big established courses, but it will serve essentially the same purpose.

**Do you have any formal facilities or techniques for measuring the progress of a new placement following his assignment to your unit?**

Commander KILO (United States):

Yes, we do have that, and we've got it pretty well worked out in detail on basic trainees—armor trainees. They have a progress card that is kept on all of them for mandatory training and things like that. . . . Mandatory training normally is . . . TIE, Character Guidance, PT, and various other general academic subjects that you run across. They are not slanted armor-wise. I think mandatory training for an armor soldier should be slanted armor-wise, and based on somebody coming up with, "What is mandatory for an armor soldier to know?" I don't think that's been adequately solved, or adequately kept. We teach what is required, but you're not really finding out where your armor soldier stands.

Interviewer: You think these mandatory requirements should be for tank crewmen, tank commanders, platoon sergeants, and so on?

Commander KILO: Yes, I do, and then [the man] should be periodically evaluated by proficiency testing. . . . You're getting into something that's real complicated business management, but . . . I think it's just as important to ask when was the last time an armor unit had a proficiency test as to ask when was the last time it had a tank check. I'm not sure but what it's more important. . . .

**How frequently do you break up crew and reshuffle them, other than when it is absolutely necessary due to personnel shortages?**

Commander GOLF (Germany):

I think it is very important that you do not break up crews and shuffle the personnel around. You lose a lot of the teamwork that is so essential. . . . If they work together they understand each other's capabilities, and this makes up for a deficiency that one or another of the crew members might have [individually]. Furthermore, it has a lot to do with esprit de corps. For example, in my unit I conduct a "Tank of the Week" program, which is a maintenance

program actually. I select the outstanding tank of the week, maintenance-wise, and all of the crews strive for recognition in that respect. . . .

**The issue of "unit" vs. "replacement center" training is an old, recurrent one. How do you stand on this issue in peacetime, during mobilization, and during war?**

**Commander MIKE (Germany):**

Well, that is very, very difficult for me to answer. I just don't like the individual replacement system. I think that the individual in a pipeline is just a completely lost man. Nobody wants him, nobody cares about him, and it's really a tough situation. He's pretty well demoralized by the time he gets to you—especially in a combat situation. . . . He is replacing somebody who is either dead or shot up, and this doesn't make him feel too happy. If they could be brought in as tank crews, with more confidence and properly motivated . . . they could tell themselves, "Well, we'll straighten up this situation." I definitely do prefer unit replacements, but I can see, on the other hand, where it is extremely difficult—extremely difficult.

**Commander FOXTROT (Germany):**

Except for the fact that we are presently in peacetime, the mission of my division and my battalion is the same as during mobilization and during war. . . . Men (when they are needed) from a replacement center . . . with the training they have had, plus the quick, rapid orientation by other members of the crew, should fit in so that the over-all effectiveness of the crew itself, and therefore the platoon and the company, is not affected. Unit training merely puts you in the category of a rookie outfit or a new outfit. You get so many new people that they cannot be assimilated and attain the same proficiency that they should have. Further, training unit replacements puts you in a training category or a recruiting status. You have the stigma of that connotation regardless of the proficiency that is available within the unit. . . . There's no use in my speaking of mobilization or war, because I feel the same way about that—only more so. . . .

The good soldier . . . will, I feel, be better off to come into the unit alone or with two or three with whom he has no intimate ties because the pattern of the service will be better. And why should he start out differently than he is going to end? Soldiering is a tough job. There's enough coddling without starting right off at the beginning by telling Johnny, "Now you are going to be with these buddies during the rest of your service." . . . I assume that there are those who feel it is true; they wouldn't say it otherwise. But in reality, it never comes off.

**Commander LIMA (United States):**

. . . I don't think there's the slightest bit of difference in any of these three phases. As far as I am concerned, our present replacement system is the world's worst, and the training we are giving in our replacement centers is almost worthless because of the way it is set up. If I had my way . . . prior to receiving the personnel we would receive key cadre to train these people, and by that I mean officers and NCO's. Now these officers and NCO's would be personnel from either a combat unit or (in peacetime) from an active Army unit, and the officers and key enlisted personnel would come back to a replacement training center and . . . train these people all the way through. . . .

You like to feel that you are taking these soldiers out—these civilians you've made soldiers—and they're going to be part of your unit, and you're going to take them wherever they go, whether it's combat or otherwise. And I feel this is the only way we can ever establish replacement center [systems] which will be valid in . . . peacetime, during mobilization, or during war—it should be the same system. . . . The British . . . have a unit overseas, they have a unit en route back from overseas with the personnel being kicked out of it that are going back to civilian life to form the new key cadre, and they have a unit in training, in the island preparing to go overseas.

Commander KILO (United States):

Well, [I recognize] that you can mass-produce replacements a lot faster at a replacement center than you can by the unit system, but I think that in some cases the academic instruction will be better [in the unit] because you have officers and noncommissioned officers that become so highly skilled in giving their specialty that they put it across and are superior instructors.

Commander ALFA (United States):

. . . I think that in peacetime the replacement center training can be extremely important, because at least it ensures that the graduates on arrival in their units are armed with a minimum standard . . . of knowledge. Now it is true that in the unit, the unit training of the people in the specific jobs they are going to hold can accomplish more if--and this is a big if--the commander is permitted to do it. At the moment, the reason that I like replacement center training is that, because of the TDY problem, the absence of personnel, and all the other many burdens with which I am saddled, I cannot do proper unit training here. I know at least that when the replacements come in from the replacement training center, they will be trained to a minimum standard before I get them. . . .

It has frequently been suggested that all tank crewmen should be trained as specialists at one crew position, and only familiarized with other crew jobs. What is your opinion of this?

Commander GOLF (Germany):

Specialization would speed up the training program considerably, and I believe that if it is imperative that we mobilize many armored divisions on very short notice, then I think that they should be trained by position. However, if we have got the time available, I think that we should cross-train them.

Commander ROMEO (United States):

I don't think they should be trained for just one job. They should be trained for every job in the tank, because the tank is a team. The crew is a team, and there's no way of getting around it. . . .

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## 5. The Training Programs for Armor

**Are you entirely satisfied with the present ATP 17-201 as formally stated or locally modified? Can you think of any way or ways in which this program can be improved?**

Commander MIKE (Germany):

... No, I personally, as far as the Basic Unit Training Phase is concerned, am not entirely satisfied with the present program—in two ways: (1) I think more time should be allowed for maintenance. I think that every crew member should not only have the knowledge, but he should have the ability, and he should be allowed to perform more functions than we are actually permitted to perform today. Tanks have grown a great deal more technical in the last few years, with very little if any increase in maintenance personnel within the company. It therefore behooves the crewmen themselves to be better trained. ... (2) We also need more actual tactics—small unit tactics. We spend a little bit too much time, particularly in armor, in running through such things as a squad attack course ... and a platoon in the defense—and this is all ground work; and then after a man hits an armor unit, he's given a pistol and he [ordinarily] doesn't even have access to a rifle. ... I think too that ... the commander (unit or battalion or company) needs a bit more leeway in being allowed more commander time, and that will give him additional opportunity to prescribe more field training down at the platoon level—and consequently more emphasis being placed on troop-leading procedures.

... I think that the content of the formal part of the 17-201 as laid down is not half as important as the local climate and facilities, and the continuity that is permitted the unit, in the use of its personnel and in following out the ATP. I think the ATP is very acceptable. My problem ... [lies] in what I am forced to do to the ATP by virtue of the shortage of personnel, equipment, and training areas.

**Do you feel that you, as a unit commander, should be given more freedom in the administration of Basic Unit Training?**

Commander FOXTROT (Germany):

I have a very strong feeling that unit commanders should be given more freedom in the administration of Basic Unit Training, and all other training, and in all other functions of a company. There is too big a tendency today in the Army for higher commanders to want to command the unit just below them, or even two units below them, instead of guiding and counseling them. I have known in recent years three very excellent prospects for Army officers who resigned for the very reason that they felt overcontrol was exerted. I quote one young man's remarks; this was an exceptional young officer. He said, "What future do I have in personal satisfaction? Sure, I'll get promoted, and my pay will steadily increase, but I am a platoon leader, and I cannot do anything without my company commander telling me what to do. ... He cannot do anything unless his superior tells him what to do. ... I even see my battalion commander canalized by what his next immediate superior tells him to do or tells him not to do. The battalion commander does not command his own battalion; my company commander does not command his own company; I do not command my own platoon. I am getting out." And he did.

**Do you give your junior commanders a fairly free hand in the conduct of their missions and their training?**

Commander FOXTROT (Germany):

I personally, as an executive officer, try to see to it that the staff and the battalion commander give the company commanders as free a hand as is within my capabilities to allow for. Never a day goes by but what some instance

of taking away command prerogative from a company commander is attempted, and very often actually accomplished. In conjunction with this, mandatory charts in our present situation (even at platoon level) on the performance of the platoon at company level, and the fact that Joe Blow has received three hours of instruction in Character Guidance, are stringently demanded—even as to form, and where they will be placed in various areas. This, to me, is a veiled statement to the effect, "Company Commander, we don't trust you; we don't think you know how to train a company; so we are just going to see that your company is trained by making you . . . maintain a chart." . . . The worst charts I have ever seen were the charts of the company that was best trained.

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## 6. Army Training Tests, Maneuvers, and Tactical Exercises

What is your frank opinion of the present Army Training Tests for Armor—e.g., ATT 17-1 and 17-2? Do you consider them adequate to meet your needs?

Commander HOTEL (Germany):

I feel that someone in the Armor School should write these. Right now, it is pretty well left to the individual units to apply the ATT or training tests . . . so there's a difference in standards. . . . I'd like to see a new standard test prepared. . . . You'd have to modify [it] every year, I guess. It could be along the general lines they have now, except you'd probably have to include more atomic play, and individual and unit measures for protection against atomic play [etc.].

. . . Retraining to correct deficiencies is difficult. . . . We took the company test on one day. We got on the flat cars the next and came back here from Grafenwoehr. Now how in the world can we retrain to correct the deficiencies that we discovered? In the first place, the best place to do it is right there where we made the mistake; and in the second place, we haven't the terrain here to correct them. We can talk about them, and we can teach classes about them, but we can't go out and correct them. The same thing applies to battalion tests.

. . . I feel the ATT should prescribe platoon tests, and it should be expanded for the whole Army instead of each unit writing its own. And—applied to our own particular case—we should be required to give a platoon test only in a major training area, where platoon leaders can function and where tanks can spread out as much as is needed.

Commander FOXTROT (Germany):

. . . I don't think the Army Training Tests are completely adequate, nor do I have any solution. . . . If new Army Training Programs were prepared . . . I would like to see a little gunnery test. . . . Possibly Table VI would be fired by each tank crew the day before the maneuvering portion of the test began, and likewise Table VI, or some other selected table, would be fired after the maneuvering was over—this, of course, to test how well the equipment was maintained during the test.

Commander ALFA (United States):

I think that the present overemphasis on the grades attained in the tests, as far as they are reflected on Efficiency Reports and OEI's (Overall Efficiency Indexes) of the persons concerned, have a very definite long-term disadvantage to the Army.

. . . A check list is a pretty good training instrument, provided it doesn't become too much of a crutch, and it at least assures that the leaders go through all of the things that are felt necessary by higher headquarters. . . . But the difficulty is that the test is used too much for the obtaining of a number, and too little for training. . . . Our previous regimental commander had, I believe, the proper slant on it when he said he looked on the training test as a graduation exercise, and a unit that did not go through it satisfactorily would then go in training some more and take it again . . . and he did not look with disfavor on a unit which for many reasons was unable to pass it the first time, because it was a method of training.

. . . The thing I object to is that the higher headquarters which has taken away my troops, and which will not send them back until the test is on and I as already been three days under way, is the same headquarters which just sent down a rather threatening warning to me the other day as to what would happen if all my unit did not obtain a Superior rating. Now in my opinion this is an asinine approach to the subject. . . . I can qualify them all Superior on paper—which they obviously will not be, because the people have not been present for the training—or I can be honest, and I've already been told what the fate is going to be if I am honest. This, then, presents me with a very difficult situation to solve. So I think the problem in the Army Training Tests is that they

are being used for the wrong thing. As a training vehicle, and as a testing vehicle of state of training, they are fine. But if the number obtained on them becomes the be-all and end-all assessment for the next ten years of that particular officer's ability at the troop-leading level, then I think we undo most of the good that the tests are designed to bring into a unit.

Commander SIERRA (Germany):

Well, I guess I'm a bit nasty, but I would like to see a unit tested on unfamiliar ground and with an unfamiliar test, because I believe that this is the way a combat situation is resolved; only with these two unknowns being present, can we give a valid training test. . . . Some of my people have umpired other training tests which have been conducted here in Seventh Army, and we found in one case, for example, that the unit umpired had rehearsed four times before taking [the test and] naturally they showed up very well. I don't consider that this is any valid test of a unit or anything else.

. . . I think that all ATT's should be conducted with these unknowns. I think that, except for these features, the ATT is a very fine test, and . . . a valid indication of the unit's ability to conduct actual operations in spite of the excessive number of safety precautions [which] would not be present in a combat situation.

Do you feel there are too many or not enough tactical exercises and maneuvers to adequately prepare your unit for future combat?

Commander FOXTROT (Germany):

I feel, for the first time, that the unit I am presently with has had the proper number of practical exercises and maneuvers--neither too much nor too little. I have been with units that I felt had too little. I have never been with a unit that I felt had too much. (My wife feels differently.)

Commander DELTA (United States):

There are no maneuvers scheduled to train this unit for future combat prior to the time it arrives in the European theater, and this is criminal negligence on somebody's part. This regiment and all of its component elements should be put in the field and kept in the field for at least a month or six weeks and maneuvered up and down until all kinks are gotten out of the system.

Commander ALFA (United States):

. . . Definitely, too few. . . . I am not permitted the people to go on a tactical exercise. Furthermore, the command-management aspect of this situation, the attempt to apply to tactical training, standards that measure quantity in a situation where quality [should be] most important, is one of the greatest ills that has crept into the Army. . . .

. . . Within this particular regiment, the impact on my training is that not one of my tracked vehicles can be moved to the new training area. This means that my crews must train on someone else's vehicles, and the vehicles on which they will go to combat will never have been used in this type of training. Now, there are two disadvantages. It is difficult to . . . build up the sense of . . . proprietorship which is so necessary if a driver is really to take an interest in the maintenance of his vehicle. The second is that the particular vehicles which we would have to do with (were we to go to combat) will never have been shaken down by field training, and may well be totally inadequate by virtue of deterioration which has set in while they were sitting in the motor pool here for the last four or five years.

. . . However, I am sure that this was hailed as a great comptroller decision, because it saved a certain number of thousands of dollars in the transportation of tracked equipment from the present post to the maneuver area--just as I have already been told that the reason we have been cut down on gasoline is because we can save a certain amount of pennies per mile in moving the unit . . . by transferring the training area to a much less satisfactory

one much nearer where we are. The dollars and cents we lose in the training of drivers who are going to handle these hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of equipment are never shown in this sort of measurement.

Commander SIERRA (Germany):

... Any administrative systems or requirements that interpose unreality in a maneuver or tactical exercise reduce its value. ... And I certainly would like to see many more tactical exercises, if there were enough areas, and if there were not so many safety and maneuver-damage type administrative requirements imposed on the unit.

**Do you have any techniques for quality-controlling the training proficiency of personnel in your unit?**

Commander DELTA (United States):

We have taken it unto ourselves to somewhat modify the Army format for standard lesson plans. It stands in need of modification Army wide. ... What we have done is add to the front of each lesson plan what might be termed a control sheet. This ... is given to the man (the officer or sergeant) who is going to present a given period of instruction. ... It spells out the number of people that he may [have] in his class ... the scope that it is desired that he cover ... who is available to serve as assistant instructor personnel ... what training aids are available. ...

... The [control] sheet ... includes a section for rehearsal and critique of this class that is scheduled, and concludes with a signature block for the company commander that indicates ... he is now ready to let this project roll.

... We receive a great many inspections from our local Post Headquarters, Regimental Headquarters, and ... I'm not too sure but whether these things are more harassment than anything else. ... By and large, our quality-control of training is accomplished through this check sheet that we use, and inspections, and certainly by my own inspections and being all over the place at all times.

**Do you think that the present Army Training Tests should merely train, should merely evaluate, or both?**

Commander HOTEL (Germany):

They should do both, especially here. We get those training areas little enough. We've got to learn something while we're there. Usually, it's been my experience—in every battalion test I've been through so far—that the battalion starts off poorly in the first day and a half, but they always end up [well] because they've learned as they go along; they get used to being in the field. A test is a training vehicle to me, as well as testing to see if the unit's any good or not, and sometimes it may not be valid for this—for testing, that is.

Commander NOVEMBER (Germany):

... You can't separate the two. However, I feel that the greatest value that you get out of them is the training. I don't think that the granting of a score such as 89.3 has too much meaning. Either you can or you can't perform your combat mission. ... What I would like to see is a board of senior officers observe an ATT and evaluate it. ... "This unit is capable of doing its job, is very capable, or is incapable." In other words, cut it into three categories, two above the satisfactory line, and one below.

Commander FOXTROT (Germany):

ATT's should be a combination of training and evaluating. They are vehicles of training, there is no doubt, but the training end of it, I feel, should be stressed more ... and evaluation underplayed. Our mission is combat readiness, and is not a competition of numbers between units. ... For a competition to be valid, the competitors should be graded by the same personnel because many of the points in the ATT are simply objective. The magnitude of testing battalions, and even companies, is of such proportions ... that the same umpires can [not] test all battalions or even a single division. ...



(U)

## 7. Mobilization Training

At the present time, many units are forced to train their personnel both for noncombat and combat duties. Do you feel this is wise? If not, which do you think should receive precedence?

Commander ALFA (United States):

At the moment, I am being forced to utilize large numbers of my personnel in noncombat type (just duty-soldier) duties that have no relationship to their combat MOS. I feel that the Army must decide which units it wishes to be combat ready. . . . The attempt to do both things at once [may have] resulted in our fooling ourselves. . . . It is quite obvious to the people on the unit level that the units (of this type that I am in) are . . . inadequately prepared to meet any combat responsibilities that might be forced upon them. . . .

Commander JULIETT (Germany):

Well, as I said before on this training business, we are cut up with these one-hour subjects requiring repetition week by week, month by month, and I am highly skeptical about their value to us. I think that the Character Guidance, TIE, and so on—things of that nature—should be done as we feel that they are needed. . . . If you actually took all the directives that are sent down, and went over them very carefully, as they pertain to the platoon and battalion, and read the fine print on how often they should be done, etc., we'd find the entire week would be taken up by these things and we'd have no time to do much else. . . .

Commander NOVEMBER (Germany):

We are not bothered too much by noncombat duties as far as training goes. What bothers me is the amount of personnel that I have to provide for post, camp, and station duties [and] the various athletic teams—football, soccer, boxing, and the like. . . . We have to support the activities which they require; and [the personnel] come from combat troops. Many of my officers have said that it would be desirable and we'd be better off, if we came to the theater without our dependents and stayed a shorter period of time. Then while we were here, we could spend 95 per cent of our time actually in the field or on duties related to our main mission, and not be losing personnel to the dependents' dispensary, the school guide, and many other things that have no relation to our TOE.

Commander FOXTROT (Germany):

Character Guidance, TIE, civilian schooling, etc., are subjects which the field leader in general feels detract from his ability to train his unit as quickly and as well as he would like. On the contrary, a subject along the same lines, the Company Commander's Tour is . . . universally accepted as a subject which should be included in all schedules at least weekly. Having to account for each and every man having been to Character Guidance and TIE, even to a greater extent than the requirement for them to be at a subject that more closely involves their combat readiness, is a fact that is resented by many commanders—the overemphasis and the oversupervision of these comparatively unimportant subjects, when speaking in terms of combat readiness.

What do you think would be Armor's biggest training problems if all-out mobilization were declared tomorrow?

Commander MIKE (Germany):

I think Armor's biggest training problem would be maintenance—very, very definitely—because maintenance is something that we gloss over. . . . in

World War II . . . the entire company—to include the officers—not on fatigues and went to the motor park and spent the morning there. . . . Our crewmen out here are darned good, and they've got a better tank, but I don't think they know as much about it as we did before. . . .

. . . Maintenance procedures are much too complicated. A man has to be a Philadelphia bookkeeper nowadays to get out and perform simple maintenance. The forms, and the maintenance records and such as that, are simply tremendous. . . . I can't see why it should be that difficult.

Commander FOXTROT (Germany):

. . . I feel it would be lack of equipment. . . . There is no training aid that is a substitute for the article itself. Recently we were exposed to this ridiculous concept of needing a trainer, and two tank trainers were more or less forced down our throats. These tank trainers were located within 100 yards of a tank park that had 72 tanks in it. This seems to me to be carrying mock-ups and training devices to the ridiculous. In answer, though, to this question—I feel a lack of equipment on which to train personnel would be the biggest problem, and I do not feel, from what I know of procurement, that it would be rectified at too quick a rate.

Commander DELTA (United States):

. . . Our biggest training problem would probably come about as a result of assignment to the Army of the lowest strata of enlisted personnel, the cream going off to the Air Force and the Navy.

. . . I think the next problem is the fact that both in the civil defense and in the battle training, we are totally unprepared in thinking to start operating on the nuclear battlefield. . . . Our equipment has disadvantages that have got to be overcome before we are ready. We don't have the radiological instruments, and we wouldn't know how to use them at the present time if we did have them. Above all, we have not learned how to process such information as they will give us. So I think that will prove to be a fantastically big training problem. As a result of all this, we are going to find the time lag, between mobilization and the time we can go overseas . . . used to give the Army a new family of equipment (if our arsenals are not bombed to oblivion); and we'll find then that we have all manner of new devices, just as we found when World War II started, that we have got to learn how to train on.

(U)

## 8. New Equipment, Materiel, and Tactics

Are you entirely satisfied with the present family of tanks we now have? If not, in what ways do you think they should be modified or improved?

Commander NOVEMBER (Germany):

... I doubt that we could support the things in combat because of the fuel requirements. ... As far as the range finder goes ... we don't have time to train with it. I don't know what value it would be after we had trained with it. ... I think we need a tank that we can communicate from, that will take us cross-country, and that will snoot—and strip out all the gadgets and added attractions that we have today.

Commander CHARLIE (Germany):

... I think it's a darn good tank. [I do] seriously object to this range finder. ... The tank [is a little] too cluttered inside, and it's due to such things as the range finder.

Commander ALFA (United States):

I am most unhappy with the present family of tanks. I think they are away too heavy, they take far too much fuel, and they are away too complicated. Furthermore, they have not been human-engineered to the bodies that have to stay inside them. ... They need to be simplified. We have gone overboard on gadgets. We have tried to create a vehicle that can do everything that ever may be demanded of it ... and I think therefore we have placed an almost impossible training problem on the units.

... I think there is great danger in giving a commander too many things to do with equipment on a battlefield. He really should be almost unequipped with things to fire, if he is going to adequately run his unit. Rommel ... used to ride along the battlefield in a very peculiar type of command vehicle that definitely kept him out of the problem of firing individual weapons and running individual tanks. One great evil has crept into the Army from the latter days in Korea, when only platoon and company actions were possible [and] officers up through the rank of Army commander ... were down actually running operations at this level. We continue this type of trend by forcing the unit commander into individual action, when he actually should be concerned with unit action. ...

... Now, with respect to the range finder, and the other things we have in the tank, I think the range finder is a magnificent piece of equipment. The question is whether it is worth the time, the trouble, and the training desired or whether—particularly in view of mobilization training—we are going to be able to afford this type of luxury on a vehicle.

... Definitely, something must be done about fuel consumption. [The tank] is far, far too heavy. ... The shape of the front of the hull on the M48 is something that the Russians had on the JS3 Shuska type way back in 1945, and it takes us almost ten years ... to catch up with them. Something must be done to lessen the lag in the development of our equipment. ... We are trying to make it ... do far, far too much. The result is that we are making it far too expensive, far too difficult to operate, far too difficult to maintain, and we are also imposing impossible demands upon the logistical system in the supply of fuel for the vehicles.

Commander DELTA (United States):

No, I'm not satisfied. ... The equipment does not have the mechanical reliability that we ask of it. Part of this is ... the fault of our operator personnel, who have not been given the kind of training that permits them to use this equipment [with] adequate freedom from breakdown.

Commander LIMA (United States):

I am definitely not satisfied with ... either the M48A1 or the M48A2, and I think ... they should be simplified, first and foremost. I think they

should take away the range finder; they should take away the present caliber .50 mount, and put the .50 out where it belongs, and make [the tank] about one fifth as heavy as it now is, and power it so it will run with the one-fifth weight it has, and give it a better gun. I don't think there's any comparison with the new JS3 the Russians have. We are outgunned, we are outrun, and we are out-armored. . . . We're in poor shape, and it's high time we did something about it and got . . . Ordnance to . . . something about developing the tank.

**Do you think the present tanks are over- or under-emphasizing the various technical and mechanical aids?**

**Commander GOLF (Germany):**

I sometimes wonder if—in case of sudden war—our country, with the mechanical features we have on our tanks, would have the time to train a tank crewman sufficiently so that he could fight out of an M48 tank. Maybe it would be better to design a very high velocity projectile, rip out all our fine fire control equipment, put in a plain sight, and replace tubes more frequently.

**Commander FOXTROT (Germany):**

. . . What good is it to have a very fine piece of machinery, if the capability of using it is not there? . . . The whole thing is getting too complicated. . . . Each one of these various things [the men] can do well—singly. They can operate the range finder; they can fire the .90; they can operate the cupola; they can operate the main turret; they can operate the radios; but they cannot do all four or five or six of these things at one time.

**Commander HOTEL (Germany):**

Definitely, the tanks are too complicated. . . . In the field and in combat, I would use the range finder in defensive situations to range out the defensive fires, and that's how it's used now in our unit. I know, from reading the manual, that you can't fire accurately with the range finder. Even so, the Seventh Army still teaches it . . . and Heaven knows that if you have to go into combat you're not going to have time to train people to use it. . . . The Germans have got a portable range finder in each tank platoon, and they can set it up on a tripod for the unit to range with, and this would be adequate for what we use the range finder for.

**Commander DELTA (United States):**

. . . For the most part, this complexity is in our equipment because the users—us—have asked that this equipment perform certain functions in certain ways. This puts the developing agency in the position of having to provide for the performance of that function. . . . I do think that we need in our Army at least one tank that is strictly stripped down to a simple model, almost [a] self-propelled gun. . . . I think, however, that the requirement for adequate logistical vehicles, improved logistical vehicles, is even greater at the present time than the requirement for improved combat vehicles. They lack the mobility; they lack the dependability, durability, and fireability; and the logistical tools we now have are extravagantly wasteful of both manpower and fuel. . . .

**Do you feel that our present armor tactical concepts are adequate to meet the present strength of the aggressor?**

**Commander JULIETT (Germany):**

I think that our present tank and platoon tests are good. . . . A good deal has been said about the overwhelming superiority of the USSR in materiel and manpower; I can't help feeling, though, that the USSR is confronted with many of the same production and training problems that we have. . . . We have the defensive ability—which is good. However, the trained individuals or

the trained units in the face of odds can certainly give a good account of themselves offensively, too. I think that the platoon that is tops on the delay and fallback is all right; it certainly does ensure their ability to maneuver when attacked, and perhaps come back and fight another day. Nevertheless, [we must] understand that we will have to seize the opportunities to attack as they appear. . . .

Commander ALFA (United States):

I think that definitely our present armor tactical concepts are inadequate to meet the present strength of the aggressor. . . . I don't think yet there is an understanding of the aggressor's armor tactics, or what the aggressor plans to do with this armor, or what our people are going to do when confronted with large, large numbers of aggressor armor on the battlefield. Some of the German experiences are worth reading on this account. . .

Commander DELTA (United States):

. . . We teach them we won't fight superior odds head on, that we'll first lure them into killing areas. . . . The enemy may blunder into these killing areas accidentally, but our ability . . . to seduce him into them is certainly a questionable capability on our part. I feel that in this era of nuclear weapons that will be used in ground support [we] must have the speed and the flexibility of shifting [our] fires so as to be able to hit the enemy where you find him. . . .

. . . I think that Armor is playing a game very much like the ostrich. It's extolling the fact that the thickness of its steel skin makes it uniquely qualified for operations in a radiological situation. . . . There is no armor formation (to my knowledge) that can operate effectively, certainly not for any length of time, without also relying upon wheeled vehicles (every one of which now in the system is a thin-skinned vehicle).

. . . We have not set up an adequate system for alternate command posts. This must be done. We have not trained or set up adequate systems for the processing of CBR information. I think that Armor is being populated, officer-wise, more and more by recent joiners from Infantry. I find that they are changing the magnificent armor doctrine or armor thinking that we developed during World War II of a headquarters-in-the-saddle type of operation. . . . We are slowing it down to a snail's pace. . . . We've got to get this spirit of mobility, fast action, speed back in the minds of our commanders, and get out there and learn how to whip this type unit around a battlefield.

**Are you giving, or have you given, any specific field training on how to meet and cope with a possible aggressor attack? Do you feel your intelligence information about the aggressor is sufficient to meet your needs?**

Commander GOLF (Germany):

We are giving specific training on how to meet and cope with possible aggressor attacks. I do feel, however, that there's one area we should have more information on, and that's the intelligence end of it: present aggressor's strength, his equipment, his disposition and tactics. . . .

Interviewer: Do you feel that the members of your organization are competent to recognize at a glance the various types of aggressor armor?

Commander GOLF: Yes, I feel that they are. We have done that through models, through posters, and training films. I feel that they would have no difficulty in recognizing enemy armor.

Interviewer: Do you feel that you have sufficient knowledge of the organization and method of employment of any future aggressor?

Commander GOLF: I feel that I personally am quite well informed as to the aggressor's organization and his tactics. However . . . I feel that [such information] should flow down to us, with everybody making a special point of trying to stay abreast of it. . . . Some individual might not think of it, and consequently his unit could be hurt, just because he was not aware of the current aggressor doctrine, equipment, and tactics.

Commander JULIETT (Germany):

Yes, I believe we have. We have emphasized here . . . such things as camouflage, to ensure that we are not discovered before we have to move, that we operate with the idea of delivering a counterattack or attack, and to move in an aggressive manner. . . . We do a considerable amount of training on the employment of ambush. . . .

Interviewer: Do you give any training on how to beat off superior numbers?

Commander JULIETT: Yes, we definitely do. This is a primary training factor which has been brought up by the Assistant Division Commander, specifically . . . that the . . . of, perhaps, being able to inflict maximum loss in the well-executed delaying type operation might well be the initial phase of wartime engagement.

Interviewer: Do you include any training involving the use of atomic weapons?

Commander JULIETT: Yes, we do. We have the units of the Pentomic Division in any atomic play, and this has figured very heavily in our tactical training. . . . We are very definitely well indoctrinated on that.

**What do you feel is your unit's primary weakness in the area of tactics?**

Commander GOLF (Germany):

Our biggest weakness in tactics would perhaps be in night operations. . . . We do operate effectively at night . . . but the men, I feel, don't have the confidence they should have in their ability to fight at night. And the only way you can acquire that, of course, is to train and train and train at night until you are certain you can fight as efficiently at night as you can during the daylight hours. They should all realize that the darkness is their friend, and not their foe, and be confident of that.

**Are there any particular or peculiar problems relating to communications or command and control which you feel call for command action or research, or both?**

Commander DELTA (United States):

. . . We have these [problems] in large measure. At the present time, the conventional way of setting up an armor battalion headquarters in the field—when the armor battalion has . . . the M59 personnel carrier—is to back at least two M59's back to back, separate them by whatever distance might be required, connect them with cables or rope, and string a tarp over the top. Then we move all the guts out of the command post out into this unarmored, canvas-covered area in between, and attempt our operations from it.

. . . We have got to have a command vehicle where all command functions that pertain to the internal functioning within the CP are carried out entirely within this vehicle. This vehicle has got to have built-ins; it's got to have places to put things; it's got to have adequate communication. . . . We'll be still further handicapped when we get the new light carriers. . . . It should not be necessary upon moving into an area that anything be dismounted from the vehicle and put outside. Command operations should take place from within that vehicle; in the event shellfire falls in this area, the only thing you have to do is drive away. . . . This vehicle [should] be tracked for the sake of mobility [and] also amphibious, to the extent that it would be able to cross interior water obstacles.

. . . I feel that if we can perfect this CP—and its tactical operations in the field—it's almost the equivalent of providing another company or two to the battalion. The same thing needs to be done at the regiment, because if confusion reigns there, certainly the accomplishments of the tactical elements cannot be high. I think that . . . the inability of the Germans during World War II to move their command posts and keep cognizant of the situation, is one of the . . . means by which we were able to wipe them out as enemies.

... The same thing is going to happen to us upon the nuclear battlefield, unless we knuckle down and do something about it.

Commander ALFA (United States):

... Every unit with which I am acquainted is inadequately prepared to meet the problem of aggressor jamming. Aggressor has a great deal of experience in the jamming of communication; and I think we are being trained to a tremendous overreliance on our signal communications, which are greatly susceptible to jamming. . . .

... [Also the] over-supervision that crept upon us is also present in this, because the army of the future is going to call for an officer who is capable of . . . commanding communications which are very amenable to over-supervision and detailed directions from several echelons above him . . . who must be psychologically able to live in this atmosphere [and yet] is supposed, on the atomic battlefield—when suddenly all communications are knocked out—to have wild initiative. . . . If he's the kind of officer who has the kind of initiative that we want on the atomic battlefield, he is going to chafe under the restrictions of over-supervision that are made possible by our present communications. . . . And likewise, the officer who can live under the over-supervision . . . is a man who is going to be frozen into immobility when the communications fail. . . .

Is there anything in the way of training literature, training aids or devices, which you feel is greatly needed by the field units?

Commander DELTA (United States):

Training literature, I think, is very, very good at the present time. . . . The main thing we need to do is show our people how to use the indexes. . . . I find that almost all of the officers and noncommissioned officers that come to my organization don't know how to enter the Army family of literature; they don't know what the index is. I strongly suspect that it should cease to be a DA Pamphlet and should be called "Index to Army Literature."

So far as training aids and devices are concerned, I feel that we are missing the boat. I think that we should have certain training aids that are fun to use . . . I think it is within our capabilities, and reasonably economically so, to provide some sort of tank turret trainer in armor company day rooms. A man needs to learn this tank turret manipulation even as a man needs to learn to play the violin. It takes hundreds and hundreds of hours of practice to really get it down to a fine point. I think we'd be amazed at the amount of free training time we could pick up if we would provide devices of this type—almost penny arcade machines, if you will—in our day rooms.

What is your biggest operational difficulty in successfully completing a tactical exercise or any type of tactical training?

Commander CHARLIE (Germany):

... Maintenance—not so much at the present time; we are so far from a training area, and the battalion commander has so many prerogatives that he is not permitted to exercise . . . that we can therefore allow sufficient time for maintenance over here. . . .

... Tank Gunnery—our problem [is that] we cannot execute or conduct any tank gunnery in this location. We must go to a major training area. This .50-caliber stuff has helped an awful lot, but it's not the real McCoy. We have to go out and fire these big guns occasionally. I don't know when we will be able to fire them again. . . .

... Range space—once again we need room. I don't see how we're ever going to do it over here. . . . As a matter of fact, I look for the day when we will have considerably less than we have at the present time. . . . It would be awfully nice if somebody would develop some sort of a device that would

approximate 90-mm gunnery . . . something along the artillery puffboard type operations of our old burst-on-target situation that we had back in the States.

. . . Tactical training areas—there's the same situation there. We are probably far more fortunate than some units in that we can at least get out and exercise one and possibly two companies, but that is about as far as we can go with what we have.

. . . Personnel—for Heaven's sake, will somebody, some place, begin to realize that we cannot have people in a combat organization who cannot get out in the field with that organization and operate with the organization!

**With regard to either training or actual field operations, do you have any difficulties or problems in any area not previously mentioned?**

**Commander DELTA (United States):**

I would like to mention the field of maintenance, which I think the Army is deaf-mute on. We are attempting to solve our maintenance problems by establishing a special course in preventive maintenance, to which we will send senior armor officers, that is, lieutenant colonels and colonels. The goal is apparently to impress such personnel with the importance of maintenance. There are few of us, who have had occasion to operate a unit in the field, who have not immediately become impressed with the importance of maintenance as we have seen more and more of our command falling by the wayside. . . . What we need to do is teach junior officers how to do maintenance. It is my personal recommendation that every second lieutenant who is to be assigned to Armor for two years or more go to a school, the Armor School, for a course of instruction in vehicular and automotive weapons maintenance that would last not less than 100 days. . . . I can see very little use in my tank platoon leaders' receiving such splendid training on how to jump out of an airplane, or how to be rangers, when they don't know whether you pour water, oil, or gasoline in a particular rheostat on a tank.

**Commander GOLF (Germany):**

. . . I feel that a unit with a combat mission such as ours should be kept at 100 per cent strength at all times. . . . This unit has a great many personnel commitments, and thus we are below TOE strength. We are not able to fully man our tanks. If it is necessary . . . to reduce the units stateside in strength I think they should be reduced to fill the units that are serving here with the NATO forces.

. . . I would like to make one last comment in regard to training back in the States . . . packet training for our division at present. It's been a practice . . . that the training units have a very small cadre that trains the packets. They have no maintenance personnel. The maintenance on the tanks is performed by the new personnel being trained. Just to give you an example, I took over a tank unit at Fort Hood. It had seven operational tanks. It wasn't possible for the few sergeants in the company—they were not mechanics—to maintain these tanks. I feel that each training company should have a full TOE complement of trained mechanics constantly with the company to maintain these tanks properly [for training of the replacement packets].

. . . I would like to see the company commander get the authority to promote and demote a man. If he has that authority, a man in the company knows that if he is doing a job, and there is a vacancy in the company . . . he is going to make it. Instead, in the present system, he can work and fight for a future promotion, and some man that is not even in the TOE slot and not in the unit gets the promotion. Stress on the promotion should be placed in the combat line element. That is the area where it is the hardest to keep men, because it is the most difficult. . . . There are a lot of men willing to sit in headquarters, because it is . . . pleasant, and [they] would do so for less pay. But the line element, which is the backbone of the Army (and the reason we have all the headquarters we do have is to support and control these front line fighting elements) . . . should be the first ones rewarded for their efforts.



Commander ALFA (United States):

Frankly, were I given the personnel--were I given adequate logistical support, particularly in ordnance parts, so that the vehicles did not have to go on deadline for 45 days every time one part was needed--and if I were given adequate training areas (of which at the moment I see no indication)--then I think I could train my unit to a satisfactory state. I am very impressed, particularly with the senior noncommissioned officers I have taken over, and I would have no doubt that I could take this unit into combat, if those three areas were straightened out. . . .

Commander NOVEMBER (Germany):

I don't think that our training and personnel procedures are geared to what we are actually working with. . . . We shuffle personnel around as if they had nothing more than a rifle to take care of and learn how to handle in combat. I think we need to take a new look at what we have got to do and how we are doing it. . . . I get personnel assigned to me who have spent six or seven years in the MP's and they say they must be retrained as tankers. In some instances this is possible, in others it isn't. I don't think that the tactical unit should have this problem. . . .

Commander TANGO (Germany):

I have one other item about which I feel very strongly. We have done much work in the Army, and [volumes] have been written about treating the individual as a human being, and yet within the Army--and within your own unit if you don't watch it every minute of the day--you will find human beings treated as a bag of beans. Personnel today are still being sent off overseas, or to other assignments within the States, on very short notice. In a unit, if you follow good personnel procedure, you see a departing member of, honor him if appropriate, and in any event you shake his hand and thank him for a job well done. However, when he leaves . . . he then is processed back to some nebulous separation point. I have had many comments from people who've gone through this process. None of them have been complimentary. The greatest days in a man's Army career are those days when he is with a unit, and you can ask any veteran anywhere, and he will verify this statement. Therefore, it seems to me that we must come to some sort of system within the Army whereby a man, when first inducted, is identified with the unit, and throughout his career, remains identified with the unit. We have too many "odd-bobs" floating through this man's Army in jobs which are not supervised. administrative-type jobs--which are necessary, I realize--but yet it seems that once a person is assigned to these jobs . . . he forgets the basic fact that he is a soldier. And only by stressing this basic fact will we build up the stamina [and] the frame of mind necessary to fight and beat our probable enemy.

## Appendix C (U)

### ADDITIONAL DATA FROM THE INTERVIEWS

Table C-1

*Do you ever give the tank commander a chance to act as platoon sergeant or the platoon sergeant as platoon leader for purposes of training?*

	Combat Ready (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	23	13	36	90.0
No	0	4	4	10.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

*Do you think this is a good training idea?*

	Combat Ready (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	23	16	39	97.5
No	0	1	1	2.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

Table C-2

*Do you have any formal facilities or techniques for measuring the progress of a new replacement following his assignment to your unit?*

	Combat Ready (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	0	1	1	2.5
No	23	16	39	97.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

Table C-3

*Do you feel that the average crewmen in your unit can take over other crewmen's jobs and perform satisfactorily—i.e., are they 'interchangeable'?*

	Combat Ready (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	5	3	8	20.0
Most crewmen can do this	1	0	1	2.5
Some crewmen can do this	11	12	23	57.5
No	6	2	8	20.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

*It has frequently been suggested that all tank crewmen should be trained as specialists at one crew position, and only familiarized with other crew jobs. Do you think this should be done?*

	Combat Ready (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	0	0	0	0
Yes, but . . .	1	2	3	7.5
No	22	15	37	92.5
Total	23	17	40	100.0

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Table C-4

*Do you give your junior commanders a fairly free hand in the conduct of their missions and their training?*

	Combat Ready (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	20	16	36	90.0
No	3	1	4	10.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

Table C-5

*Do you think the present tanks are over- or underemphasizing the various technical and mechanical aids?*

	Combat Ready (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Overemphasizing	22	16	38	95.0
Underemphasizing	0	0	0	0.0
Just right	1	1	2	5.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

Table C-6

*Have you received any special instructions and have you developed any procedures for integrating new and special weapons into your organization?*

	Combat Ready (N = 23)	CONUS (N = 17)	Total	Percentage of All Units
Yes	0	2	2	5.0
No	23	15	38	95.0
Total	23	17	40	100.0

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Modified Handling Authorized

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS (C)**

The author is indebted to all Armor personnel who assisted in collecting the data. Special acknowledgment is given to the commanders and staff members of the 38 Armor units that participated in the survey.

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1 DIR WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVAL GP  
1 CINC US ARMY PACIFIC APO 998 SAN FRAN  
1 ATTN G3 GAT DIV  
2 CG SOUTH EUROPEAN TASK FORCE APO 188 NY  
2 CG US ARMY JAPAN APO 343  
1 CG US ARMY ATTN G3  
1 CG US ARMY ALASKA APO 949 SEATTLE  
2 ATTN COMBAT DEVEL  
2 CG US ARMY EUROPE APO 403 NY  
1 ATTN OPNS DIV  
2 CG SECOND ARMY FT GEO G MEADE ATTN G3  
1 CG THIRD ARMY FT MONTERSON  
1 CG FOURTH ARMY FT JAM HOUSTON ATTN G3  
1 CG FIFTH ARMY CHICAGO ATTN G3  
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2 CG EIGHTH ARMY APO 301 SAN FRAN ATTN G3  
1 DIR HUMAN ENGIN LABS  
1 ABERDEEN PROV GND MD  
1 CG ORD TNG COMD ABERDEEN PROV GND MD  
1 ATTN CURRICULUM BR  
2 PSYCHOL BR ENVIRONMENTAL RES DIV  
1 USA GM RES & ENGIN CTR NATICK MASS  
1 PRES USA GHEM CORPS SD USA GHEM CTR MD  
2 CG FT ORD  
1 DIR WALTER REED ARMY INST RES  
1 WALTER REED ARMY MED CTR  
1 CG HQ USA ENLISTED EVAL CTR  
1 FT BENJ HARRISON  
2 LIS USA WAR COLL CARLISLE BKS PA  
2 DIR MIL PSYCHOL & LABSMP US MIL ACAD  
1 USA ARMOR SCH FT KNOX ATTN DIR INSTRJC  
1 COMBAT USA ARMOR SCH FT KNOX  
1 ATTN WEAPONS DEPT  
2 COMBAT USA ARMOR SCH FT KNOX  
1 ATTN COMBAT DEVEL GP  
1 CG GHEM CORPS TNG COMD FT MCLELLAN  
1 CG USA TRANS TNG COMD FT EUSTIS  
1 ATTN COMBAT JBATECH  
1 COMBAT USA ORD GUIDED MISSILE SCH  
1 REDSTONE ARSENAL ATTN ORDSB GMS RB  
2 COMBAT USA AIR DEFENSE SCH FT BLISS  
2 COMBAT USA ARMY & MISSILE SCH FT BELL  
1 ARMED FORCES STAFF COLL  
1 NAV OPERATING BASE NORFOLK ATTN LIS  
2 COMBAT USA ENGIN SCH FT BELVOIR  
2 SOS MIL GMS SA ATTN CHF TNG DIV  
1 CHF TRANS SA ATTN RLS DIV  
1 US ARMY COMBAT SURVEILLANCE AGY  
1 OFC CHF SIG OFF  
1 ACS RESERVE COMPONENTS SA  
1 GBR ARMED SERV TECH INFO AGY  
1 ARLINGTON VA ATTN TIPC  
1 CG US ARMY COMBAT SURVEILLANCE AGY  
1 CLARENDON VA  
1 CHF RES & DEVEL SA ATTN TECH LIAISON OFC  
1 PERB & TNG DIV URDNC OFC CHF ORD SA  
2 PRES US ARMY ARMOR SD FT KNOX  
2 PRES US ARMY INF SD FT BENNING  
1 PRES US ARMY MAINT SD FT KNOX  
1 PRES US ARMY ORD SD ABERDEEN PROV GND MD  
1 PRES US ARMY SIG CORPS SD FT MONMOUTH  
1 PRES US ARMY TRANS SD FT EUSTIS  
1 ATTN TECH DIR  
1 CG CGA 1ST ARMORED DIV FT HOOD  
2 CG 4TH ARMORED DIV APO 326 NY  
1 CG 4TH ARMOR GP APO 757 NY  
1 CG US ARMY ARMOR & ARTY FIRING CTR  
1 FT STEWART ATTN AG OF S G3 TNG OFF  
1 1ST ARMORED DIV HQ & HQ CO FT HOOD  
1 1ST CAV DIV 3D MED TK BN  
1 46TH ARMOR APO 24 SAN FRAN  
1 1ST INF DIV 1ST MED TK BN  
1 69TH ARMOR FT RILEY  
1 3D INF DIV 1ST MED TK BN  
1 69TH ARMOR APO 24 NY  
1 4TH INF DIV 1ST MED TK BN  
1 34TH ARMOR FT LEWIS  
1 7TH INF DIV 2D MED TK BN  
1 46TH ARMOR APO 7 SAN FRAN  
1 6TH INF DIV 2D MED TK BN  
1 66TH ARMOR APO 34 NY  
1 CG 3D MED TK BN  
1 33D ARMOR US ARMY ARMOR CTR FT KNOX  
1 CALIF NATL GRS 46TH ARMORED DIV  
1 AG OF S G3 LOS ANGELES  
2 CG US ARMY ARMOR CTR FT KNOX  
1 ATTN G3 ASST  
2 CG 1ST INF DIV FT RILEY ATTN G3  
1 CG 2D INF DIV FT BENNING ATTN G3  
1 CG 4TH INF DIV FT LEWIS ATTN G3  
1 CG 6TH INF DIV APO 111 NY ATTN G3  
1 CG FT CARSON ATTN G3  
1 CG HQ US ARMY HAWAII APO 987 SAN FRAN  
1 ATTN G3  
2 CG 32D ASN INF DIV FT BRAGG ATTN G3  
1 CG 1ST INF BRIG FT BENNING ATTN G3  
1 CG 1ST BATTLE GP 3D MED FT MYER  
1 CG 1ST ARMORED RIFL BN 46TH INF REG  
1 APO 30 NY  
1 ASSOC DIR ARMY ARMY PARTICIP GP  
1 US NAV TNG DEPT CTR FT WASHINGTON LI  
1 CG US ARMY LIAISON GP  
1 PROJ MICH WILLOW RUN ASS MICH  
1 DIR ARMY LIS  
1 CHF MIL HIST SA ATTN GEN R.F BN  
1 CG & DIR USN TNG DEV CT  
1 FT WASHINGTON LI ATTN LISN  
1 CHF NAV PERS BN ATTN DIR PSYCHOL SCI DIV  
1 CODE 450  
1 CG PAC MISSILE RANGE US NAV MISSILE CTR  
1 FT MUGU CALIF ATTN TECH LIS CODE 310  
1 COMBAT MARINE CORPS CODE DC  
1 HQ US MARINE CORPS  
1 COMBAT MARINE CORPS  
1 HQ US MARINE CORPS ATTN AD 4E  
1 CHF HUMAN FACTORS DIV DIRCTE NLS &  
1 TECHNOL DCS DEVEL HQ US AIR FORCE  
1 GBR AIR RES COMB WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB  
1 ATTN CHF OPER TNG SECT TNG PSYCHOL UR  
1 DIR AIR U LIS MAXWELL AFB  
2 CENTRAL INTEL AGY ATTN OGR MAIL RM  
1 DIR RES ANAL CORP THE JOHNS HOPKINS  
1 U BETHESSA ATTN DCS  
1 THE MITRE CORP SEAFORD MASS ATTN LIS  
2 BRITISH DEFENCE RES STAFF  
2 CANADIAN ARMY STAFF W

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